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I. INTRODUCTION 
Two thrill ride accidents in July 2013—one involving a woman who 
fell seventy-five feet to her death from a roller coaster,1 and another 
involving a log flume that overturned and trapped seven patrons 
underwater2—placed national attention on the safety of amusement park 
rides.3  Following the accidents, social media erupted with calls for 
increased ride safety.4  At the same time, a Kansas waterpark was 
completing construction on the world’s “tallest, fastest and ‘most 
extreme’ water slide ever built”5—the Verrückt, which is “German for 
insane.”6  A target for “adrenaline junkies who are always looking for the 
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 1.  See, e.g., Ryan Owens, Family Sues Six Flags After Woman’s Fall from 14-Story High 
Roller Coaster, ABC NEWS (Sept. 12, 2013), http://abcnews.go.com/US/family-sues-flags-womans-
fall-14-story-high/story?id=20231931 (discussing the July roller coaster death and alleged safety 
issues). 
 2.  See, e.g., Tina Burgess, Water Ride Accident at Cedar Point, Six Flags Death: Too Many 
People?, EXAMINER.COM (July 22, 2013, 1:04 AM), http://www.examiner.com/article/water-ride-
accident-at-cedar-point-six-flags-death-too-many-people-video (explaining that patrons were 
submerged in water after the boat overturned); Cedar Point Accident: Log Flume Ride Malfunctions, 
Injures 7, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (July 21, 2013), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Latest-News-
Wires/2013/0721/Cedar-Point-accident-Log-flume-ride-malfunctions-injures-7 (noting passengers 
were “belted into the boat” and unable to escape). 
 3.  See, e.g., Laura Petrecca & Rebecca Castagna, Seeking the Thrill of Your Life—Just not 
your Last; Two Weekend Accidents have Theme Park Fans Asking: Are Rides Safe?, USA TODAY 
(McLean, Va.), July 23, 2013, at 3A (discussing cascade of media coverage for both ride accidents). 
 4.  See, e.g., id. (providing Facebook and Twitter messages expressing flood of concerns over 
ride safety). 
 5.  Top 10 Reasons to Visit Kansas City in 2014, VISIT KC (Jan. 13, 2014), http://www.visit 
kc.com/press-release/top-10-reasons-visit-kansas-city-2014.  
 6.  Tony Rizzo & Adam Darby, Verrückt, the World’s Tallest and Fastest Water Slide, is 
Taking Shape at Schlitterbahn (poll), KAN. CITY STAR (Nov. 19, 2013), http://www.kansascity.com/ 
2013/11/19/4633721/take-a-peek-at-verruckt-the-worlds.html. 
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next biggest, coolest thrill,”7 the Verrückt plunges patrons down a 
seventeen-story platform at speeds exceeding sixty-five miles per hour.8  
With waterparks recording over 130 million visits annually,9 and 
constantly creating bigger and faster rides,10 the recent surge of national 
concern over ride safety is understandable.11 
But ride safety not only concerns the public.  Courts now struggle to 
determine whether new rides promising heightened thrills require 
heightened liability.12  The law regarding the appropriate liability 
standard for water ride operation is especially fractured and unclear.13  
As water rides grew in complexity, variety, and intensity, courts 
contorted tort liability by inconsistently applying a heightened standard 
of care to ride operators.14  These multiplying inconsistencies eventually 
                                                          
 7.  Id. 
 8.  See id. (providing various ride design specifications and measurements); Steve Larese, 
Verruckt: Designer of Tallest Slide Takes the Plunge, USA TODAY (July 7, 2014, 9:17 AM), 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/travel/destinations/2014/06/26/verruckt-worlds-tallest-water-slide-
exclusive-ride-video/11421473/ (noting that the Verrückt “is taller than both Niagara Falls and the 
Statue of Liberty . . . [and] promises to be a daredevil blockbuster.”); Edward M. Eveld, First Riders 
on Verrückt at Schlitterbahn Love the ‘Rush’ (with video), KAN. CITY STAR (July 14, 2014), 
http://www.kansascity.com/entertainment/article697346.html (noting that the slide’s first riders 
sought—and loved—the rush from plunging down a 160-foot-tall slide platform).  It is also not 
surprising that the world’s largest water slide resides in Kansas City because the Midwest is 
considered the largest waterpark market.  See Mary Syrett & Callina Wood, A Delicious Splash, 
MISSOURI LIFE (July 2, 2013), http://www.missourilife.com/travel/delicious-splash/.  In fact, a 
different waterpark in Kansas City is the largest in the Midwest, at sixty acres.  Id.  And Kansas City 
is home to the World Waterpark Association.  See World Waterpark Ass’n, Contact Us, 
http://www.waterparks.org/contactus.asp (last visited May 8, 2015).  
 9.  See AECOM, The Americas Continued Growth and Economic Recovery, in 2012 THEME 
INDEX: GLOBAL ATTRACTIONS ATTENDANCE REP. 23 (2013), available at http://www.aecom.com/ 
deployedfiles/Internet/Capabilities/Economics/_documents/2012%20Theme%20Index%20Combine
d_1-1_online.pdf (providing annual attendance statistics for American theme parks).  It is also not 
surprising that the Verrückt is so popular that, as of August, 2014, “demand is greater than the 
amount of available rides” for the water slide, which means that patrons must reserve a ride time to 
even get on the slide.  Verrückt – World’s Tallest Waterslide! SCHLITTERBAHN WATERPARK, 
http://www.schlitterbahn.com/kansas-city/rides/all-new-verruckt (last visited May 8, 2015).   
 10.  See, e.g., Brian Avery & Duncan R. Dickson, Insight into Amusement Park Ride and 
Device Safety in the United States, 2 WORLDWIDE HOSPITALITY & TOURISM THEMES 299, 300 
(2010) (on file with the author) (noting that modern amusement parks swim in a constant race with 
each other to build “bigger, taller, and faster” rides).  
 11.  See, e.g., Petrecca & Castagna, supra note 3 (providing outpour of Facebook and Twitter 
messages expressing concerns over ride safety); Amy Hawley & Shannon Halligan, 8-Year-Old 
Nearly Loses Toe at Schlitterbahn, KSHB ACTION NEWS (July 24, 2013), http://www.kshb.com/dpp/ 
news/local_news/woman-warns-others-about-schlitterbahn-experience (interviewing mother of 
injured child who posted warning about waterpark on Facebook). 
 12.  See infra Part II.C. (discussing courts’ divergent treatment of water-ride operators with 
respect to the applicable liability standard).   
 13.  Id. 
 14.  See Chavez v. Cedar Fair, LP, No. WD 75373, 2013 Mo. App. LEXIS 843, at *5 (Mo. Ct. 
App. July 16, 2013) (applying highest duty of care to ride operation), rev’d, No. SC93658, 2014 Mo. 
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derailed industry-wide efforts to streamline inspection procedures, ride 
testing and other safety measures because different courts often imposed 
different requirements for different rides based on different rationales.15  
So, operators ignored industry efforts to develop effective and uniform 
safety measures because of the frequent conflict between what the 
industry suggested and what courts required.16 
Today, this extensive liability patchwork forms a Frankenstein’s 
monster that destroys uniformity, eludes court control, and terrorizes 
both injured patrons and ride operators alike by making it impossible to 
predict which tort principals apply in water-ride cases.17  Absent a more 
uniform approach, courts risk applying overly demanding standards on 
the operators of low-risk rides, and lenient standards on the operators of 
high-risk rides.  This mismatch is largely attributable to the difficulty of 
drawing a line between high-risk and low-risk rides.  Given the infinite 
variety of water-ride designs, features, operation methods, and potential 
patrons, it is impossible for courts to consistently divide extreme rides 
(fit for a heightened standard) from ‘not-so-dangerous’ rides.18  While 
Universal Studios has a Harry Potter adventure where a ‘sorting hat’ can 
successfully sort patrons of all shapes and sizes into four different 
                                                          
LEXIS 220, at *26 (Mo. Nov. 12, 2014) (“This Court finds that the trial court erred in instructing the 
jury that Cedar Fair owed the highest degree of care to Ms. Chavez because the ordinary duty of care 
is the proper duty of care in a negligence action against an owner or operator of an 
amusement park.”); see also Nalwa v. Cedar Fair, L.P., 290 P.3d 1158, 1160 (Cal. 2012) (applying 
assumption of risk doctrine to injuries from bumper cars). 
 15.   See, e.g., Avery & Dickson, supra note 10, at 309 (noting that “[t]here still is a large 
faction of fixed site, mobile operators, manufacturers, states regulators and inspectors who are 
simply unaware, choose to ignore, or do not have to abide by the current amusement ride and device 
safety standards. The inconsistent application and use of standards across the USA potentially aides 
in unnecessarily placing patrons in harms-way.”). 
 16.   Id.  
 17.  See id. at 310 (explaining the effect of inconsistent liability standards and noting that 
“across the USA, amusement ride and device owners and operators are being subjected to varying 
approaches to industry safety based on state-by-state objectives and concerns.  As a result, owners 
and operators are interpreting and applying the existing standards inconsistently.  Many of the 
requirements to operate an amusement ride or device change based on the number of rides, 
employees, and/or location of the facility or temporary event.  This haphazard approach does little to 
assist in the unification of safety efforts industry wide and potentially inhibits the closure of any gaps 
realized from previous incidents or situations.”); William L. Prosser, Res Ipsa Loquitur in 
California, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 183, 186 (1949) (“The law of negligence of the late nineteenth century 
was to a considerable extent the law of railway accidents.  It was perhaps inevitable that Baron 
Pollock’s Latin phrase should become involved in passenger cases, and that it should there cross-
breed with the carrier’s burden of proof and produce a monster child.”). 
 18.  See Gomez v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 41, 45–49 (Cal. 2005) (surveying the different 
factors that courts around the country inconsistently examine to determine the appropriate liability 
standard). 
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‘house’ categories, that magical sorting power does not travel beyond the 
park gates and into the courthouse.19 
Even if categorizing rides by risk is a good idea in theory, a recent 
Missouri case shows that, in practice, drawling lines of demarcation 
between rides and liability standards is unworkable.20  In Chavez v. 
Cedar Fair, the Missouri Court of Appeals held that “the facts and 
circumstances of a given case” determine whether an ordinary or 
heightened care standard applies to ride operation.21  But the court lacked 
a concrete test for identifying and weighing the facts and circumstances 
in the case.22  Consequently, the court overlooked important and unique 
ride characteristics, such as patron control, water speed, the slide’s 
height, and the operator’s inability to steer the raft as it traveled down the 
slide—all factors that affect the risk of injury and, thus, the appropriate 
liability standard.23 
However, the Missouri Supreme Court caught the oversight, 
overruled the appellate court, and held that the slide operator was subject 
to a reasonable care standard instead of a heightened liability standard.24  
The supreme court emphasized that amusement park rides were not 
dangerous enough to justify raising the liability standard beyond 
reasonable care.25  So, instead of choosing between two standards in each 
                                                          
 19.  See ‘A Celebration of Harry Potter’ Brings Stars, Sorting Hat, and Wizard Duels to 
Universal Florida, WALT DISNEY WORLD INFO. (Jan. 24, 2014), http://blog.wdwinfo.com/2014/ 
01/24/a-celebration-of-harry-potter-brings-stars-sorting-hat-and-wizard-duels-to-universal-orlando/ 
(describing the sorting hat experience, which “allowed guests to actually be sorted into a Hogwarts 
house by a Hogwarts student in a sorting ceremony.”).  To be clear, one can purchase a sorting hat 
replica to take beyond the park gates, but that replica does not enable courts to effectively sort thrill 
rides into concrete liability categories—even if the owner is a “Gryffindor.”  See The Universal 
Store, UNIVERSAL ORLANDO RESORT, https://www.universalorlando.com/Merchandise/Gift/ 
Harry_Potter/Hats/Sorting_Hat.html (last visited May 8, 2015) (selling sorting hat replicas for 
$29.95). 
 20.  See, e.g., Chavez v. Cedar Fair, LP, No. WD 75373, 2013 Mo. App. LEXIS 843, at *5 
(Mo. Ct. App. July 16, 2013), cert granted (reviewing application of highest degree of care duty to 
water-ride operators) rev’d, No. SC93658, 2014 Mo. LEXIS 220, at *26 (Mo. Nov. 12, 2014). 
 21.  Id. at *13.  
 22.  See id. (explaining that the standard of care depends on the circumstances). 
 23.  See id. at *1–3, 19–20 (showing that the injured patron was not in an enclosed vehicle, was 
not restrained by any belt or harness, and the patron shared control over the raft and risk of injury 
because releasing her grip on the raft’s straps or uncrossing her legs during the ride enabled ejection 
or collision with co-patrons). 
 24.  See Chavez v. Cedar Fair, LP, No. SC93658, 2014 Mo. LEXIS 220, at *26 (Mo. Nov. 12, 
2014) (“This Court finds that the trial court erred in instructing the jury that Cedar Fair owed the 
highest degree of care to Ms. Chavez because the ordinary duty of care is the proper duty of care in a 
negligence action against an owner or operator of an amusement park.”).  The Missouri Supreme 
Court’s decision in Chavez was released during the editing phase for this Comment.  So, this 
Comment only provides a light analysis of that recent decision. 
 25.  See id. at *3–5. 
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new case involving a thrill-ride injury, Missouri courts have a single 
liability standard that offers increased predictability for both parties.26 
In addition to providing predictability, the reasonable care standard 
also prevents prejudice.  With a heightened standard, the jury instructions 
“overemphasize[] the defendant’s duty”27 by requiring precautions 
beyond what is reasonable.28  As reasonable care requires operators to 
take a level of precaution that matches the level of risk (the higher the 
risk, the higher the precaution), the heightened standard effectively 
requires operators to take more precaution without knowing when more 
is enough.29  Further, the heightened standard waters down comparative 
fault and contributory negligence defenses by implicitly suggesting to 
jurors that the operator’s duty of extreme care dwarfs the patron’s lesser 
duty to exercise reasonable care.30  Thus, due to the semantic differences 
between these two standards, juries are more likely to find in favor of 
careless patrons and against careful operators.31 
However, while the reasonable care standard promotes uniformity, 
predictability, and fairness, those benefits flow chiefly to water-ride 
operators.  For patrons, there remain challenges with identifying an 
injury’s cause and with the lack of control on certain water rides. 
 To balance operators’ need for predictability with patrons’ need for 
protection, this Comment proposes that courts should apply the 
reasonable care standard with a rebuttable presumption of operator 
negligence.  By making reasonable care the default liability standard, 
courts can replace confusion with clarity because the liability standard 
does not change based on a court’s particular view of the ride, features, 
patrons, and risks.  Instead, courts will have a baseline, reasonable care 
                                                          
 26.  See id. at *4–5. 
 27.  Id. at *17 (quoting Gormowsky v. Ingersol, 241 S.W.2d 60, 62 (Mo. Ct. App. 1951)).  
 28.  See Ronald J. Cereola & Reginald Foucar-Szocki, Fixed Site Amusement Rides: Who 
Regulates Safety?, 25 FLA. INT’L U. HOSPITALITY REV. 45, 49 (2007), available at http:// 
digitalcommons.fiu.edu/hospitalityreview/vol25/iss2/4 (“[A] charge by the Court to the jury, 
directing a heightened standard of care, may very well sway the jury in favor of the plaintiff . . . .”). 
 29.  See William E. Westerbeke, Kansas Survey: Torts, 33 U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 14 n.75 (1984) 
(explaining that juries are likely to misunderstand the highest degree of care instruction as requiring 
liability regardless of fault because the standard demands precautions that exceed reasonableness); 
Chavez, 2014 Mo. LEXIS 220, at *17 (internal quotation omitted) (noting that reasonable care offers 
flexibility and increased precaution against increased risks, while the heightened liability standard 
“overemphasizes the defendant’s duty”). 
 30.  See, e.g., Union Traction Co. of Ind. v. Berry, 121 N.E. 655, 658 (Ind. 1919) (arguing that 
the “use of such terms as ‘slight care,’ ‘great care,’ ‘highest degree of care,’ or other like expressions 
in instructions . . . is misleading; and . . . constitute an invasion of the province of the jury”). 
 31.  Chavez, 2014 Mo. LEXIS 220, at *23–24 (pointing out the misleading nature of the 
heightened care jury instruction and finding that the ride operator was prejudiced at trial by an 
elevated liability instruction). 
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standard that provides both predictability and flexibility by always 
requiring ride operators to exercise precautions that are proportionate to 
the risk of harm from the specific ride.32 
In contrast, the rebuttable presumption places the initial burden of 
proof on the ride operator to first explain the cause of the accident at 
issue, and then to show that the operator exercised reasonable care.33  
This approach strikes at the heart of patrons’ empirical difficulty 
identifying the cause of an accident—a difficulty that goes up whenever 
a patron goes plummeting down, around, or upside down on a water ride.  
While it may seem that patrons should be able to connect their injuries to 
some type of event—such as smashing into another patron or a ride’s 
fiberglass chute—the more important issue is the cause of that impactful 
event.  But patrons are in the worst position to answer that question 
because patrons often lack the ability or opportunity to analyze the 
mechanics of a ride while lying on their backs and being whisked away 
by massive volumes of water that launch patrons at high speeds through 
vertical loops, sideway turns, and spinning whirlpools. 
Contrast patrons’ situation with the ride operators’ standpoint.  
Operators not only have a big-picture view of the ride, operators are also 
the most likely to be familiar with a ride’s common problems, design, 
injury risks, and ride components that may have contributed to a patron’s 
particular injury.  Be it a sharp turn on a water slide or water pump that 
gushes too much water into a water channel, it is the ride operator—often 
an eyewitness to an accident—who is in the best position to provide 
evidence and an explanation about the cause of a patron’s injury.34  
Given the operator’s superior position, it makes more sense to apply a 
rebuttable presumption of negligence onto the operator, which shifts the 
initial burden of proof onto the operator to explain the cause of an 
accident, instead of leaving the injured patron to speculate about the 
cause of the accident. 
Further, the rebuttable presumption addresses the control disparity 
between patrons and operators.  While many water rides provide patrons 
with significant freedom and control, patrons are still dependent on ride 
                                                          
 32.  See infra part II.B. (discussing flexible nature of the reasonable care standard in requiring 
precaution commensurate with risks). 
 33.  See infra part III.C. (arguing that the combination of a rebuttable presumption and 
reasonable care standard is important for clear jury instructions that also balance inherent ride risks 
with appropriate precautions). 
 34.  See O’Callaghan v. Dellwood Park Co., 89 N.E. 1005, 1007 (Ill. 1909) (“If the injury of a 
passenger is caused by apparatus wholly under the control of a carrier and furnished and managed by 
it, and the accident is of such a character that it would not ordinarily occur if due care is used, the 
law raises a presumption of negligence.”). 
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operators to perform inspections, maintenance, and other similar 
functions.  In fact, the original goal of the heightened liability standard 
was to place the risk of loss onto operators because, by surrendering 
control and the ability to protect against various dangers, patrons 
depended on operators for safety.35  Yet heightened liability rarely 
achieves that protective goal because patrons—unfamiliar with ride 
mechanics and engineering—struggle to explain the cause of ride 
injuries.  But the rebuttable presumption fills this causation gap and, as a 
result, fulfills the fundamental protective goal of the heightened standard 
by requiring an operator to show that a patron’s injury was not caused by 
the operator’s negligence.36  While shifting the burden to the operator 
may seem unfair, the combination of a rebuttable presumption with a 
reasonable care standard reduces potential prejudice against the operator 
by applying a balanced, flexible test that aligns the level of required 
precaution with the level of foreseeable risk of injury. 
In addition, while the rebuttable presumption primarily benefits 
patrons, the presumption still produces fair results for operators by 
preserving conduct-based defenses.  For example, where patrons are 
careless or willfully engage in dangerous conduct, operators can call 
upon the full force of a contributory negligence or an assumption of risk 
defense.  Operators can rely on these defenses without worrying that 
ambiguous jury instructions may confuse jurors with multiple liability 
standards—a critical benefit that vanishes under a heightened standard.37  
Furthermore, an assumption of risk defense is especially important with 
water rides because patrons go to waterparks for the purpose of chasing 
thrills and experiencing a sense of danger.38  While patrons do not seek 
actual harm, injury can easily result from patrons’ careless actions, 
violation of warnings and ride rules, or from horseplay near park 
                                                          
 35.  See, e.g., Brown v. Winnwood Amusement Co., 34 S.W.2d 149, 152 (Mo. Ct. App. 1931) 
(connecting heightened liability standard with common carriers’ exclusive control and management 
of the apparatus). 
 36.  See id.  
 37.  See infra part III.C. (arguing that the combination of a rebuttable presumption and 
reasonable care standard is important for clear jury instructions that also balance inherent ride risks 
with appropriate precautions). 
 38.  See Lamb v. B & B Amusements Corp., 869 P.2d 926, 931 (Utah 1993) (explaining that, 
unlike passengers on early common carriers, amusement ride patrons “expect . . . high speeds, steep 
drops, and tight turns.”); Jeffrey S. Goodfried, Comment, Back on Track: How the California 
Supreme Court Got It Wrong, and What Legislature Can Do to Fix It, 27 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 1, 
11 (2007) (“[T]he purpose of thrill rides is to frighten and surprise the rider by utilizing means that 
present the impression of inherent danger. Dangerous elements are intrinsic to these rides, and 
passengers choose these rides for exactly this reason.”).   
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machinery.39  Under a heightened standard, a ride operator is still likely 
to be responsible for these avoidable, self-inflicted harms.  But a 
rebuttable presumption makes it easier for courts to weed out cases 
where the patron bears the blame, which provides a larger benefit of 
encouraging more responsible patron behavior.40 
Part II.A. of this Comment will provide background information 
about the evolution of  both water rides and heightened liability 
standards.  Part II.B. will examine the differences and similarities 
between the heightened common carrier standard and the reasonable care 
standard.  Part III will then analyze the benefits of applying a reasonable 
care standard over other negligence standards.  Then, Part III will explain 
the important balancing role that a rebuttable presumption provides in 
water-ride cases.  Part IV will conclude that courts should apply a 
reasonable care standard with a rebuttable presumption of negligence as 
the default approach for water-ride injury claims. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. Charting a Historical Course of the Changes, Currents, and 
Cascades in Common Carrier Liability 
To analyze whether water-ride operators should be subject to the 
heightened, common carrier standard or, instead, a reasonable care 
standard with a rebuttable presumption, it is important to understand the 
genesis and evolution of common carrier liability, water rides, and the 
courts’ treatment of ride operators.  While modern courts rely heavily 
upon early court rationales, technological advances raise new issues and 
concerns that early courts and ride operators did not anticipate.  To 
reconcile these early court rationales with present conditions, this section 
will discuss the unique and historical concerns first raised by early courts 
in common-carrier cases and then in water-ride cases.  This section 
concludes by examining the various ways that courts have either 
divorced or combined water-ride operation and common carrier liability.  
Each section covers similar spans of time, but given the way that modern 
courts are divided over different issues and concerns, it is more helpful to 
                                                          
 39.  See, e.g., Desai v. Silver Dollar City, 229 Ga. App. 160, 160–63 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997) 
(granting summary judgment against patron who jumped out of a raft despite receiving multiple 
warnings not to do so). 
 40.  See infra part III.C. (arguing that the rebuttable presumption and reasonable care 
combination strike a delicate balance between inherent risks and appropriate caution). 
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organize the background by individual issues instead of by set periods of 
time. 
1. Common Carrier Genesis 
Originally, a “common carrier” was someone who transported goods 
for a cost.41  In 1680, common law courts held these carriers strictly 
liable for any loss or damage to transported goods.42  So, if a carrier was 
extremely cautious or absurdly reckless, the carrier was still “liable for 
every accident, except by the act of God, or the King’s enemies.”43  This 
strict liability approach was an extension of the common-law bailment 
jurisprudence, where courts treated bailees—those entrusted with 
property of another—as insurers of entrusted goods against any loss or 
damage.44 
Economic and public policy concerns prompted early courts to 
extend the role of insurer to common carriers.45  Courts feared that a due 
care standard would allow carriers to excuse their lack of precaution by 
blaming some unknown third party for damage to transported goods.46  
Courts rationalized that strict liability ensured that carriers would 
exercise “greater care and diligence”47 because carriers would bear the 
full cost for lost or damaged goods.48  This outpour of extreme carrier 
caution would theoretically reduce the risk of loss and inspire public 
                                                          
 41.  See Gomez v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 41, 43 (Cal. 2005) (noting carriers of property for 
reward were labeled “common carriers” (citing Lovett v. Hobbs, 89 Eng. Rep. 836 (1680))).  While 
over three-hundred years have passed since common-law courts created the definition, the legal 
meaning has remained essentially the same, as a common carrier is still considered to be “a 
commercial enterprise that holds itself out to the public as offering to transport freight or passengers 
for a fee.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 226 (8th ed. 2004). 
 42.  See Gomez, 113 P.3d at 43 (articulating that “[c]arriers of goods are bailees” and strictly 
liable for damage to bailed goods at common law); See also G. Gregg Webb, Note, The Law of 
Falling Objects: Byrne v. Boadle and the Birth of Res Ipsa Loquitur, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1065, 1081, 
1085 (2007) (noting existence of strict liability standard for damage or loss of property); Robert J. 
Kaczorowski, The Common-Law Background of Nineteenth-Century Tort Law, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 
1127, 1132–35 (1990) (noting gratuitous bailors only required to exercise slight care, but common 
carriers were strictly liable).   
 43.  Kaczorowski, supra note 42, at 1135 (quoting Forward v. Pittard, 99 E.R. 953, 953 (Crt. Of 
King’s Bench, 1 TERM REPORTS 27, 1785)). 
 44.  See id. at 1129–31 (tracing the origin of common carrier liability to common-law bailment 
concepts); Gomez, 113 P.3d at 43 (explaining that first common carriers were labeled as bailees). 
 45.  See Kaczorowski, supra note 42, at 1135–36 (discussing various policy goals of applying a 
strict liability standard over a due care standard). 
 46.  See id. at 1136, 1139 (pointing to common carriers’ attempts to escape liability based on 
third-party negligence). 
 47.  Id. at 1136. 
 48.  See id. (examining goal to prevent excuses and encourage greater care as a justification to 
apply strict liability to common carriers). 
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confidence in carrier services.49  The public’s reduced loss, courts 
argued, would precipitate a flood of public confidence in carrier services 
and, as a result, benefit carriers through increased popularity and a 
cascade of new business.50 
2. Creation of the Heightened Standard of Care 
The heightened standard of care emerged in the late 1700s when 
common carriers began to transport passengers in stagecoaches.51  
Common-law courts explained that, unlike inanimate goods, passengers 
could perceive potential danger and either avoid or mitigate incoming 
harm.52  But strict liability did not incentivize passenger caution because 
carriers were still liable for injuries that passengers could easily 
prevent.53  At the same time, passengers had a limited ability to avoid 
harm because carriers had “exclusive control” over the vehicle.54  
Passengers were helpless if a carrier operator overturned the stagecoach55 
or failed to inspect defective mechanical components.56  Courts thus 
feared that the reasonable care standard—a concept still developing in 
the 1700s57—was an “insufficient incentive to deter carriers from 
                                                          
 49.  Id.  
 50.  See id. (“[C]ommercial interests also motivated English judges to increase common carrier 
liability”). 
 51.  See Gomez v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 41, 43 (Cal. 2005) (identifying stagecoach 
operators as the first carriers that were not held strictly liable for passenger injuries (citing Lovett v. 
Hobbs, 89 Eng. Rep. 836 (1680))); Webb, supra note 42, at 1088 (pointing out that common carrier 
liability was founded by common-law treatment of passengers injured on stagecoaches, but railroads 
molded the majority of the common-law tort concepts applied to common carriers). 
 52.  See Webb, supra note 42, at 1085 (noting “people could both watch out for their own 
safety and precipitate their own injuries.”). 
 53.  See id. (discussing passenger ability to avoid harm and mitigate injuries). 
 54.  See Kaczorowski, supra note 42, at 1158 (noting that passengers were helpless and unable 
to anticipate or prevent accidents while being transported by a carrier). 
 55.  See, e.g., St. Louis Sw. Ry. Co. v. Parks, 76 S.W. 740, 742 (Tex. 1903) (explaining that 
passengers on railroad trains cannot stop a train from derailing, and it makes sense to presume the 
operator of that train was negligent in causing the accident). 
 56.  See Webb, supra note 42, at 1085–86 (noting that stagecoach passengers had no way to 
determine if transportation machinery was sound and that only the carrier could find defects by 
inspecting the stagecoach (citing Christie v. Griggs, (1809) 170 Eng. Rep. 1088 (P.C.)); Johns 
Hopkins Hosp. v. Correia, 921 A.2d 837, 846 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2007) (explaining that “when the 
passenger commits himself to the carrier he does so in ignorance of the machinery and appliances (as 
well as their defects) used in connection with the means of transportation, and becomes a passive 
and helpless creature in the hands of the transportation company and its agents” (quoting Fox v. 
Philadelphia, 57 A. 356, 358 (Pa. 1904)), aff’d, 954 A.2d 1073 (Md. 2008))). 
 57.  See Webb, supra note 42, at 1085 n.116 (citation omitted) (“The concept of ‘reasonable 
care’ as the basis for negligence liability was just coming into widespread use in the common law 
during this period.  The meaning of ‘negligence’ was thus in flux and not always pegged to a 
reasonable care standard.”).  
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compromising passenger safety.”58  To balance these passenger and 
carrier concerns, common-law courts created a heightened liability 
standard that was intended to be “below strict liability but above . . . 
reasonable care.”59  Though a creative attempt to craft a middle ground, 
courts struggled to apply the standard because there was no uniform 
definition or test to determine if a carrier satisfied the heightened 
standard.60 
American courts also struggled to navigate the heightened liability 
standard.61  In the 1839 case of Stokes v. Saltonstall, the Supreme Court 
adopted the heightened standard, holding that carriers must exercise “the 
utmost prudence and caution.”62  But the Court did not clarify the 
difference between “normal” prudence and the “utmost” prudence.63  
Further, while the Court noted that common carriers were not insurers of 
passengers’ safety, a constant shower of confusing and conflicting 
interpretations of the same standard effectively obscured the precise 
scope and limits of the carriers’ duty.64 
As time went on, courts only deepened the pool of confusion by 
adding more semantic variations of the standard in an attempt to clarify 
the scope of liability.  For example, one court stated that carriers “must 
exercise the highest degree of care and caution for the safety of [their] 
passengers, and do all that human foresight can reasonably require, 
                                                          
 58.  Id. at 1085.  
 59.  Id. (discussing the middle ground between strict liability and reasonable care). 
 60.  See, e.g., Benjamin C. Zipursky, Sleight of Hand, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1999, 2019–21 
(2007) (noting that, at common law, common carriers were held to a heightened standard of care that 
was only defined as being more demanding than the ordinary care standard); Philip H. Budwick, 
Strict Liability or Negligence: What Standard of Care Applies When Crewmembers Assault 
Passengers on Cruise Ships?, 19 TUL. MAR. L.J. 353, 355 (1995) (explaining that common law 
“required carriers to do everything possible to provide for the safe transportation of passengers” 
while the requirement was not intended to make carriers strictly liable for injuries to passengers); 
Union Traction Co. of Ind. v. Berry, 121 N.E. 655, 658 (Ind. 1919) (explaining that the heightened 
standard was not measurable because it required some unknown level of care that flowed beyond 
reasonable care). 
 61.  See William E. Westerbeke & Stephen R. McAllister, Survey of Kansas Tort Law: Part I, 
49 U. KAN. L. REV. 1037, 1065 (2001) (explaining that phrases like “the highest degree of care” are 
frequently applied but rarely defined with a measurable test).   
 62.  Gomez v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 41, 43 (Cal. 2005) (citing Stokes v. Saltonstall, 38 U.S. 
181, 193 (1839)), aff’g 1 Cal. Rptr. 3d 860 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003). 
 63.  See id. (citing Stokes, 38 U.S. at 193) (providing a mere semantic difference between the 
utmost care and reasonable care). 
 64.  See Stokes, 38 U.S. at 191–92 (finding common carrier not strictly liable for passenger 
injured in stagecoach); Gomez, 113 P.3d at 44–46 (quoting Lopez v. S. Cal. Rapid Transit Dist., 710 
P.2d 907 (Cal. 1985)). 
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consistent with . . . practical operation, to prevent accidents . . . .”65  
Other courts described the heightened standard as requiring the “utmost 
care” or “the greatest possible care and diligence.”66  However, while 
these definitional variations suggested something more than reasonable 
care,67 courts remained confused over the precise scope of a carrier’s 
duty under the heightened standard. 
Due to this unsettled scope, the heightened standard precipitated 
inconsistent outcomes when courts applied it to similar facts.68  Some 
courts held carriers liable for all vehicle defects, “no matter how 
extraordinary the inspection required to discover” the defect;69 other 
courts only held carriers liable for outward, visible defects.70  Some 
courts instructed juries that carriers were liable for “the smallest 
negligence”;71 other courts instructed juries that carriers had to do 
everything “humanly possible” to prevent injury to passengers.72 
It is no surprise that these different interpretations produced different 
jury verdicts in cases with similar facts.  For example, in two cases 
where passengers were injured after an axle fell out from a stagecoach, 
one jury found for the carrier, and the other jury found for the 
passenger.73  Both carriers failed to discover a crack in their axles.74  In 
finding for the carrier, one jury explained that no matter the type of 
inspection, the operator could not have detected the defect beforehand.75  
In finding for the passenger, the other jury noted that axle defects, though 
                                                          
 65.  Bibeau v. Fred W. Pearce Corp., 217 N.W. 374, 376 (Minn. 1928) (citing O’Callaghan v. 
Dellwood Park Co., 89 N.E. 1005 (Ill. 1909)). 
 66.  Chavez v. Cedar Fair, LP, No. WD 75373, 2013 Mo. App. LEXIS 843 at *10–11 (Mo. Ct. 
App. July 16, 2013) (citing Gromowsky v. Ingersol, 241 S.W.2d 60, 63 (Mo. Ct. App. 1951)), rev’d, 
450 S.W.3d 291 (Mo. 2014). 
 67.  Rivere v. Thunderbird, Inc., 353 So. 2d 346, 348 (La. Ct. App. 1977) (citing Givens v. De 
Soto Bldg. Co., 100 So. 534 (1924)). 
 68.  See Gomez, 113 P.3d at 43–46 (illustrating the different outcomes when state courts applied 
the heightened standard to similar thrill-ride cases).  
 69.  Kaczorowski, supra note 42, at 1162.  
 70.  See Webb, supra note 42, at 1087 (discussing case where the jury limited liability to 
discoverable defects). 
 71.  See Kaczorowski, supra note 42, at 1158–59 (quoting Aston v. Heaven, (1797) 170 Eng. 
Rep. 445 (K.B.); 2 Esp. 533, 535). 
 72.  See id. at 1168 (“[T]he determination whether the precautions taken by carriers had met 
this abstract standard in the circumstances of specific cases was made by juries. . . .”). 
 73.  See id. at 1163–65 (demonstrating inconsistent results under common carrier standard as 
applied to similar facts). 
 74.  See id. (explaining that both axles slipped from the stagecoach because an undiscovered 
crack caused the wood to split and separate). 
 75.  See id. at 1163 (citing Christie v. Griggs, (1809) 170 Eng. Rep. 1088 (P.C.); 2 Camp. 79) 
(discussing defense verdict in early heightened duty, common carrier case where “[t]he jury 
found . . . the weakness in the axle-tree was not discoverable by inspection of any kind”). 
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hidden, were not “impossible to guard against.”76  As time went on, juries 
continued to pour out inconsistent outcomes, and courts diluted the 
heightened standard’s purpose with a wave of conflicting caselaw. 
3. Splashes and Spillover between the Heightened Standard and a 
Rebuttable Presumption of Negligence 
Several early courts interpreted the heightened standard as applying a 
presumption that the carrier was liable for the passenger’s injury.77  
However, this presumption of negligence was an independent tort 
doctrine that was distinct from the heightened liability standard.  But 
courts, confused over the heightened standard’s meaning and effect, 
assumed that the heightened standard implied a presumption that carriers 
were at fault.78  This presumption shifted the burden of proof to the 
carrier.79  To rebut the presumption of negligence, the carrier had to both 
explain the cause of the accident80 and also provide evidence that the 
carrier’s precautions satisfied the heightened standard of care.81  Over 
time, as common carriers changed from stagecoaches to railroads,82 the 
combination of the heightened liability standard and the rebuttable 
presumption—sometimes labeled res ipsa loquitur83—gained wide 
acceptance in American courts.84 
                                                          
 76.  See id. at 1164–65 (“[T]o escape liability, the carrier then had to show that the injury was 
unforeseeable or impossible to guard against.”). 
 77.  See Webb, supra note 42, at 1085–87 (citing Christie, 170 Eng. Rep. 1088, as the first case 
to combine the heightened liability standard with a presumption of carrier negligence). 
 78.  See id. at 1090 (explaining heightened standard of liability for common carriers and res 
ipsa loquitur were created and applied simultaneously). 
 79.  See Kaczorowski, supra note 42, at 1163 (describing change in allocation of burden of 
proof “on the basis of the public policy of promoting public safety by requiring parties to behave 
with due care” in order to “impos[e] liability on the party in the best position to avoid the injury 
and . . . requir[e] a party to compensate for injuries caused by his fault”). 
 80.  See id. at 1164–65 (explaining that carriers met utmost degree of care standard by showing 
passenger’s injury was unforeseeable or impossible to prevent). 
 81.  See Webb, supra note 42, at 1086 (requiring evidence both of the cause of the stagecoach 
accident as well as evidence that the operator exercised the “utmost care” (citing Christie, 170 Eng. 
Rep. 1088 (C.P. 1809))). 
 82.  See, e.g., Brown v. Winnwood Amusement Co., 34 S.W.2d 149, 152 (Mo. Ct. App. 1931) 
(holding res ipsa applied to common carriers due to carriers exclusive control and management of 
apparatus), overruled by Chavez v. Cedar Fair, LP, 450 S.W.3d 291 (Mo. 2014); Webb, supra note 
42, at 1092 (noting common carrier duty toward passengers and res ipsa fault inference were both 
justified by a control disparity between railroad operators and passengers). 
 83.  See id. at 1088 (discussing the “connection between common-carrier cases and the 
emergence of the res ipsa doctrine”). 
 84.  See, e.g., Hardin v. San Jose City Lines, Inc., 260 P.2d 63, 65 (Cal. 1953) (noting that in 
addition to holding common carriers to a heightened standard of care, it is “well settled . . . that an 
inference of negligence based on res ipsa loquitur arises” where passengers are injured by a common 
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To be sure, there were definite similarities between the rationales for 
applying a rebuttable presumption of carrier negligence and the 
justifications for creating the heightened standard of care.  For example, 
both concepts originated from concerns that a carrier’s exclusive control 
over a vehicle85 made passengers’ safety dependent on the carrier’s 
expertise and skill.86  Courts argued that the carrier’s exclusive control 
placed the carrier in the best position to prevent harm.87 
Further, courts argued that passengers could not prevent serious 
injury due to a lack of specialized mechanical training.  Most passengers 
had no idea if a train or stagecoach was properly maintained, and 
passengers were unlikely to detect an operator’s lack of skill or training 
before the operator’s mistake injured the passengers.88  With an inference 
of negligence, courts could balance that knowledge gap and encourage 
cautious operation by placing a higher risk of liability on the carrier.89  
At the same time, the rebuttable presumption was not supposed to make 
carriers strictly liable whenever someone was in an accident or injured, 
as the presumption’s core purpose related to causation instead of 
liability.90 
                                                          
carrier’s operation); O’Callaghan v. Dellwood Park Co., 89 N.E. 1005, 1007 (Ill. 1909) (applying 
inference of negligence to common carrier accident on roller coaster); Webb, supra note 42, at 
1085–88, 1099, 1104 (identifying the simultaneous, linked evolution of the common carrier liability 
standard and a presumption of negligence by operators of common carriers). 
 85.   See, e.g., Brown, 34 S.W.2d at 152–53 (holding that res ipsa applied to common carriers 
due to carriers exclusive control and management of apparatus); Webb, supra note 42, at 1099 
(noting courts felt the “discrepancy in the relative control of plaintiff and defendant over a dangerous 
situation” justified a presumption that the carrier was negligent). 
 86.  See, e.g., Johns Hopkins Hosp. v. Correia, 921 A.2d 837, 846 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2007) 
(explaining that “when the passenger commits himself to the carrier he does so in ignorance of the 
machinery and appliances (as well as their defects) used in connection with the means of 
transportation, and becomes a passive and helpless creature in the hands of the transportation 
company . . . .” (quoting Fox v. Philadelphia, 57 A. 356, 358 (Pa. 1904))); Webb, supra note 42, at 
1086 (pointing out that passengers on early common carriers had “no ability to judge either the 
soundness of a coach or the skills of its driver and consequently had been dependent on the expertise 
of the defendant and his employees. . . . [A] rebuttable presumption of negligence should fall on the 
better informed”); Kaczorowski, supra note 42, at 1158 (reciting courts’ concern that passengers 
were helpless and unable to anticipate or prevent accidents while being transported by a carrier). 
 87.  See Jeffrey P. Aiken, Construction Experts and Res Ipsa Loquitor: Bridging the 
Evidentiary Gap, 30 CONSTR. LAW. 22, 25 (2010) (explaining that the foundational justification for 
presuming negligence is the “exclusive management and control of an instrumentality” (citing 
Zukowsky v. Brown, 488 P.2d 269, 276–78 (Wash. 1971))); O’Callaghan, 89 N.E. at 1007 (focusing 
on the operator’s exclusive control and management). 
 88.   See Kaczorowski, supra note 42, at 1158 (noting passengers were helpless and unable to 
anticipate or prevent accidents while being transported by a carrier). 
 89.  See Webb, supra note 42, at 1093 (explaining that the carrier was better informed than the 
passenger and would thus bear the risk of liability). 
 90.  See id. at 1092–93 (noting that the carrier was supposed to be able to rebut the presumption 
and not be held strictly liable for risks that a passenger could avoid). 
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The rebuttable presumption’s core focus was on the evidence gap 
between carriers and passengers.91  Passengers on carriers were usually 
confined and unable to see or understand the cause of an accident.92  
Carriers, by inspecting, maintaining, controlling, and operating the 
vehicle, had the best access to evidence of the accident’s cause; but 
carriers had no incentive to provide that evidence to patrons.93  Without 
this causation evidence, a passenger could not recover for injuries from, 
for example, flying out of a train window right before the train derailed.94  
Courts thus applied the rebuttable presumption to flush out causation 
evidence and protect passengers in cases where the only evidence of 
negligence was the accident’s occurrence.95 
Furthermore, courts argued that in cases where passengers were 
responsible for their own injuries, carriers should have little difficulty 
with providing clear, exonerating evidence of passenger misbehavior.96  
In retrospect, the rebuttable presumption could have resolved these 
evidentiary access concerns without pouring the heightened standard into 
                                                          
 91.  See Aiken, supra note 87, at 25 (explaining that the presumption of negligence had an 
evidentiary focus instead of being a liability standard). 
 92.  See, e.g., Parke G. Young, Recent Decision, Negligence: Res Ipsa Loquitor: Common 
Carriers, 18 MARQ. L. REV. 4, 265–66 (1934) (describing how “it would be difficult for him to 
know definitely what the carrier’s employees had failed to do or to discover what they had done 
improperly.  This is particularly true in collision cases. . . .  The carrier is expected to explain how 
the collision occured [sic] because his employees have been in a better position than the plaintiff to 
have seen what happened.”).  
 93.  See id. (explaining that the carrier had employees to identify problems and causes that 
would be unknown to passengers); St. Louis Sw. Ry. Co. v. Parks, 76 S.W. 740, 742 (Tex. 1903) 
(explaining that passengers on railroad trains cannot stop a train from derailing, and it therefore is 
sensible to presume that the operator of the train was negligent in causing the accident); Jamey B. 
Johnson, Note, Torts—Res Ipsa Loquitor is Inapplicable When a Plaintiff Offers Expert Testimony to 
Furnish a Complete Explanation of the Specific Cause of an Accident, 25 U. BALT. L. REV. 261, 262 
(1996) (“wrongly injured plaintiffs had no way to recover if the evidence establishing the injury was 
solely in the hands of the defendant.” (citing Ronald J. Allen, Burdens of Proof, Uncertainty, and 
Ambiguity in Modern Legal Discourse, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 627, 632 (1994))); Webb, supra 
note 42, at 1086 (pointing to evidentiary access gap between passengers and carriers that justified 
inference of negligence to help passengers recover for their injuries).   
 94.  See Webb, supra note 42, at 1086 (noting that passengers had only the occurrence of the 
accident as evidence of negligence, and despite evidence of the operator’s carelessness, the 
passenger has no evidence about the cause of the accident). 
 95.  For cases that illustrate how early carrier passengers faired without an inference of carrier 
negligence, see Benedick v. Potts, 40 A. 1067, 1068–69 (Md. 1898) (holding that the presumption 
did not apply where railway car passenger was found unconscious, on the side of the tracks, and 
unable to recall the cause of injury after the train went through a tunnel); Fisk v. Chicago Water 
Chute Co., 119 Ill. App. 536, 541 (Ill. App. Ct. 1905) (noting plaintiff alleging negligent operation 
of boat ride had the burden to provide specific evidence of negligence and could not apply res ipsa 
loquitor). 
 96.   See Myrlak v. Port Auth., 723 A.2d 45, 51 (N.J. 1999) (pointing out that the defendant is 
only required to explain, not exonerate.  Further, plaintiffs may be relieved from the burden of proof, 
but the burden of persuasion is unaltered by application of the presumption of negligence). 
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the mix.97  But courts insisted on contorting and combining the concepts 
together,98 and the benefits of the presumption were rinsed away by the 
confusion and inconsistencies that flowed from the heightened standard’s 
application. 
B. Trickles to Typhoons: From the Beginning Bubbles of Water Rides to 
a Modern Monsoon of Innovation. 
This section will discuss the historical evolution of amusement 
parks, water ride features, ride safety, and technological developments.  
The subsections that follow are divided by issue rather than by time.  As 
a result, a subsection often ends by discussing modern conditions, but the 
next subsection begins by jumping backward in time to trace the 
evolution of a particular concept. 
Tracing the past and present of each issue is important because, 
while technological advances have washed away most dangers inherent 
in early water rides, many modern courts overemphasize antique dangers 
when deciding on the appropriate liability standard for water-ride 
operators.99  Thus, to determine if a heightened standard is justified for 
modern ride operators, it is important to examine the differences between 
early water rides and those that fill amusement parks today. 
1.  Amusement Ride Genesis 
It made sense for early courts to classify ride operators as common 
carriers because transportation companies built and operated the very 
first American amusement parks and thrill rides.100  In the 1800s, 
                                                          
 97.  Compare Kahalili v. Rosecliff Realty, Inc., 141 A.2d 301, 306–07 (N.J. 1958) (applying res 
ipsa and reasonable care standard where plaintiff fell out of a roller coaster), with Gomez v. Superior 
Court, 113 P.3d 41, 47–48 (Cal. 2005) (applying heightened standard of care to an amusement park 
based personal injury suit). 
 98.  See Webb, supra note 42, at 1067–68 (describing mixture of rebuttable presumption and 
common carrier liability).  
 99.  See Avery & Dickson, supra note 10, at 305 (“Restraints, emergency shutdown systems, 
block sensors, anti-rollbacks, machine guards, warnings, fencing, and more have become common 
place on most amusement rides and devices.  Redundant safety systems also play a role in critical 
areas on amusement rides and devices.”). 
 100.  See 2 GORDON REAVLEY, AMUSEMENT PARKS: SOCIAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES, 
THE 1910S, at 310 (Daniel J. Walkowitz & Daniel E. Bender eds., 2009) (identifying the early 1800s 
as the time-period when the first American amusement parks were created by common carrier 
businesses). 
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American railway, streetcar,101 train, and trolley companies—all business 
competitors—sought to attract customers by building small parks and 
primitive rides at transportation terminals throughout various cities.102  
An instant success, these parks quenched Americans’ thirst for a source 
of entertainment, relaxation, and escape from an exhausting work 
environment.103 
Though entertaining, these early parks were more akin to picnic 
areas than to today’s amusement parks.104  The parks were modeled after 
the European pleasure gardens of the late 1700s, which featured theatre 
productions, wrestling matches, concerts, fireworks, and, above all else, 
a large field where patrons drank beer for hours on end.105  The first rides 
in American parks were treated like a side activity instead of a main 
attraction.106  And while merry-go-rounds and carousels existed as far 
back as 500 A.D., the only ride found in several early parks was some 
type of a slide.107  Thus, in the beginning, Americans visited amusement 
parks to relax—not to experience death-defying thrills. 
But Americans quickly turned their attention from relaxation to rides 
when, in the late 1800s, transportation companies introduced rail-based 
                                                          
 101.  See ROBERT CARTMELL, THE INCREDIBLE SCREAM MACHINE: A HISTORY OF THE ROLLER 
COASTER 60, 63 (1987) (crediting early American transportation companies with developing 
amusement parks and noting that “park owners . . . were often streetcar companies.”). 
 102.  Adam Hornbuckle & Martin Manning, Amusement Parks and the National Parks System, in 
8 AMERICAN ERAS: DEVELOPMENT OF THE INDUSTRIAL UNITED STATES 1878-1899, at 394–95 
(Vincent Tompkins ed., 1997) (explaining that trolley, subway, and railway companies built parks at 
the end of transportation lines to attract more passengers, and, because the companies were charged 
a flat fee for electricity, the companies sought to soften the electric bill by attracting more riders). 
 103.  See infra notes 112–18. 
 104.  See infra notes 119–21.  
 105.  Catherine C. Galley & Briavel Holcomb, Amusement Parks, 1 ST. JAMES ENCYCLOPEDIA 
OF POPULAR CULTURE 77, 77 (Sara Pendergast & Tom Pendergast eds., 2000), available at 
http://go.galegroup.com/ps/i.do?id=GALE%7CCX3409000080&v=2.1&u=ksstate_ukans&it=r&p=
GVRL&sw=w&asid=dca3d92543ef633ace90550388d5c7e6 (finding terminal parks stemmed from 
European pleasure gardens that featured fireworks, dancing, and primitive machine-based rides.  The 
pleasure gardens were common around large urban areas through Europe).  For a more detailed 
explanation of the link between Europe’s pleasure gardens and American amusement parks, see 
DALE SAMUELSON & WENDY YEGOIANTS, THE AMERICAN AMUSEMENT PARK 10–13, 16–17 (Mike 
Schafer ed., 2001) (tracing the evolution of flower-based pleasure gardens in France, to the British 
additions of theatre performances and fireworks in the mid-1600s, and finally to the United States, 
where Americans added stream trains, primitive Ferris wheels, and early roller coasters—rides that 
designers quickly designed with increases in size and speed, yet often decreases in safety). 
 106.  Of note, Walt Disney initially designed Disneyland after this “rides-on-the-side” concept.  
SAMUELSON & YEGOIANTS, supra note 105, at 11.  But, after visiting the world’s oldest theme park, 
operating in Denmark since 1583, Walt Disney quickly altered his design in order to emphasize thrill 
rides and create a place where Americans could marvel together over engineering masterpieces.  Id. 
 107.  See id. at 10 (tracing the history of carousel-type rides); CARTMELL, supra note 101, at 55 
(noting that prior to 1893, most of the early parks featured only a single slide). 
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water rides and roller coasters.108  Transportation companies already built 
and operated rail-based transportation systems, like trains, so it was a 
simple task to build a similar ride based on the same mechanical 
concepts and designs.109  In fact, the first roller coaster was basically a 
glorified trolley that looped around a metal, closed-circuit track.110  Still, 
these primitive mechanical rides offered far more thrills than a stationary 
slide or rowboat.111 
By 1895, engineers and architects tried to capitalize on this wave of 
popularity by building more complex and thrilling rides.112  For example, 
one of the earliest American amusement parks introduced a new type of 
water slide that shot riders out of a chute and over a basin of water—
providing a brief free-fall before the patron reached the water.113  By 
1920, similar rides became so popular in America that, on an average 
summer day, over one million patrons could fill any one of the nearly 
2,000 amusement parks throughout the nation.114 
But the 1920s became a time of financial crisis for park owners, as 
Americans lost interest in amusement parks.115  With early parks located 
at transportation terminals, most patrons would get off a trolley or train 
and step right into the amusement park.116  However, the advent of the 
                                                          
 108.  See Hornbuckle & Manning, supra note 102, at 395 (explaining that boat rides and track-
based rides on land grew out of early terminal parks).  For purposes of this Comment, a “rail-based” 
ride is generally one that has some type of capsule that travels along a looping track.  So, a rail-based 
ride could be a roller coaster, a train ride, or another similar ride.  But a water ride, such as a tall 
slide, would not fit the “rail-based ride” description if patrons could control or influence their 
trajectory, or if patrons finished the ride by being ejected from a slide channel and into a body of 
water.  
 109.  See CARTMELL, supra note 101, at 60 (explaining that many of the first park owners were 
rail-based transportation companies). 
 110.  See id. at 63 (describing early roller coasters as miniature versions of trolley systems). 
 111.  See id. at 55–56, 66 (pointing to ice slides as a stationary slide that simply provided the 
basis for more exciting rides like roller coasters and modern water slides); SAMUELSON & 
YEGOIANTS, supra note 105, at 10 (linking Russian ice slides and the more complex designs of 
modern roller coasters). 
 112.  See Galley & Holcomb, supra note 105, at 77 (connecting “the growth of the amusement 
park industry” with enclosed parks “produced by architects, engineers, and planners”); REAVLEY, 
supra note 100, at 315 (identifying public demand for increased thrills as cause of “trend toward 
steeper and higher rides and greater speeds”). 
 113.  See CARTMELL, supra note 101, at 66–67.  This water slide was not the only feature in this 
water park.  In fact, Captain Paul Boyton, the first American to swim the English Channel, had “40 
trained seals” throughout the park.  Id. at 66.  The park was appropriately named the “Sea Lion 
Park,” and some historians even suggest that this park was America’s first modern amusement park.  
Id.   
 114.  See REAVLEY, supra note 100, at 312–17 (providing attendance statistics for early 
amusement parks and showing sharp rise in patron population). 
 115.  See id. at 317 (contrasting early popularity boom with sudden decline in attendance). 
 116.  See id. at 318 (describing mass transit systems as the main transportation for patrons). 
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automobile changed that arrangement because Americans became 
independent and used their new mobility to pursue different activities, 
“such as motion pictures or . . . independent leisure travel,” instead of 
visiting amusement parks.117  Park operators responded by building more 
extreme, complex rides,118 such as roller coasters with higher speeds and 
steeper drops than ever before.119 
Park owners started to win back American patrons, but maintaining 
the patrons’ interest required constant development and construction of 
new rides with even greater thrills.120  Americans were going to spend 
money on the most entertaining activity available, so amusement parks 
had to compete against other parks as well as other forms of 
entertainment.121  As a result, amusement parks were locked into a 
constant race to see who could build the biggest, fastest, and most 
extreme ride in the least amount of time.122 
2.  Water-Ride Characteristics and Patron Control 
Early on, patrons had little control over their movement and speed 
because water rides were tethered to rails and tracks.123  Yet scant 
control, slow speeds, and simplistic designs did not prevent water rides 
from becoming wildly popular in early amusement parks.124  Patrons paid 
good money just to sit passively in a boat that traveled on a track.  For 
                                                          
 117.  Galley & Holcomb, supra note 105, at 79. 
 118.  See Avery & Dickson, supra note 10, at 299–300 (explaining that ride operators regained 
popularity by offering increased thrills and more extreme ride features); REAVLEY, supra note 100, 
at 315 (examining how “patrons . . . demanded more precipitous descents, faster rides, and greater 
capacity”). 
 119.  See Avery & Dickson, supra note 10, at 300 (noting that roller coasters were fundamental 
in attracting patrons back to amusement parks). 
 120.  See id. at 299–300 (pointing out that “[t]he addition of thrill rides, attractions, shows, and 
much more forever changed the landscape of the amusement industry and the expectations of patrons 
seeking new and evolving thrills”); REAVLEY, supra note 100, at 315 (demonstrating that patron 
demands created a trend of designing more extreme rides). 
 121.  See Avery & Dickson, supra note 10, at 300, 312.  See also Hornbuckle & Manning, supra 
note 102, at 395 (explaining that the public attraction to thrill rides was because “Americans want 
either to be thrilled or amused, and . . . are ready to pay well for either sensation.”). 
 122.  See Avery & Dickson, supra note 10, at 299–301 (contending that “[t]he amusement park 
industry has been in perpetual evolution since its inception; mainly resulting from its quest to adapt 
to new and emerging trends and technologies in pursuit of attracting and sustaining crowds.”). 
 123.  See A Drop in the Ocean, NAT’L FAIRGROUND ARCHIVE (2007), http://www.nfa. 
dept.shef.ac.uk/history/miscellaneous_articles/article20.html (“These rides worked with a boat-style 
passenger device hoisted up an inclined track and then released and guided down the track with the 
aid of braking and steering assistant. . . . Circular track based Water Chutes were pioneered in the 
1930s”). 
 124.  See id. (indicating that water rides were quickly installed in parks after gaining strong 
popularity with patrons).  
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example, the first water rides simply featured a mechanical pulley that 
hoisted a boat up an incline track before releasing the boat down a 
channel that emptied into a body of water.125  In the 1930s, ride designers 
created water rides with looping tracks, which enabled operators to send 
patrons around a continuous circuit without having to retrieve boats from 
the bottom of the ride.126 
In the 1980s, water rides transitioned from slow and simple to fast-
paced and mechanically complex.127  For example, water rides 
incorporated steep drops, sharp turns, and high volumes of rapidly 
flowing water that pushed rafts and patrons through large channels.128  
And while early rides sent boats around a flat track, newer rides sent 
patrons vertically through twisting tunnels, large loops, and swirling 
streams.129  These new features became so popular that, for the first time, 
water slides became regular features at amusement parks.130 
The biggest effect of these new features was to decrease operators’ 
control, and provide the patrons themselves with a greater level of 
control and freedom of movement.131  For example, unlike roller 
coasters, patrons on water slides and raft rides were not strapped into a 
vehicle that was anchored to a rail or track.132  Patrons could control their 
                                                          
 125.  See id. (illustrating how early water “rides worked with a boat-style passenger device 
hoisted up an inclined track and then released and guided down the track with the aid of braking and 
steering assistant.  The passengers were plunged into a large pool of water and the boat left to float 
before being re-hoisted up the incline.”).   
 126.  See id. (detailing that “[c]ircular track-based Water Chutes were pioneered in the 1930s, 
with . . . [a] track-based Water Chute . . . which ‘splashed’ through a shallow pool and moved 
through a continuous circuit.”).  
 127.  See id. (“As white-knuckle demands began to dictate the structure and topology of these 
rides, there was a move towards more enclosed track layouts utilising [sic] steeper drops and 
innovations such as turntables.”). 
 128.  See id. (stating that rides in the late 1980s employed “a raging channel of water carrying a 
swirling circular raft of passengers through a series of twists, turns and” other ride features that were 
all enhanced by technological advances). 
 129.  Joanne Austin, Blood Sport: Revisiting Traction . . . Er, Action, Park, WEIRD N.J., 
http://weirdnj.com/stories/action-park/ (last visited May 8, 2015) (describing a variety of rides that 
looped patrons through enclosed slides and offered sharper twists on non-looping slides). 
 130.  See id. (suggesting that water slides became mainstream because patrons inundated 
amusement parks just to ride on certain slides).  
 131.  See id. (revealing that what made water rides “different from other amusement parks was 
the control that patrons had over their ride experience”). 
 132.  Allison Becker, Blood Sport: Revisiting Traction . . . Er, Action, Park, WEIRD N.J., 
http://weirdnj.com/stories/action-park/ (last visited May 8, 2015) (providing a first-hand description 
of a popular water slide from the 1980s where “a physics-defying ride . . . was a cluster of four or 
five short, fast water slides that ended by shooting you out into a lake.  Various kids would fly out at 
various times . . . .  One of these vigorous ‘shoots’ was particularly intriguing, as it would suck you 
in and then immediately make an abrupt 90 degree turn.  Not a 45 degree turn.  Not even a nice, 
slow, smooth, curvy 90 degree turn.  No.  It would literally slam you into a wall and toss you in a 
different direction”). 
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own movements in rapid-water kayak rides;133 their speed in bumper 
boats that could zoom around at 40 miles per hour; 134 and their bodily 
position while on raft rides and water slides.135  To be sure, patrons did 
not have absolute control while on these water rides, but the 1980s 
marked the birth of a spectrum of rides and features that afforded patrons 
varying levels of control—a significant change from the early track-
based rides.136 
Since the 1980s, water rides have constantly grown in number, 
features, size, and design because of amusement parks’ efforts to create 
one-of-a-kind rides.137  As a result, water rides of the same “type” often 
have unique features and significantly different designs.138  Take water-
rapid rides for example.  One rapids ride might have an inflatable, 
circular raft that spins around as patrons brace themselves by gripping 
handles inside the raft.139  Another rapids ride might have a flat course 
with geysers that bounce patrons around as they sit inside a rubber raft 
that has seatbelts and a steering wheel—a raft feature that gives patrons 
control over the speed and frequency of spins.140  While both rides are 
classified as “water rapids” rides, patrons on the second ride have far 
more control over the raft than patrons on the first ride—where water 
pumps, curves in a fiberglass chute, and gravity controls the raft’s 
movement.141 
                                                          
 133.  Austin, supra note 129 (explaining how kayak rides allowed patrons to move themselves 
through a water channel).  
 134.  See id. (describing how “Super Speedboats could go up to 35-40 miles an hour and were 
treated like bumper boats by park attendees”).  
 135.  See id. (noting that patrons on rafts could move in different directions based on how they 
steered the device); Moody v. Aqua Leisure Int’l, No. H-10-1961, 2012 WL 5335842, at *3 (S.D. 
Tex. Oct. 26, 2012) (illustrating how most water rides “propelled participants by gravity from high 
elevations on curved channels covered with small amounts of water used to reduce friction during 
the descent”).  
 136.  See NAT’L FAIRGROUND ARCHIVE, supra note 123 (describing how track-based rides, like 
log flumes and water-coasters, did not provide patrons with control over their movements).  
 137.  See Moody, 2012 WL 5335842 at *3–4 (involving a patent dispute over a water ride; 
including a water pump that has two speed settings instead of one—providing a great example of the 
minor variations that set water rides apart from one another); See Avery & Dickson, supra note 10, 
at 299–300 (discussing competition among waterparks to create unique and enticing rides). 
 138.  See NAT’L FAIRGROUND ARCHIVE, supra note 123 (comparing log flumes and water 
slides). 
 139.  See Spinning Rapids Ride, HOPKINS RIDES, http://www.hopkinsrides.com/public/spinning 
%20rapids%20ride/index.cfm (last visited May 8, 2015) (picturing described raft design). 
 140.  See Bigfoot Rapids, KNOTT’S BERRY FARM, https://www.knotts.com/rides/Water-Rides-1-
5-12-21/Bigfoot-Rapids (last visited May 8, 2015) (employing a water raft with no restraints but a 
wheel to maneuver the raft throughout the ride).  
 141.  Compare id., with Spinning Rapids Ride, supra not 139. 
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The example above only speaks to a few of the ride differences that 
affect a single aspect (patron control) on one type of ride (water rapids).  
But there are numerous types of water rides, each with countless 
variations in shape, size, track design, specialty features, etc.  Since the 
1980s, those differences have only increased.  So, labeling a ride as a 
“log flume” or “water slide” is just another example of “[p]otato, 
potahto, tomato, tomahto,”142 because a ride’s label does not speak to that 
ride’s unique components and features.  Ultimately, the impact of this 
growing spectrum of ride designs and features is that water rides have 
infinite variations that are impossible to separate into clear categories. 
3.  Early Ride Safety Concerns 
Beginning in the early 1900s, the race to build ‘more extreme’ rides 
precipitated a flood of safety issues.143  While safety concerns varied 
from park-to-park and ride-to-ride, the prevailing practice was to make 
rides steeper—not safer.144  And given that the amusement park industry 
was unregulated and in its infancy, ride designers enjoyed extreme 
freedom to experiment with ways to one-up competing rides and 
parks.145 
These circumstances painted an ugly picture that stood out in various 
courts where injured patrons filed suit.  Consider the perspective of a 
judge in 1912.  The first wooden roller coaster opened in 1912.146  
However, 1912 was also the year when an infamous engineering 
masterpiece—the “unsinkable” Titanic—sank to the bottom of the 
ocean.147  If the best engineering and technology could not save the 
Titanic, a ship built to ensure a safe voyage, then what hope was there for 
rides that had experimental features and a purpose of scaring patrons?148  
After all, patrons injured on a ride in 1912 could not even stop the 
bleeding by using a Band-Aid—a product invented eight years later.149 
                                                          
 142.  LOUIS ARMSTRONG & ELLA FITZGERALD, Let’s Call the Whole Thing Off, on ELLA AND 
LOUIS AGAIN (Verve Records 1957). 
 143.  See Avery & Dickson, supra note 10, at 302 (explaining that concerns over patron safety 
“took a backseat to production efforts and progress” for early amusement parks).  
 144.  See id. at 301–02; REAVLEY, supra note 100, at 315. 
 145.  Avery & Dickson, supra note 10, at 302. 
 146.  REAVLEY, supra note 100, at 315. 
 147.  1910 to 1919, THE PEOPLE HIST., http://www.thepeoplehistory.com/1910to1919.html (last 
visited May 8, 2015). 
 148.  Merry Farmer, Life in 1912, MERRY FARMER (Dec. 29, 2011), http://merryfarmer.net/ 
2011/12/life-in-1912/. 
 149.  Mary Bellis, The Roaring Twenties, ABOUT.COM, http://inventors.about.com/od/time 
lines/a/twentieth_3.htm (last visited May 8, 2015). 
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As time went on, the various safety concerns condensed into two 
issues: 1) the lack of ride-testing procedures;150 and, 2) the absence of 
oversight for ride operators.151  First, several parks opened new rides 
before testing for defects and safety flaws.152  As a result, patrons served 
as guinea pigs to test new ride dynamics and features.153  Ride operators 
feared that extensive safety testing would take so long that patrons would 
abandon the amusement park out of boredom with “older” rides.154  
Consequently, safety considerations “took a backseat to production 
efforts,” and, as a result, the rates of patron injury and death grew higher 
and higher.155 
Second, the lack of oversight in the amusement park industry 
magnified safety concerns.156  Park regulation was “unheard of during 
the early years of amusement park development.”157  In fact, as of 1929, 
Wyoming was the only state with any sort of amusement park 
regulation.158  Thus, ride operators were free to build rides without safety 
restraints, assign untrained employees to operate complex machinery, or 
employ ride vehicles that were physically or technologically unsound.159  
The only checks on these practices were after-the-fact lawsuits from 
injured patrons. 
These practices of opening untested and poorly designed rides even 
continued during the torrent of water-ride innovations in the 1980s.160  
                                                          
 150.  See REAVLEY, supra note 100, at 315 (speaking generally about roller coaster safety, and 
how the demand for “heightened thrills” led to “dangerous experimentation”); Avery & Dickson, 
supra note 10, at 308 (“Charles Dinn, an industry giant and world renowned wooden roller coaster 
designer stated . . . that patrons riding today’s roller coasters are guinea pigs.”).  
 151.  See Avery & Dickson, supra note 10, at 300 (identifying only one state that regulated 
amusement rides before 1929). 
 152.  See REAVLEY, supra note 100, at 315 (remarking that “higher speeds also required higher 
safety standards.  Despite increased safety measures, however, consumers’ demands for heightened 
thrills did lead to some dangerous experimentation in coaster dynamics”). 
 153.  See id.; Avery & Dickson, supra note 10, at 302, 308 (discussing “trial and error” approach 
that used patrons to identify ride dangers). 
 154.  See Avery & Dickson, supra note 10, at 303 (“[A]ttendance figures were climbing 
exponentially within the amusement industry.  As a result, amusement park operators and 
manufacturer’s [sic] were trying to keep pace with the new demands to fulfill guests expectations by 
offering more advanced versions of amusement rides and devices of yesteryear.”).  
 155.  See id. at 302 (highlighting the range of injuries caused by early amusement rides and 
noting that safety standards that would prevent such injuries took years to appear). 
 156.  See id. at 300, 302 (pointing to early amusement rides where operators did not face state 
regulation or industry inspections). 
 157.  Id. at 300. 
 158.  Id.  
 159.  See id. at 302–03 (identifying safety and oversight concerns for early amusement rides). 
 160.  See Austin, supra note 129 (illustrating accidents that occurred at a New Jersey amusement 
park resulting from the lack of testing procedures). 
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By 1981, water slide accidents—alone—accounted for over half of 
amusement park accidents and injuries.161  Water rides carried risks of 
electrocution, drowning,162 colliding with another patron, and injury from 
flopping out of a ride chute and awkwardly landing in a pool of water.163 
Nevertheless, while courts worried about ride risks, the general 
American public cared more about “heightened thrills” than safety.164  
And as park owners gave in to patron demands for riskier rides, patron 
attendance surged,165 despite safety issues,166 because extreme rides had 
become a cultural icon that attracted Americans with a near-magnetic 
force.167  Parks were a place where all American social groups could 
share thrilling experiences.168  In fact, in addition to creating new ride 
features, amusement parks also provided a host of new foods for patrons 
to consume with each other—a park feature that introduced Americans to 
a popular food item known as the hot dog.169  Notwithstanding the 
flavorful foods, it was the shared cultural experience of conquering ever-
increasing challenges (by riding scarier and scarier rides) that repeatedly 
reeled patrons in and persuaded patrons to willingly sacrifice safety in 
exchange for heightened thrills.170  In essence, stepping onto a terrifying 
ride became the American thing to do. 
                                                          
 161.  Id.  
 162.  Id.; see also Burgess, supra note 2 (noting drowning risk for overturning water rides). 
 163.  See U.S. Water Ride Fatalities (1972-1997), RIDEACCIDENTS, http://www.rideaccidents 
.com/water.html (last visited May 8, 2015). 
 164.  Avery & Dickson, supra note 10, at 302; REAVLEY, supra note 100, at 315–16. 
 165.  See REAVLEY, supra note 100, at 315 (suggesting patron awareness of injury risks when 
they demanded danger in the form of “precipitous descents and faster rides,” but noting high 
amusement park attendance despite that knowledge). 
 166.  See Avery & Dickson, supra note 10, at 302 (showing that patrons knew that other patrons 
were being injured on rides, yet most patrons rode on thrill rides despite the possibility of serious 
injury from an accident). 
 167.  See Galley & Holcomb, supra note 105, at 79 (describing the cultural significance of thrill 
rides, and focusing on the suburban desire to escape routine and experience danger). 
 168.  Richard W. Flint, Meet Me in Dreamland: The Early Development of Amusement Parks in 
America, 8 NINETEENTH CENTURY 99–100 (1982); JOANNA M. DOHERTY, AMUSEMENT PARKS AS 
LANDSCAPES OF POPULAR CULTURE: AN ANALYSIS OF WILLOW GROVE PARK AND THE 
WILDWOODS 1–3 (1999) (analyzing the societal attitudes and perceptions about thrill rides); 
Hornbuckle & Manning, supra note 102, at 395 (connecting new American cultural trends with the 
thrills that amusement parks could offer). 
 169.  See 1 ANNA NOTARO, ST. JAMES ENCYCLOPEDIA OF POPULAR CULTURE: CONEY ISLAND 
686 (Thomas Riggs ed., 2014) available at http://go.galegroup.com/ps/i.do?id=GALE%7CCX273 
5800608&v=2.1&u=ksstate_ukans&it=r&p=GVRL&sw=w&asid=fee6f5f16472179bd55d739f28dc
404f (pointing to Coney Island as the reason that the hot dog became popular in America). 
 170.  See Galley & Holcomb, supra note 105, at 91–93 (describing how amusement parks’ status 
as cultural symbols drew in diverse groups of Americans, and explaining how patrons had a near-
magnetic attraction to “chaos created by . . . disorienting attractions”). 
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4.  Technological Innovations and Modern Precautions 
Technological advances have remedied most of the safety concerns 
discussed in the prior subsections.  Those subsections provide insight 
into the concerns of the past that prompted courts to expand the liability 
of ride operators.  But, today, water rides are safer, operators must 
comply with stringent standards, and the amusement industry focuses on 
safety over sales.171  Ultimately, this section demonstrates that 
yesterday’s concerns do not reflect today’s water rides. 
Today, water rides are more popular than ever.172  In a given year, 
amusement parks record nearly 300 million visits,173 and experts project 
that attendance will only go up in the upcoming years.174  With 600,000 
employees and $57 billion dollars in revenue,175 the amusement park 
industry remains a dominant entertainment source for Americans.  While 
parks still offer new extremes with bigger, taller, and faster rides,176 
modern parks are also filled with a smorgasbord of gentle rides, such as 
‘lazy rivers’ and ‘wave pools’—attractions that provide families and 
individual patrons with less-intense ride options.177 
Even the extreme rides are safer than ever.178  Modern, high-tech 
safety devices have significantly reduced the high injury risk that defined 
                                                          
 171.  See Avery & Dickson, supra note 10, at 304 (comparing the safety of modern rides 
compared to early rides). 
 172.  See Petrecca & Castagna, supra note 3, at 3A (providing various statistics about the 
popularization of water rides as compared to other types of thrill rides). 
 173.  See Charles C. W. Cooke, Ed Markey’s Peculiar Crusade, NAT’L REV. 1 (Feb. 9, 2013, 
4:00 AM), http://www.nationalreview.com/article/340033/ed-markeys-peculiar-crusade-charles-c-w-
cooke (breaking down annual park attendance figures); Amusement Park Attendance and Revenue 
History, INT’L ASS’N OF AMUSEMENT PARKS AND ATTRACTIONS, http://www.iaapa.org/resources/by 
-park-type/amusement-parks-and-attractions/attendance-revenue-history (last visited May 8, 2015) 
(tracing amusement park revenue and attendance). 
 174.  See AECOM, supra note 9, at 27–29 (providing annual attendance at theme parks); 
Research and Markets: Amusement Parks in the U.S., BUS. WIRE (Dec. 3, 2012, 5:37 AM), 
http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20121203005761/en/Research-Markets-Amusement-
Parks#.VNE5K2TF-PU (“Revenue is expected to improve through 2016, however, as companies 
seek to lure more consumers with new attractions.  Also, the improved economy is projected to help 
raise consumer confidence, causing demand for entertainment to rise substantially.”). 
 175.  See Cooke, supra note 173.  
 176.  See Avery & Dickson, supra note 10, at 308 (explaining how amusement parks must 
continue to increase the thrill level of rides in order to satisfy patrons’ demands). 
 177.  See Syrett & Wood, supra note 8 (noting the diverse types of rides).  
 178.  See Lucas K. Murray, Rides: ‘New thrills with increased safety’, COURIER-POST (Cherry 
Hill, New Jersey), May 27, 2012; Tobias Butler, Comment, Rider Beware: Relying on the Courts 
and A Nationalized Rating System to Address the Duty of Care Owed to Amusement Park Attraction 
Guests, 9 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 369, 374–76 (2006) (“The physics behind today’s thrill rides 
often means subjecting people to much greater forces than before . . . . Just some of their more 
popular rides include: Millennium Force, a 310 feet tall steel coaster with a near-vertical drop and 
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the industry in the 1980s.179  “Emergency shutdown systems, [electronic] 
sensors, anti-rollbacks, machine guards, warnings, fencing,” and back-up 
systems are common features on most modern rides.180 
Furthermore, unlike early rides, modern water-ride designs undergo 
extensive expert evaluation and correction before construction.181  Thus, 
while rides continue to grow bigger and taller, technological advances 
and prior experience make newer rides safer than smaller, shorter rides 
from years past.182 
The absence of water ride oversight is also a thing of the past.183  
Internal industry standards, independent safety agencies, state 
legislatures, and courts are all sources of modern water-ride 
regulations.184  The vast majority of states require operators to meet the 
safety standards set by the American Society for Testing and Materials 
(“ASTM”)—a national ride-safety organization composed of academics, 
government officials, and industry experts.185  These standards, while not 
entirely uniform, generally require regular inspections and safety testing, 
                                                          
top speed over 90 miles per hour . . . Mean Streak, a 161 feet tall wooden coaster, which are 
historically known for rough rides, that travels over 60 miles per hour . . . and Power Tower, a set of 
towers which use pressurized air to either blast riders up or pull riders down over 200 feet along the 
sides of the towers.  These experiences represent a small sampling of the 68 mechanical rides this 
one park offers. . . . While this may seem unsettling to the ordinary reader, it does not translate into a 
disregard for the safety of riders.  In fact, the modern roller coaster is much safer than many of its 
predecessors. . . . Safety is the first concern of any park operator.  In addition to strict standards 
imposed by park operators, forty-two states have enacted requirements for ride safety.  In 2003, the 
International Association of Amusement Parks and Attractions (IAAPA), working with the National 
Safety Counsel, found approximately 2,486 guest injuries occurred during the 2001-2002 season 
while approximately 300 million people visited facilities with transportation-based attractions.  
Therefore, these major machines are not untamed beasts.”). 
 179.  See Avery & Dickson, supra note 10, at 305; Murray, supra note 178 (pointing to new 
braking technologies and harness mechanisms). 
 180.  Avery & Dickson, supra note 10, at 305. 
 181.  See id. at 311 (noting majority of past issues were design defects and not operator 
mistakes). 
 182.  See id. at 304–05 (linking increased safety with increased ride complexity); Goodfried, 
supra note 38, at 2 (“Since accidents commonly occur at theme parks, amusement park liability is a 
timely issue.  Although accidents in amusement parks are as common as cotton candy, serious 
injuries are rare.  In fact, no serious injuries were reported in 2004 at amusement park sites in 
California, with more than 110 million rides given.”). 
 183.  See Cereola & Foucar-Szocki, supra note 28, at 51–52 (noting that modern regulations also 
apply to water rides).  
 184.  See id. at 51–53; Avery & Dickson, supra note 10, at 304, 310–11 (pointing out the various 
sources for ride regulations); Cooke, supra note 173 (explaining the pressure on ride operators from 
insurance carriers to maximize safety features).  
 185.  Avery & Dickson, supra note 10, at 304.  While ASTM stands for “American Society for 
Testing and Materials,” the organization operates globally, and the same ASTM standards often 
apply in several different countries.  See About ASTM International, ASTM, http://www.astm.org/ 
ABOUT/overview.html (last visited May 8, 2015). 
2015] WET ‘N WILD 813 
and several poorly operated or improperly designed rides have been shut 
down as a consequence of failing to comply with the ASTM’s 
standards.186 
Furthermore, despite being business competitors, park operators 
collect and share testing and safety information with one another.187  This 
pool of information flushes out rare and undiscovered risks and enables 
ride operators to identify and implement the most effective safety 
procedures.188 
Nevertheless, media reports and proponents of increased ride 
regulation allege that modern rides are more dangerous than ever 
before.189  Initially, investigative reports that show increased injury rates 
are often based on incomplete information because there is no 
requirement for parks to disclose all company data for every thrill ride.190  
So, the public may never see company reports that show years of 
flawless inspections and injury-free operation of a certain ride.  And, as 
water parks do not hand out company logs to every curious reporter, 
negative reports often omit strong safety records and overemphasize 
isolated, unrepresentative injuries.191  Unfortunately, politicians and 
media members have sometimes tried to garner public attention and 
popularity by sensationalizing isolated ride incidents and exploiting the 
American public’s excitement and interest in thrill rides.192  But, motive 
aside, injury reports are usually based on incomplete data. 
More importantly, even complete, raw injury statistics fail to reveal 
whether the ride operator or a patron’s careless conduct caused the 
                                                          
 186.  See Austin, supra note 129 (pointing out various rides that have been closed as a result of 
failing safety inspections); Cereola & Foucar-Szocki, supra note 28, at 52 (noting that the lack of 
regulatory oversight for thrill rides is a thing of the past); Avery & Dickson, supra note 10, at 311 
(highlighting various mandatory industry inspections). 
 187.  See Avery & Dickson, supra note 10, at 304 (explaining the pooling of information 
between parks). 
 188.  See id. (demonstrating the benefits of sharing ride data between parks).   
 189.  See Anna Mulrine, Not-So-Amusing Rides, 129 U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. 59 (Aug. 14, 
2000) (showing Congressional appeal to public over minor ride incidents); Goodfried, supra note 38, 
at 4 (“While an accident at a theme park garners much media attention, it rarely results in anything 
more than minor injuries.”). 
 190.  See Avery & Dickson, supra note 10, at 307 (noting that some parks do not respond to 
accident surveys); Cereola & Foucar-Szocki, supra note 28, at 47 (explaining that high-fatality 
reports are inaccurate because there is no central reporting requirement to check that statistics are 
precise and not manipulated); Austin, supra note 129 (noting that parks do not report all statistics).   
 191.  See Avery & Dickson, supra note 10, at 300 (explaining the bias in ride accident reports). 
 192.  See id. at 301, 303 (providing examples of political sensationalism as related to ride 
accidents).   
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accident.193  Further, even with a blameless patron, the injury may not be 
attributable to the ride operator.  While operators “run” the ride, 
operators do not design, construct, or manufacture the ride or the ride’s 
components.  So instead of an operational problem, an injury may result 
from a flaw in the ride’s design, a construction error, or a manufacturing 
defect in a particular ride component—distinctions that are masked by 
raw injury numbers.194 
This is not to say that modern water rides are completely safe and 
injury-free.195  Water-ride incidents, resulting in various injuries from 
broken bones to drowning after capsizing,196 form the basis for more 
personal injury lawsuits than any other type of thrill-ride accident.197  
These injuries can be straightforward, such as skin lacerations from 
sliding over a section of chipped fiberglass, or more complex, such as 
injuries that raise questions about how frictional forces between a 
patron’s leg and the water slide contribute to development of alopecia 
patches on the patron’s body.198  And one can imagine the headaches of 
determining what caused a patron to lose contact with a slide’s surface, 
over-accelerate above the water before a turn, and then crash into the 
slide wall with enough force to kill the patron.199  In reality, modern 
water ride injuries often fit into the complex category because of the 
various unique factors that can contribute to a patron’s injury.  So, even 
today, it may be impossible to fully predict and prevent the risk of injury 
from each twist and turn for each individual patron.200 
However, even without a pinpoint risk calculation for each patron, 
modern rides are safer than ever.  In fact, even according to the data from 
investigative reports showing the highest ride-injury rates, Americans are 
still 1,000 times more likely to die from being struck by lightning or 
                                                          
 193.  See Mulrine, supra note 189 (indicating that “rider stupidity causes many accidents. In at 
least one, a rider pushed a restart button just as others were disembarking”). 
 194.  See Avery & Dickson, supra note 10, at 305–06, 311 (noting the various alternate causes 
for a ride accident). 
 195.  See id. at 305, 311 (listing continued concerns with water rides). 
 196.  See id. at 305 (“the industry continues to experience minor and major losses; some of 
which are highly publicized and a cause for concern. The riding public has incurred injuries and 
deaths such as . . . the capsizing and drowning of occupants on a river ride, . . . drowning at water 
parks, broken necks on inflatable’s [sic].”). 
 197.  See Austin, supra note 129 (focusing on water rides as the main source of injury). 
 198.  Brian B. Adams, Water-Slide Alopecia, 67 CUTIS 399, 399–400 (2001), available at 
http://www.cutis.com/fileadmin/qhi_archive/ArticlePDF/CT/067050399.pdf. 
   199.  See Piotr Szczepaniak & Ryszard Walentyński, Safety of Recreational Water Slides: 
Numerical Estimation of the Trajectory, Velocities and Accelerations of Motion of the Users, in 
COMPUTATIONAL SCIENCE–ICCS 2007, at 219–20 (Yong Shi, et al. eds., Springer Berlin Heidelberg 
2007). 
 200.  Id. 
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falling in a bathtub than from a roller coaster accident: “a one-in-300-
million chance.”201  In fact, an engineering group recently compared 
several ride-injury reports and concluded that “injury rates at amusement 
parks are ‘significantly lower’ than those of ‘other activities[,] such as 
owning bunk beds, skateboards, sleds, or bicycles.’”202  Furthermore, of 
the hundreds of millions of patrons who rode thrill rides in 2011, only 
five percent of injured patrons required hospital care;203 and only 1.5 
percent of injured children were hurt badly enough to require 
hospitalization.204  So modern rides are not only significantly safer than 
early thrill rides, but the modern risk of serious injury is also 
microscopic. 
C.  Drowning Water-Ride Developments in a Crest of Common Carrier 
Concerns 
Drawing from the previous background sections for support, this 
final background section traces the historical changes in how courts link 
common-carrier concepts and various types of water rides.  Specifically, 
this section demonstrates how courts inconsistently respond to changes 
in water-ride design and technology by emphasizing different—and 
sometimes conflicting—interests and concerns when deciding which 
liability standard to apply to ride operators.205  By mixing different tort 
and common-carrier concepts with different types of water rides, courts 
continue to mystify the meaning and effect of heightened liability 
standards.  More concerning is that this constant confusion defeats the 
purpose of a heightened standard by disrupting national industry efforts 
at improving ride safety. 
                                                          
 201.  Cooke, supra note 173. 
 202.  Id.; see also Goodfried, supra note 38, at 5 (“With any recreational activity, from daredevil 
extreme skiing to . . . golf, there is always some risk of serious injury or fatality.  In 2004, four 
people died as a result of accidents at fixed-site amusement parks. . . .  Four fatalities out of 
169,100,000 visitors is a ratio of one out of every 42,275,000, which makes the act of driving your 
own car to an amusement park far more dangerous than embarking on a ride once at the park.  
Understandably, some argue that four fatalities a year are still four too many. However, raising the 
safety standard is not the answer.  Heightened standards will allow more lawsuits, but will not 
decrease the number of fatalities.”). 
 203.  Petrecca & Castagna, supra note 3, at 3A.   
 204.  JoNel Aleccia, Amusement Rides Hurt 4,400 Kids a Year, Large Study Finds, NBC NEWS 
(Apr. 30, 2013, 9:02 AM), http://vitals.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/05/01/17988578-amusement-rid 
es-hurt-4400-kids-a-year-large-study-finds?lite. 
 205.  See Avery & Dickson, supra note 10, at 309–10 (offering a discussion of the various flaws 
with a piecemeal focus on ride standards and liability). 
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Courts did not apply common carrier concepts in the first amusement 
park cases.  Before the 1900s, American ride operators were only liable 
for ordinary negligence.206  As noted earlier, this period of time featured 
water rides that were free of complex machinery, such as simple slides 
and basic boats.207 
The beginning of the 1900s marked the period when American 
courts started to hold ride operators to differing liability standards.208  In 
1902, a New York court decided one of the first water-slide cases in 
Barrett v. Lake Ontario Beach Improvement Co.209  In Barrett, a fifteen-
year-old boy died from falling off of a twenty-five-foot tall water slide.210  
The trial court followed the lead of earlier courts and held that the park 
operator was required to exercise reasonable care in constructing and 
operating the slide.211  In finding for the park, the court explained that it 
was reasonable for the park to build a shorter railing around the slide’s 
platform because “the character and purpose of the [slide] . . .  was 
simply and solely for purposes of amusement.”212  Thus, according to the 
trial court, patrons came to the slide seeking thrills, and that purpose 
made the risk of falling from a wet slide obvious, possibly even enticing, 
to patrons.213 
Yet on appeal, the appellate court reversed the decision, holding that 
the slide operator had a “stricter measure of duty” than reasonable 
care.214  The appellate court argued that, even if risks were obvious or 
enticing to patrons, the operator had to minimize all foreseeable risks to 
satisfy this heightened standard of care.215  The court explained that, like 
                                                          
 206.  See Bendick v. Potts, 40 A. 1067, 1068 (Md. 1898) (requiring railway car passenger to 
prove operator was negligent). 
 207.  See Decatur Amusement Park Co. v. Porter, 137 Ill. App. 448, 449–50 (Ill. App. Ct. 1907) 
(applying ordinary care where amusement park operated a large, 10-foot-deep pond). 
 208.  Compare Rayfield v. Sans Souci Park, 147 Ill. App. 493, 498–99 (Ill. App. Ct. 1909) 
(applying ordinary care standard to ride operation), with O’Callaghan v. Dellwood Park Co., 149 Ill. 
App. 34, 37–38 (Ill. App. Ct. 1909) (applying highest degree of care standard to operation of scenic 
railway in amusement park). 
 209.  See Barrett v. Lake Ontario Beach Improvement, Co., 68 A.D. 601, 602–03 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 1902) (involving twenty-five foot, six-inch tall water slide with a wooden platform that was 
surrounded by four-foot tall railing). 
 210.  See id. at 602, 611. 
 211.  See id. at 605–09 (requiring exercise of ordinary care and measuring standard of care by 
risks obvious to park but not patron). 
 212.  See id. at 605 (connecting risks with injuries). 
 213.  See id. 
 214.  See Barrett v. Lake Ontario Beach Improvement, Co., 66 N.E. 968, 970 (N.Y. 1903) 
(changing the standard of care).  
 215.  See id. (requiring that “risks should be minimized to the extent that reasonably prudent men 
might foresee the necessity of doing so. The risk of falling from the platform may have been 
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a common carrier, the slide operator invited the public to use the slide, 
and, like passengers, the public thus assumed that the operator did 
everything necessary to make the ride safe and eliminate injury risks.216  
Thus, even for the most obvious risks, the operator had a duty to take 
extra precautions for the patrons’ safety.217  However, as with early 
common carrier cases, the court never clarified how to determine when 
the operator had done enough to satisfy this “stricter measure of duty.”218  
In addition, the court failed to clarify if the heightened liability standard 
applied only to water-ride operation—meaning the maintenance, 
supervision, and control of the ride219—or also applied, as a matter of 
premise liability, to the slide’s physical construction and modification.220 
Following Barrett, several courts started to apply the common carrier 
standard to a variety of rides.221  Unfortunately, courts were inconsistent 
and unpredictable in deciding when to apply the standard.  As a result, 
courts either held similar types of rides to differing standards, or courts 
gave divergent rationales for holding dissimilar rides to the same 
standard.222  For example, in 1909, one Illinois court held the operator of 
a glass maze to a reasonable care standard.223  But—that same year—
another Illinois court both held the operator of a scenic train ride to the 
heightened common carrier standard and also applied a rebuttable 
presumption of operator negligence.224  The latter argued that scenic train 
                                                          
apparent to persons using it, but those persons had the right to assume that they went there without 
incurring any risk which might have been reasonably anticipated by the proprietor”). 
 216.   See id. (noting amusement rides may have inherent risks, but the duty is first on the park 
owner to construct rides that increase ride safety with respect to those inherent risks). 
 217.   See id. (requiring parks take “every reasonable care” when constructing water slides). 
 218.   See Chavez v. Cedar Fair, LP, No. WD 75373, 2013 Mo. App. LEXIS 843 at *14–17 (Mo. 
Ct. App. July 16, 2013) (noting differences between negligent construction and negligent operation 
of amusement ride). 
 219.  See id. (listing different torts for negligent construction, operation, and maintenance, but 
not identifying elements or applicability of a specific tort in this case).  
 220.  See Barrett, 66 N.E. at 969–70 (discussing public invitee concerns and park duties for ride 
construction). 
 221.  Compare Rayfield v. Sans Souci Park, 147 Ill. App. 493, 498–99 (Ill. App. Ct. 1909) 
(applying ordinary care standard to ride operation), with O’Callaghan v. Dellwood Park Co., 89 N.E. 
1005, 1006 (Ill. 1909) (applying highest degree of care standard to operation of scenic railway in 
amusement park). 
 222.  See supra notes 14–15, 208 (discussing inconsistent standards and outcomes in various 
water-ride cases). 
 223.  See Rayfield, 147 Ill. App. at 498–99 (denying application of res ipsa loquitor and finding 
operator maintained maze “in a safe manner”).   
 224.  See O’Callaghan, 89 N.E. at 1006–07 (requiring “the highest degree of care and caution for 
the safety of its passengers . . . consistent with the . . . practical operation of the railway”). 
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rides and roller coasters were like railroad operators—the clearest 
example of a common carrier for most courts.225 
However, the court’s holding was based more on broad public policy 
concerns than on a clear test to determine which amusement rides were 
enough like common carriers to justify a heightened liability standard.226  
As time went on, several courts agreed that roller coasters were similar to 
railroad trains, but those courts did not agree over which tort principles 
should apply to coaster operators.227  The same division followed for 
scenic railway rides, and courts steadily broadened the web of confusion 
that left more and more operators in the dark about their duty to park 
patrons.228 
Eventually, even for the same type of ride, some courts called for the 
heightened standard,229 others added a rebuttable presumption,230 and yet 
others maintained a reasonable care standard.231  Eventually, as parks 
created a variety of rides with different features, sizes, speeds, and 
technological innovations, courts were doused with a deluge of ride 
classifications, features, and designs.  Unfortunately, each new case 
called for a new trip to the common carrier buffet—where courts seemed 
to fill their plates with different factors and new concerns.232 
                                                          
 225.  See Webb, supra note 42, at 1088 (explaining that “[t]he law of negligence of the late 
nineteenth century was to a considerable extent the law of railway accidents.”).   
 226.  See O’Callaghan, 89 N.E. at 1006–07 (noting utmost care and diligence was required of 
coaster operators because the ride posed a potentially great danger of harm).   
 227.  See Barr v. Venice Giant Dipper Co., 32 P.2d 980, 980 (Cal. Ct. App. 1934) (linking roller 
coaster with common carrier concepts). 
 228.  Compare Bibeau v. Fred W. Peace Corp., 217 N.W. 374, 376 (Minn. 1928) (citing 
O’Callaghan, 89 N.E. at 1007) (applying res ipsa loquitor and holding that “the proprietor of a 
roller-coaster must exercise the highest degree of care and caution for the safety of his passengers, 
and do all that human foresight can reasonably require, consistent with its practical operation, to 
prevent accidents to them.”), with Best Park & Amusement Co. v. Rollins, 68 So. 417, 418 (Ala. 
1915) (holding scenic railway operator in amusement park to highest degree of care due to common 
carrier application). 
 229.  See Bibeau, 217 N.W. at 376 (charging operators of roller coasters with highest degree of 
care).  
 230.  See Gomez v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 41, 47–48 (Cal. 2005) (surveying different 
common carrier concepts as applied to thrill rides). 
 231.  See Wash. Luna Park Co. v. Goodrich, 66 S.E. 977, 977 (Va. 1910) (requiring “due and 
proper care” in operation of roller coasters). 
 232.  Sometimes courts even added new legal questions to the mix.  For example, after 
concluding that the carrier standard applied to a ride operator, one California court pondered when 
the “passenger-carrier relationship” began and ended.  See Orr v. Pac. Sw. Airlines, 257 Cal. Rptr. 
18, 21 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (quoting Dayton v. Yellow Cab Co., 193 P.2d 959 (Cal. Ct. App. 1948)) 
(adding even more complexity and confusion to the carrier standard by concluding that the 
relationship lasts until “‘the passenger reaches a place outside the sphere of any activity of the carrier 
which might reasonably constitute a mobile or animated hazard to the passenger.’”).   
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III. ANALYSIS 
This Comment will first analyze whether water-ride operators should 
be subject to the heightened common carrier standard or, instead, a 
reasonable care standard with a rebuttable presumption of operator 
negligence.  To make that determination, the analysis below answers 
three questions.  First, can courts consistently distinguish water rides and 
common carriers based on identifiable similarities and differences?  
Second, if courts cannot consistently make that distinction, then should 
all water-ride operators be held to the heightened standard or the 
reasonable care standard?  Third, is a rebuttable presumption of operator 
negligence necessary for a particular liability standard to be effective? 
A.  Flushing out the Differences Between Water Rides and Common 
Carriers 
1.  Similarities and Differences Between Water Rides and Common 
Carriers 
Courts eventually pointed to so many different ride aspects, policy 
goals, and common carrier characteristics that it became impossible to 
draw meaningful lines between rides that should and should not be 
subject to the common carrier standard.233  The traditional justifications 
for applying either the heightened standard or a rebuttable presumption 
were broken up, altered, and sometimes ignored altogether.234  
Specifically, courts disagreed over: (1) control factors; (2) the effect of a 
patron’s purpose; and (3) public policy goals.  Eventually, whether a ride 
looked tall, fast, or scary became more important than a detailed 
comparison of ride features and traditional common carrier 
characteristics.235  Even then, courts disagreed over which rides were 
                                                          
 233.  See Butler, supra note 178, at 379 (“Protection has not solely been left to the legislatures, 
however.  The courts also have a place in the debate on an amusement park operator’s duty of care.  
Through a combination of statutory clauses and common law decisions, the state courts have sharply 
divided in answering what an amusement park operator owes to his guests.”). 
 234.  See id.; Gomez, 113 P.3d at 42–45 (Cal. 2005) (surveying different common carrier 
concepts as applied to thrill rides); Ronald J. Cerola, Fixed Site Amusement Rides: Duty Of Care—
An Ordinary Negligence Standard Or Common Carrier Liability?, 4 FLA. INT’L. U. HOSPITALITY L. 
1, 9 (2012), available at http://hospitalitylawyer.com/wp-content/uploads/VolumeIV_Article1.pdf  
(“The jurisdictions that have imposed common carrier liability upon amusement ride operators and 
thus requiring a heightened degree of care are just as numerous as those not requiring such, and just 
as diverse in their rationale in arriving at their conclusions.”). 
 235.  See, e.g., Best Park Amusement Co. v. Rollins, 68 So. 417, 418 (Ala. 1915) (focusing on 
“[t]he steep inclines, sharp curves and great speed” when applying heightened standard of care to 
amusement park ride) (quoting O’Callaghan v. Dellwood Park Co., 89, N.E. 1005, 1006 (Ill. 1909).  
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“tall, fast, or scary enough” to warrant a heightened liability standard.236  
And with water rides, those disagreements stormed quickly and seeped 
deep into courts’ thrill ride jurisprudence.237 
a.  Control Factors 
First, despite the overflow of divergent approaches, courts often 
examined the control disparity between operators and patrons because 
the hallmark of early common carrier jurisprudence was operators’ 
exclusive control over a carrier.238  Roller coasters presented an easier 
case for the control analysis because patrons—locked into a ride 
apparatus—could not alter the coaster’s speed or direction; only the ride 
operator controlled those functions.239  In contrast, water rides typically 
provided patrons with greater mobility.240  For example, on water slides 
without rafts, there was usually no safety bar or harness to restrain a 
patron’s movement and control.241  However, with log flumes, straps and 
bars were commonly installed to keep patrons inside the boat during the 
ride.242  Ironically, while the log flume restricted patrons’ control and 
ability to move away from potential harm, it was the water slide that 
courts first subjected to a heightened standard of care.243 
                                                          
 236.  Compare id. (expressing concern over steep inclines on roller coasters), with Lamb v. B & 
B Amusements Corp., 869 P.2d 926, 931 (Utah 1993) (explaining that, unlike passengers on early 
common carriers, amusement ride patrons “expect . . . high speeds, steep drops, and tight turns”). 
 237.  See infra Part III.A.3. 
 238.  See, e.g., Tenn. State Fair Ass’n v. Hartman, 134 Tenn. 159, 161–63 (Tenn. 1916) 
(focusing exclusively on control disparity for common carrier application to amusement ride); 
Gomez, 113 P.3d at 47–48 (Cal. 2005) (surveying heightened standard as applied to thrill rides and 
noting common control consideration); Cerola, supra note 234, at 12 (“[F]indings of common carrier 
are based upon the passenger’s ceding of control to the carrier and the passenger’s inability at that 
point to do anything to prevent an injury.”). 
 239.   See Chavez v. Cedar Fair, LP, No. WD 75373, 2013 Mo. App. LEXIS 843, at *13 
(pointing to earlier cases where coaster operator had exclusive control and ability to prevent harm). 
 240.  See id. at *4, *13 (pointing out that patron was able to let go of raft straps and fly into a 
fellow patron in the raft). 
 241.  See Tenn. State Fair Ass’n, 134 Tenn. at 161–63; Hartman v. Tenn. State Fair Ass’n, 134 
Tenn. 149, 156–58 (Tenn. 1916) (both cases discussing the same ride and inability of patrons to 
escape harm due to restraints on coaster). 
 242.  See Burgess, supra note 2 (explaining that log flume passengers could not escape the ride 
because they were belted in with straps); Cedar Point Accident, supra note 2, at 3A (discussing 
restraint in overturned log flume boat).  
 243.  See Matenaer v. Gatlinburg Waterslide, Inc., No. 79-1519, 1981 U.S. App. LEXIS 19901, 
at *2 (6th Cir. Feb. 24, 1981) (finding waterslide had “same duty of care as a common carrier.”).   
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As technological advances produced a cascade of new ride 
features,244 courts reached different conclusions about the effects these 
new features had on patron control.  These ride characteristics—such as 
ride height, slick surfaces, high speeds, and high volumes of water from 
large pumps245—altered patrons’ control, but courts were unsure what 
that meant for liability purposes because early common carrier cases did 
not involve towering water slides or mechanical pumps.246  Due to this 
lack of guidance, courts drifted away from the traditional common 
carrier rationales and historical characteristics and, instead, latched on to 
the various characteristics and features of modern rides.  For example, 
whether a ride had a raft or seatbelts was sometimes dispositive of what 
liability standard would apply—an approach that ignored other ride 
characteristics that increased or decreased patron control.247 
While some courts attempted to weigh all of the similarities and 
differences between a water ride and a common carrier, this process 
produced unpredictable outcomes because, without a common balancing 
test, courts weighed different factors in different ways.248  For example, 
the Missouri Court of Appeals engaged in this weighing process in 
Chavez v. Cedar Fair, a case involving a patron who, while traveling 
down a 70-foot-tall water slide with several other individuals, collided 
with another patron in the same raft.249  The court held that “the 
appropriate standard of care . . . depends upon the facts and 
circumstances of a given case.”250  In spite of that call for a detailed 
analysis of the water slide’s unique characteristics, the court, considering 
cases involving roller coasters and airplanes, only evaluated one factor—
                                                          
 244.  See Goodfried, supra note 38, at 3 (detailing how technological advances enabled ride to 
“range from bloodcurdling roller coasters with 200-foot drops, to children’s rides that slowly move 
passengers through rooms filled with singing animatronics.”). 
 245.  See Chavez, 2013 Mo. App. LEXIS 843 at *13–17  (determining the applicable liability 
standard for the operator of a modern, complex water slide by applying precedent from cases 
involving roller coasters, primitive water rides, and injuries from slick spots throughout park 
premises). 
 246.  See Kaczorowski, supra note 42, at 1165 (explaining that early common carriers were land-
based stagecoaches and railroad trains).   
 247.  See Chavez, 2013 Mo. App. LEXIS 843, at *1, *9 (involving a patron who was not in an 
enclosed vehicle, was not restrained by any belt or harness, and shared control over the raft and risk 
of injury because releasing her grip on the raft’s straps or uncrossing her legs during the ride enabled 
ejection and collision with co-patrons). 
 248.  See id. at *5 (holding that “the operator had complete control and its patrons were 
dependent upon the operator for their safety.  Under such circumstances, Cedar Fair had a duty to 
operate Hurricane Falls with the highest degree of care”).  But there were no other factors that the 
court analyzed, despite calling for an evaluation of all the circumstances.  Id. at *5.  
 249.  Id. at *1, *9.  
 250.  Id. at *4.  
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the operator’s control—before applying the heightened standard.251  But 
focusing exclusively on the operator comes dangerously close to 
imposing a strict liability standard because the patron’s careless conduct 
is either overlooked or ignored.252  In fact, the court’s holding was at 
odds with the patron’s own theory: that the operator gave the patron too 
much control by failing to install a restraining harness in the raft.253  One 
commentator highlighted additional control distinctions in the case: 
[F]orces on a coaster are such that these restraints are designed to 
restrict the guest’s freedom of movement significantly. . . . But a water 
slide is fundamentally different.  By its nature, guests have far more 
control . . . .  Guests on a water slide cannot be restrained . . . as to do 
so would potentially create a drowning hazard.  Differences in guest 
weight, guest distribution in the raft, and body position, which are all 
beyond the operator’s complete control, can lead to significantly 
different riding experiences . . . .  Moreover, a rider on a water slide has 
the ability to do just about anything once that raft leaves the dispatch 
point, thus creating a risk of injury an operator cannot control.  A guest 
that wants to jump out of a roller coaster train must work hard to do it.  
A guest that wants to jump out of the raft on a water slide simply has to 
do it.254 
The Missouri Supreme Court also disagreed and recently overruled 
the appellate court’s decision.  However, despite the appellate court’s 
extensive discussion of the operator’s control, the supreme court’s 
majority opinion in Chavez largely skipped over the control disparity, as 
the majority focused on patrons’ purpose for riding the slide and the lack 
of a sufficient risk of harm to justify a heightened liability standard.255  In 
contrast, the dissenting opinion spoke almost exclusively about the 
control disparity between the injured patron and the slide operator.256  
 When compared, these three Chavez opinions show how courts—in a 
                                                          
 251.  See id. at *2–3 (comparing control on water ride to rollercoaster and then concluding the 
analysis). 
 252.  See Webb, supra note 42, at 1085 (noting that “people could both watch out for their own 
safety and precipitate their own injuries” and thus the heightened standard was supposed to account 
for that to protect carriers from becoming insurers of “passenger safety”). 
 253.  See Chavez, 2013 WL 3660372, at *1, *9 (where the injured plaintiff argued that the 
defendant failed to provide adequate “restraints or other devices”); see also Erik H. Beard, Planes, 
Trains, & Waterslides? Missouri Imposes Heightened Liability Standard On Amusement And Water 
Parks, LEGAL ROLLER COASTER (Jul. 19, 2013, 2:56 PM), http://www.legalrollercoaster.com/2013/ 
07/planes-trains-waterslides-missouri.html (noting that the patron’s argument about the lack of 
safety devices spoke to a flaw with the ride’s design and construction, which is not a responsibility 
of a ride operator). 
 254.  Beard, supra note 253. 
 255.  See Chavez v. Cedar Fair L.P., No. SC 93658, 2014 WL 5856696, at *4, *7–8 (Mo. 2014). 
 256.  See id. at *9 (Teitelman, J., dissenting). 
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single case involving the same ride—are inconsistent in selecting the 
number and type of ride characteristics to analyze.  Moreover, courts that 
do examine the same characteristics may weigh them differently and 
reach different conclusions.  These type of inconsistencies are shining 
examples of how focusing on certain ride characteristics generates 
confusion and division—across the nation—over the appropriate liability 
standard for water-ride operators.257  So, while the Missouri Supreme 
Court’s ruling eliminates a significant amount of confusion about 
liability standards for thrill rides, the root cause of that confusion remains 
intact. 
b.  Patron Purpose 
Second, in addition to the control analysis, courts have also 
considered the patron’s purpose for getting on a water ride.258  It should 
come as no surprise that courts disagree over the relationship between a 
patron’s purposes and the scope of an operator’s duty.259  Some courts 
felt that a heightened standard was inappropriate because patrons’ 
expectations and purpose in paying for admission to an amusement park 
                                                          
 257.  See Beard, supra note 253 (arguing that “the decision in Chavez v. Cedar Fair is a very big 
deal – particularly for operators in the State of Missouri.  Left unchecked, this opinion just increased 
the liability exposure for every operator in the state”); Kaczorowski, supra note 42, at 1155 (“The 
divisions among state judges seem to be attributable to different understandings of the nature of the 
American economy and economic relationships, of the nature of common carriers as public or 
private enterprises, and of the consequent public need for the intervention of the courts to adjust the 
conflicting interests of shippers and carriers through law.”); see also Cerola, supra note 234, at 6, 8; 
Avery & Dickson, supra note 10, at 309–10 (“There still is a large faction of . . . operators . . . who 
are simply unaware, choose to ignore, or do not have to abide by the current . . . standards. The 
inconsistent application and use of standards across the USA potentially aides in unnecessarily 
placing patrons in harms-way. . . . [A]cross the USA, amusement ride and device owners and 
operators are being subjected to varying approaches to industry safety based on state-by-state 
objectives and concerns.  The existing standards are being interpreted and applied inconsistently as a 
result.  Many of the requirements to operate an amusement ride or device change based on the 
number of rides, employees, and/or location of the facility or temporary event.  This haphazard 
approach does little to assist in the unification of safety efforts industry wide and potentially inhibits 
the closure of any gaps realized from previous incidents or situations. . . .  [E]ach group is acting 
independently from one another yet they are trying to achieve the same goals. . . . It has the 
appearance that industry efforts will become watered-down if this trend continues.”). 
 258.  See O’Callaghan v. Dellwood Park Co., 89 N.E. 1005, 1006–07 (Ill. 1909) (noting roller 
coasters, like elevators and trains, are “wholly under the control of” the operator). 
 259.  See Cerola, supra note 234, at 6, 8–9 (noting that “courts in various jurisdictions have 
emphasized different criteria in arriving at the same conclusion that operators of amusement rides 
are not common carriers subject to a heightened standard of care. The determinative factors appear 
to” be the patron’s purpose, movement control, and the carrier’s purpose).  
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was to experience extreme sensations,260 dangers261 and thrills.262  This 
expectation for operators to create a feeling of danger for ride patrons 
stands in sharp contrast to the traditional role of common carriers to 
merely provide the public with transportation to and from the 
workplace.263 
Other courts argued that a patron’s purpose made no difference in 
extending the heightened standard because some passengers on early 
carriers rode along for recreation,264 such as sightseeing or just for the 
sake of traveling.265  These courts also noted that amusement ride 
operators were technically common carriers because rides were “open to 
the public, for carriage upon a fixed route and operated for reward.”266 
c.  Public Policy Justifications 
Third, courts also provided different public policy justifications for 
applying the heightened standard to water-ride operators.  Most of these 
policy concerns related to vulnerable patrons or a desire for water-ride 
operators to adopt additional safety precautions.267  Sometimes courts 
mixed concerns with vulnerable patrons with the control disparity by 
                                                          
 260.  See id. at 6, 8 (discussing cases where the patron’s purposes and expectation of danger was 
the justification for denying common carrier liability); Kaczorowski, supra note 42, at 1148 
(explaining how early common carriers served a key “public interest”).   
 261.   Nalwa v. Cedar Fair, LP, 290 P.3d 1158, 1160 (Cal. 2012) (applying assumption of risk 
doctrine to injuries from bumper cars because patrons assume and expect inherent injury risks by 
riding on thrill rides). 
 262.  See Avery & Dickson, supra note 10, at 299–300 (discussing the expectations of patrons). 
 263.  See Cerola, supra note 234, at 6 (discussing a case holding that an “amusement park was 
not a common carrier simply upon the basis that the defendant did not provide public transportation 
in the traditional sense that was ordinarily associated with common carriers.  It . . . did not perform a 
public service in transporting passengers from one point to differing points of location, but merely 
provided transport on its own premises.”).   
 264.  See id. at 12 (discovering that “jurisdictions that impose common carrier liability do so 
based upon the finding that amusement ride operators simply fit the technical definition of a 
common carrier in that they are open to the public, for carriage . . .  and operated for reward.”).  The 
patron’s purpose is thus a secondary consideration with little weight.  Id.  However, the operator’s 
control and risk of harm are still important factors for several courts.  
 265.  See Gomez v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 41, 48 (Cal. 2005) (noting recreational uses of 
trains and other earlier carriers and accordingly holding that purpose “does not determine whether 
the provider of the transportation is a carrier for reward”); O’Callaghan v. Dellwood Park Co., 89 
N.E. 1005, 1006–07 (Ill. 1909) (analogizing by asking if  “the motive which causes a person to take 
passage make any difference as to the degree of responsibility with which the carrier is charged? 
Passenger elevators are frequently operated in buildings in order to convey persons to some vantage 
point where they can overlook a great city or some other object of interest, and trips on electric cars 
are often made solely for pleasure.”).   
 266.  Cerola, supra note 234, at 12; see, e.g., Lewis v. Buckskin Joe’s, Inc., 396 P.2d 933, 938–
39 (Colo. 1964) (linking control and patron vulnerability, but ignoring patron purpose). 
 267.  See supra notes 223–26 (providing examples of different policy rationales). 
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arguing that patrons had entrusted their safety to the ride operator and 
were thus helpless to avoid injury due to the inability to control the ride’s 
direction or speed.268 
Courts’ main concern with vulnerable patrons was the degree to 
which patrons understood the risk of injury on various rides.269  Some 
courts reasoned that all patrons on extreme rides, like roller coasters, 
were “subjected to much greater danger than is generally realized.”270  
Other courts disapproved of ride operators’ advertising of parks and rides 
in a way that appealed to children because children, it was thought, could 
not appreciate the risks involved with the various rides.271  With water 
rides, some courts also pointed out the unique and less-obvious risk of 
drowning272 or being electrocuted from water-to-wire contact while on a 
water ride.273 
While these policy concerns were understandable, courts often 
ignored the traditional common carrier characteristics in favor of 
individual ride features and abstract public policy goals.274  As a result, 
the heightened standard slowly detached from its common carrier roots, 
and courts focused on an even broader set of concerns that deepened the 
well of inconsistencies and expanded the pool of issues that divided 
courts across the nation.275 
                                                          
 268.  See Chavez v. Cedar Fair, LP, No. WD 75373, 2013 Mo. App. LEXIS 843, at *5, *7 (Mo. 
Ct. App. July 16, 2013). 
 269.  Bibeau v. Fred W. Pearce Corp., 217 N.W. 374, 376 (Minn. 1928) (applying heightened 
standard of care based on alleged patron ignorance of roller coaster risks). 
 270.  Id.   
 271.  See Gomez v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 41, 45–46 (Cal. 2005) (discussing limited ability of 
children and other patrons to appreciate risks of roller coasters). 
 272.   See Kyia v. Lake Compounce Theme Park, Inc., No. CV 010807302S, 2002 WL 1949222, 
at *1–2 (Conn. Super. Ct. July 22, 2002) (noting concern over six-year-old boy who “was permitted 
to ride alone in a ‘Lake Plunge’ ride down a water slide in an inner tube which flipped over, causing 
the decedent to be thrown beneath the surface of the lake and suffer injuries which led to his death 
six days later,” and connecting the injury to ‘“failing to see that infant plaintiff was too small to ride 
said water ride without an adult,’ supplemented by all the other allegations of the ride’s height and 
lack of safety measures, adequately sets forth a claim of reckless conduct”); see also Austin, supra 
note 129 (discussing patrons who drowned in wading pools but connecting their deaths to their 
choice to enter the pool without knowing how to swim). 
 273.  See Austin, supra note 129 (discussing patron who was electrocuted after stepping out of a 
kayak and into water); Loope v. Goodings Million Dollar Midways, Inc., 553 S.W.2d 573, 574–75 
(Tenn. 1977) (“Petitioner sustained electrical shock when she touched a metal handrail while at the 
same time standing on wet ground, as she was preparing to enter one of the cars or cages of the 
midway ride.  Subsequent investigation revealed that a short had occurred in the electrical circuits 
supplying current to the lights on the unit.”).   
 274.  See supra notes 234–35 (demonstrating disconnect between traditional justifications and 
modern applications). 
 275.  See supra notes 14, 18, 232, 236 (providing cases where courts focused on particular ride 
features). 
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2.  Blurring Lines Between Similar and Dissimilar Water Rides 
Several courts argue that the appropriate liability standard depends 
on the particular type of ride at issue.276  By varying the liability standard 
based on a ride’s characteristics, courts attempt to draw lines of 
demarcation between rides subject to reasonable care and rides 
demanding heightened care.  Courts sketch these dividing lines based on 
various ride characteristics, public policy concerns, and common carrier 
elements.277  But courts disagree over the characteristics and concerns 
that call for one liability standard instead of another.278  This 
disagreement has flooded water ride litigation.  Courts applying a 
heightened standard to operators of a certain type of water ride “are just 
as numerous as those not requiring such, and just as diverse in their 
rationale[s] in arriving at their conclusions.”279  But, with water rides, 
courts continually struggle to draw meaningful lines of demarcation 
because the infinite combinations of characteristics, designs, features, 
and risks make it impossible for courts to consistently apply the same 
standard to the same “types” of rides.280 
                                                          
 276.  See Chavez v. Cedar Fair, LP, No. WD 75373, 2013 Mo. App. LEXIS 843, at *13 (Mo. Ct. 
App. July 16, 2013) (explaining that the liability standard depended on the circumstances); Chad A. 
Gerardi, Note, A Tale Involving the Magic Kingdom, Pirates, and a Court’s Broad Interpretation of 
Common Carrier Liability, 1 CHAP. L. REV. 171, 183 (1998) (“However, the majority of the rides, 
such as Peter Pan’s Flight, It’s a Small World, the Haunted Mansion and Pirates of the Caribbean, 
are innocuous excursions in which persons of every age may ride comfortably.  An illogical result 
would exist if these rides are considered common carriers, while holding the park’s roller coasters 
are not common carriers because of the perceived risks.  This variety in the types of amusement rides 
underscores the problem with [a] broad holding that amusement park rides are per se common 
carriers. . . .”). 
 277.  See supra Part III.A.1 (outlining general inconsistencies). 
 278.  See supra notes 14–15, 221 (providing specific inconsistencies); Gerardi, supra note 276, 
at 176 (stating that “courts nationwide have struggled with the degree of care owed by amusement 
park operators” (citing Neubauer v. Disneyland, Inc. 875 F. Supp. 672, 673 (C.D. Cal. 1995))).  
 279.  Cerola, supra note 234, at 9. 
 280.  See Gerardi, supra note 276, at 183 (explaining that the “variety in the types” of rides 
makes it impossible for a broad holding about ride liability to accommodate those different risks); 
Deutsch v. Chubb Grp. of Ins. Cos., Civ. A. No. 95–B–331, 1995 WL 584394 (D. Colo. 1995) 
(white water rafting operator held not a common carrier); Avery & Dickson, supra note 10, at 305–
06 (“The decision of the California Supreme Court to apply common carrier law to amusement rides 
and device might be the opposite end of the spectrum for the industry; placing an undue burden on 
owners and operators in California to achieve unrealistic expectations. The reality of the matter is 
that the industry is providing ride and device experiences that are unique to each rider . . . . The 
combination of ride and device types, rider decisions, operator considerations, inspections practices, 
oversight, and design play a role in each incident . . . . The industry is inviting guests to actively 
participate or be transported on numerous rides and devices of varying extremes. Each rider is 
unique and their experiences and knowledge with amusement rides and devices diverse.”) (citation 
omitted).   
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Take water slides, for example.  To name just a few differences, 
patrons may slide through a channel on their backs, on a raft, or in a tube.  
Rafts and inner tubes might have nylon handles, harnesses, seatbelts, or 
no restraints at all.281  The water slide could be anywhere from 10-feet 
tall to nearly 140-feet tall.282  Patrons might reach speeds of up to sixty-
five miles per hour283 for varying lengths of time or on slides with 
different designs.284  Some slides have massive water pumps that churn 
out thousands of gallons of water into the slide’s channel on an hourly 
basis,285 and other slides have no water pumps at all.286  Some slides are 
enclosed and run underwater, while other slides are open and 
aboveground.287  Even more, water slides have different twists, turns, 
drops, safety mechanisms, operation procedures, construction materials, 
wiring systems, water depths, and other unique features.  And these are 
just a few differences between water slides!288  With just as many 
differences between any water-ride category, it does little good to apply 
the same standard to a ride based on an artificial label like “log flume” or 
“water rapids.”  After all, each amusement park intentionally designs 
rides that are different from those in other parks, which all but guarantees 
that water rides will only grow in difference.289 
By trying to navigate the vast conglomerate of water-ride 
characteristics, courts often get distracted by a ride’s complex 
mechanical features and overlook the core, historical justifications for 
                                                          
 281.  See Rivere v. Thunderbird, Inc., 353 So. 2d 346, 347 (La. Ct. App. 1977) (running water 
and no raft on slide); Rossetti v. Busch Entm’t Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 415, 416–17 (E.D. Pa. 2000) 
(oversized rafts in narrow slide channel); Greenwood v. Busch Entm’t Corp., 101 F. Supp. 2d 292, 
293 (E.D. Pa. 2000) (slide without raft but with three-foot-deep pool as landing spot); Kyia v. Lake 
Compounce Theme Park, Inc., CV010807302S, 2002 WL 1949222, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. July 22, 
2002) (slide with innertube that landed in a lake); Chavez, 2013 Mo. App. LEXIS 843, at *1–4 (raft 
with nylon handles that seated multiple patrons); Neubauer v. Disneyland, Inc., 875 F. Supp. 672, 
673 (C.D. Cal. 1995) (larger boats that collided on the surface); Ortiz ex rel. Ortiz v. Splish Splash 
Adventureland, Inc., 17 Misc. 3d 1104(A), *1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2007) (steep slide with no raft or 
innertube but patrons propelled by pressurized water jets); Austin, supra note 129 (noting sharp 
slides with enclosures and loops were common but dangerous). 
 282.  See supra notes 132, 139–41 (providing specific types of ride restraints); Insane 17-Story 
Waterslide Coming to Schlitterbahn, FOX 4 NEWS (Nov. 19, 2013, 2:05 PM), http://fox4kc.com/ 
2013/11/19/insane-17-story-waterslide-coming-to-schlitterbahn/. 
 283.  See supra notes 8, 134, 178 (listing different speeds patrons travel on different rides).  
 284.  See discussion supra Part II.B.2 (discussing infinite variations in ride designs). 
 285.  See supra notes 137, 141; infra notes 326, 340, 462 (discussing differences in rides with 
water pumps).   
 286.  See supra notes 125–27, 132–35 (showing differences between rides without water pumps).  
 287.  See supra note 280. 
 288.  See discussion supra Part II.B.2.  
 289.  See supra notes 122, 137–43 (showing how parks strategically build unique rides); Avery 
& Dickson, supra note 10, at 305–11 (noting that competition created unique rides). 
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imposing common carrier liability. 290  Consequently, whether a ride has, 
for example, a raft with nylon handles, becomes more important than a 
patron’s inability to prevent incoming harm on a particular ride.291  More 
importantly, by focusing solely on the control disparity, courts risk 
incentivizing operators to remove safety restraints on rides in order to 
avoid the heightened standard. 
Courts also ensure a constant stream of future litigation by applying 
different liability standards to different types of rides.292  Given the 
multitude of water-ride characteristics, parties can always find several 
differences between the ride at issue and some “similar” ride from 
another case where the court applied a reasonable care or heightened 
standard.293  For instance, after surveying cases where courts applied 
common carrier liability to operators of amusement rides with 
supposedly similar features, the California Supreme Court held the 
operator of a Disneyland roller coaster to the heightened standard 
because, according to the court, elevated liability balanced the profit 
made from transporting patrons along the ride’s sharp curves and steep 
inclines.294  That rationale created more confusion than clarity because 
whether a ride had “steep inclines” or “sharp curves” was a subjective 
determination that varied for every person, ride, and court.295  More 
concerning was that these vague descriptions focused more on a ride’s 
                                                          
 290.  See Rivere v. Thunderbird, Inc., 353 So. 2d 346, 348 (La. Ct. App. 1977) (citing Givens v. 
De Soto Bldg. Co., 156 La. 377 (1924)) (focusing on ride appearance more than carrier similarities); 
Best Park & Amusement Co. v. Rollins, 68 So. 417, 418 (Ala. 1915) (focusing on “[t]he steep 
inclines, sharp curves and great speed” when applying heightened standard of care to amusement 
park ride (quoting O’Callaghan v. Dellwood Park Co., 89 N.E. 1005, 1007 (Ill. 1909))). 
 291.  See Chavez v. Cedar Fair, LP, No. WD75373, 2013 Mo. App. LEXIS 843, at *13–14 (Mo. 
Ct. App. July 16, 2013) (focusing more on the raft’s specific design features than on traditional 
carrier rules and rationales). 
 292.  See Stephen M. Sullivan, Note, Of Thrill Rides and Bar Fights: Gomez v. Superior Court, 
Delgado v. Trax Bar & Grill, and the Expanding Duty of Care in California, 36 SW. U. L. REV. 59, 
73 (2007) (“Because of Gomez, parties must litigate the issue of what constitutes the ‘mode and 
characteristic’ of the ride in addition to what is ‘reasonable’ in the operation of the attraction.”). 
 293.  See supra notes 122, 137–43, 280 (highlighting infinite ride variations). 
 294.  Gomez v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 41, 45–46 (Cal. 2005). 
 295.  See Goodfried, supra note 38, at 22–23 (“With this decision, operators of amusement parks 
will lack a clear understanding of the liability for attractions other than roller coasters in their own 
park. The plain language of the opinion states that roller coasters and other similar attractions can be 
common carriers, but never defines or explains what is included in ‘other dissimiliar, amusement 
rides.’ A roller coaster is defined as a ‘steep, sharply curving elevated railway with small open 
passenger cars that is operated at high speeds as a ride, especially in an amusement park.’ The 
question remains whether only rides with railways and high speeds are considered similar 
attractions, or, whether the court considers attractions that offer similar thrills to be common carriers. 
Hypothetically, a large Ferris Wheel, which might be considered more prone to causing injuries than 
a typical roller coaster, might not be a common carrier, leaving major liability questions 
unanswered.”); Sullivan, supra note 292 (explaining confusion over differing water ride types). 
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appearance than on the traditional common carrier justifications for 
imposing elevated liability.296 
As a result, injured patrons and ride operators cascaded into 
California courts to litigate the appropriate liability standard for each 
amusement ride—from different roller coasters297 to bumper cars in a 
variety of sizes298—based on each ride’s unique characteristics.299  
Additionally, there was no incentive to settle these cases because patrons 
wanted to broaden the application of the heightened liability standard, 
and ride operators wanted the narrow the standard.  Nevertheless, 
seemingly with each district, appellate, or California Supreme Court 
case, courts provided inconsistent rationales and focused on distinct ride 
characteristics to determine the applicable liability standard for a 
particular ride.300  Regrettably, this confusion and inconsistency 
inundates courts across the nation.301  Thus, a court’s decision about the 
liability standard for a tall, fast, raft-based ride typically does not resolve 
the liability question for slides with different handles, sizes, speeds, or 
heights. 
Ultimately, neither patrons nor ride operators can predict which 
liability standard and tort concepts apply to patrons’ injury claims.302  In 
fact, with future technological advances sure to multiply the features and 
types of water rides303—on top of each amusement park’s goals to offer 
unique rides304—attempts to draw lines of demarcation along the water-
ride spectrum will create more confusion, encourage additional litigation, 
                                                          
 296.  See Gomez, 113 P.3d at 45–46 (Cal. 2005) (focusing on danger and not providing a clear 
test for common carrier application). 
 297.  See Cerola, supra note 234, at 8–12 (noting confusion over roller coasters with different 
features). 
 298.  See Nalwa v. Cedar Fair, LP, 290 P.3d 1158, 1160 (Cal. 2013) (applying assumption of risk 
doctrine to injuries from bumper cars). 
 299.  See Gomez, 113 P.3d at 45–46; Gerardi, supra note 276, at 171 (“This standard, while 
simple conceptually, has proven difficult in its application. When interpreting this statute, the 
California courts have struggled with defining a common carrier.”). 
 300.  See Goodfried, supra note 38, at 22–23; Sullivan, supra note 292, at 73 (reviewing 
confusion in California over governing standards for ride operators). 
 301.  See Gerardi, supra note 276, at 171 n.3 (“This standard, while simple conceptually, has 
proven difficult in its application. When interpreting this statute, the California courts have struggled 
with defining a common carrier.”) (citing “B.E. Witkin, Summary of California Law, vol. 6, §§ 767–
73 (9th ed. 1988)); see also Webster v. Ebright, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 714 (Ct. App. 1992) (operator of 
horseback rides held to a duty of ordinary care); McIntyre v. Smoke Tree Ranch Stables, 23 Cal. 
Rptr. 339 (Ct. App. 1962) (operator of a mule train held to a duty of utmost care and diligence).  
 302.  See Avery & Dickson, supra note 10, at 304 (explaining confusion for industry and courts 
over appropriate standard and scope of liability).   
 303.  See id. at 305–10 (noting safety features, new designs, and new features that will grow as 
technology advances).   
 304.  See supra notes 17–18, 122, 137–43 (discussing one-of-a-kind rides).  
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and add to the number of inconsistent standards to which ride operators 
are held. 
3.  Effect of Inconsistent Standards on the Amusement Park and Water-
Ride Industry 
Courts crushed the amusement industry’s efforts to reduce ride 
injuries by developing definitive industry standards.305  Amusement 
parks repeatedly tried to unify and streamline water-ride safety 
measures.306  Parks tried to collaborate by sharing accident data and 
safety-test results to determine the most effective precautions.307  But it 
did not matter what experts agreed was the best safety measure, 
equipment, or procedure, because each state required operators to use or 
do something else.308 
The optimum precaution was not always the precaution courts 
required.309  Some courts required less, while others required something 
more without explaining what more could feasibly be done to protect 
passengers.310  And while state legislatures and industry organizations 
also created a body of divergent safety requirements and laws, it was 
courts that drove the nail in the coffin by spawning a vast body of 
conflicting interpretations of organizational and legislative 
requirements.311  One commentator explained that inconsistent standards 
decreased ride safety because: 
[A]cross the USA, amusement ride and device owners and operators 
are being subjected to varying approaches to industry safety based on 
state-by-state objectives and concerns.  The existing standards are 
being interpreted and applied inconsistently as a result.  Many . . . 
change based on the number of rides, employees, and/or location of the 
facility or temporary event.  This haphazard approach does little to 
                                                          
 305.  See Avery & Dickson, supra note 10, at 309 (noting effect of inconsistent standards on ride 
safety). 
 306.  See id. at 304–05 (discussing attempts to improve safety measures derailed by inconsistent 
standards). 
 307.  See id. at 305 (highlighting independent park efforts). 
 308.  See id. at 309 (pointing out the struggle to unify ride standards). 
 309.  See id. (noting that improved mechanical devices could not be implemented without 
violating the inflexible engineering standards). 
 310.  See Gomez v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 41, 45–48 (Cal. 2005) (providing abstract 
requirements of care for common carries without any technical specifications explaining how they 
could have exercised more care). 
 311.  See Avery & Dickson, supra note 10, at 306–08 (identifying the magnified problem with 
legislative involvement because having so many different agencies effectively dilutes industry safety 
efforts as well as industry voice). 
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assist in the unification of safety efforts industry wide and potentially 
inhibits the closure of any gaps realized from previous incidents or 
situations.312 
Furthermore, due to these inconsistent standards, there are now “a 
large faction” of ride operators “who are simply unaware, choose to 
ignore, or do not have to abide by” the various legal liability standards 
and safety requirements.313  Thus, courts’ attempts to draw lines in the 
sand do little to promote safety but do much to increase the risk of patron 
injury. 
B.  A Flood of Flaws that Flow from the Heightened Standard 
This section compares the heightened standard of care with the 
reasonable care standard.  It concludes that the reasonable care standard: 
(1) places liability on the actor who is best able to control the risk of 
injury; (2) prevents unlimited liability by providing clear guidelines; and 
(3) decreases prejudice.314 
1.  Liability for Controllable Risks 
The foundational common carrier rationales support the application 
of a reasonable care standard to water-ride operators because patrons 
have significant control and freedom on water rides.  Originally, courts 
created the heightened standard to protect passengers in horse-drawn 
stagecoaches and early trains315 because those passengers could neither 
prevent nor cause harm.316  But water-ride patrons are often free to jump, 
                                                          
 312.  Id. at 310. 
 313.  Id. at 309. 
 314.  See Union Traction Co. of Ind. v. Berry, 121 N.E. 655, 658 (Ind. 1919) (arguing jury 
instruction with heightened standard prejudices the defendant); Houston & T.C. Ry. Co. v. Keeling, 
120 S.W. 847, 848 (Tex. 1909) (noting highest degree of care jury instruction by itself is inadequate 
because “attempting to define the carrier’s duty only by the use of an adjective, are not apt to convey 
to the minds of jurors any very definite conception of the subject.”). 
 315.  See Kaczorowski, supra note 42, at 1164–65 (discussing the disjunction between different 
time periods and fault analysis); Gerardi, supra note 276, at 184 (“California’s common carrier 
statute was enacted in 1872. At that time, the primary sources of transportation were horses, 
stagecoaches, steamboats, and railways. Legislation was enacted to regulate the new transportation 
era. Arguably, the intent was to provide safety in transportation, not entertainment. After all, the first 
roller coaster in the United States was not in operation until 1884. The first Ferris wheel was 
introduced in Chicago in 1893. California’s first amusement park opened for business at Santa Cruz 
in 1904.”). 
 316.  See Kaczorowski, supra note 42, at 1158 (noting passengers were helpless and unable to 
anticipate or prevent accidents while being transported by a carrier). 
832 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63 
swim, or move around.317  And unlike a train or stagecoach passenger, a 
patron on a water slide does not ride in an enclosed vehicle that the 
operator drives and controls.318 
Moreover, the operator might inspect the slide and offer warnings, 
but the operator cannot stop a patron from grabbing hold of the side and 
intentionally jumping out of the slide.  Likewise, a ride operator cannot 
stop one patron from pulling on the side of an inflatable raft to overturn 
it.  Ultimately, with patrons having so much freedom and control, 
applying the heightened standard forces a ride operator to bear the cost of 
injuries that are caused by a patron’s irresponsible behavior.319  That 
result is at odds with courts’ justification for refusing to apply strict 
liability to passenger carriers—to incentivize cautious passenger 
behavior by limiting the heightened standard to cases where patrons 
cannot protect themselves.320 
Furthermore, a ride operator’s conduct is merely one of several 
industry-related factors that may contribute to a patron’s injury.321  For 
example, a patron’s injury might be the result of a design flaw, 
construction error, installation mistake, ride-operator error, unsafe 
condition on the premises, the patron’s own conduct, or a fellow patron’s 
conduct—to name a few potential causes.322  In theory, an operator error, 
such as failing to secure a lap bar, should be easily distinguished from a 
construction error, such as failing to waterproof a section of electrical 
conduit.  But, in practice, courts blur these different factors and apply a 
broad interpretation of operation.323 
So, while operation may be defined as ‘running’ a ride, there is no 
bright line test for separating non-operational activities.324  Moreover, 
                                                          
 317.  See Beard, supra note 253 (noting freedom to move on water slides).   
 318.  See id.; see also supra note 280.   
 319.  See Beard, supra note 253 (connecting heightened operator liability with decreased patron 
caution).  
 320.  See Conver v. EKH Co., No. 02AP-1307, 2003 WL 22176815, at *5–9 (Ohio Ct. App. 
Sept. 23, 2003) (connecting precaution and prevention in a case involving injury to limousine 
passengers). 
 321.  See Avery & Dickson, supra note 10, at 305–06 (pointing to multitude of causes in ride 
injuries).   
 322.  See id. (noting that operation is just one aspect of causal factors for patron injuries, and 
listing ride and device types, rider decisions, operator considerations, inspection practices, oversight, 
and design as potential causes of a patron’s injury).   
 323.  See Beard, supra note 253 (highlighting overlooked differences between negligent 
construction and negligent operation).   
 324.  See Chavez v. Cedar Fair, LP, No. WD 75373, 2013 Mo. App. LEXIS 843, *13–18 (Mo. 
Ct. App. July 16, 2013) (conflating ride operation with ride construction by imposing heightened 
liability based on the design and construction of the rafts’ safety features, but largely ignoring how 
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this blurring makes the operator liable for injuries caused by construction 
errors or design flaws—despite the operator’s minimal ability to control 
those problems.325  In fact, a ride operator may perform daily test runs 
and inspections, yet still be liable for injuries caused by a latent 
manufacturing defect in, for example, a computer chip or valve pump.326  
And while operators are expected to inspect and maintain rides, operators 
are not experts in the computer programming or mechanics of each 
water-ride component.327 
Furthermore, unlike the early 1800s when common carriers often 
owned, built, and maintained their own stagecoaches,328 modern rides are 
increasingly complex.329  Requiring operators to inspect each nut and 
bolt, along with having expertise for each unique ride component, creates 
a standard of care that is impossible to satisfy.330 
Despite operators’ limited control over the potential causes of an 
accident, several courts single out ride operators when applying the 
heightened standard by only applying a reasonable care standard to the 
other potentially culpable actors.331  Thus, even when a patron’s injury is 
clearly the result of a construction error, patrons are incentivized to craft 
                                                          
careful the ride operator was in actually using those devices), rev’d, No. SC93658, 2014 Mo. LEXIS 
220 at *1 (Mo. Nov. 12, 2014). 
 325.  See Beard, supra note 253 (highlighting overlooked differences between negligent 
construction and negligent operation in court’s analysis and decisions); Avery & Dickson, supra 
note 10, at 305–06 (expressing concern over unachievable precaution requirement). 
 326.  See Avery & Dickson, supra note 10, at 305–06, 311–12 (explaining operators’ limited 
ability to prevent accidents where there is a flaw in the design). 
 327.  See id.  
 328.  See Webb, supra note 42, at 1086–87 (discussing stagecoach accidents as an origin of the 
res ipsa loquitor doctrine).  
 329.  See Avery & Dickson, supra note 10, at 305–06 (pointing to multitude of causes in ride 
injuries).   
 330.  See id. at 305–06 (arguing that effect of carrier liability on ride operators is “placing an 
undue burden on owners and operators in California to achieve unrealistic expectations.  The reality 
of the matter is that the industry is providing ride and device experiences that are unique to each 
rider.  As a result, the industry and external agencies must contend with the fact that the combination 
of ride and device types, rider decisions, operator considerations, inspections practices, oversight, 
and design play a role in each incident.”). 
 331.  See discussion supra Part III.B.1.  For an in depth examination of the theoretical 
applications of these standards, see James Fleming Jr., Functions of Judge and Jury in Negligence 
Cases, 58 YALE L.J. 667 (1949); Steven Hetcher, The Jury’s Out: Social Norms’ Misunderstood 
Role in Negligence Law, 91 GEO. L.J. 633, 633–34 (2003); Stephen G. Gilles, On Determining 
Negligence: Hand Formula Balancing, the Reasonable Person Standard, and the Jury, 54 VAND. L. 
REV. 813, 814–15 (2001); Richard W. Wright, Hand, Posner, and the Myth of the “Hand Formula”, 
4 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 145, 148 (2003); Ashley M. Votruba, Comment, Will the Real 
Reasonable Person Please Stand Up? Using Psychology to Better Understand How Juries Interpret 
and Apply the Reasonable Person Standard, 45 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 703, 704–05 (2013); Alan D. Miller & 
Ronen Perry, The Reasonable Person, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 323, 333–34 (2012); Zipursky, supra note 
60, at 2015–17. 
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their pleadings to shift the blame to the ride operator, as the heightened 
standard increases the likely settlement value or trial award.332  
Additionally, even if the construction company is joined to the case, the 
operator is still disadvantaged because the jury instructions will require a 
higher level of caution from the operator and, thereby, suggest to the 
jurors that the construction company has less responsibility for the 
construction error.  As a result, liability falls on the ride operator, who is 
the party least capable of preventing the harm, and the construction 
company—whose engineers, experiences, and experts place it in the best 
position to detect and correct the error—avoids responsibility for its 
actions.333 
To make matters worse, ride operators are often prohibited by 
various standards and regulations “from making design changes or 
modifications[,] even when they may enhance the ride’s safety.”334  
Given that most safety issues stem from design and construction 
defects,335 it makes little sense to impose heightened liability on a ride 
operator and, consequently, place the full cost of a defect on an operator 
who is prohibited from making any repairs. 
Ride operators may also be punished twice when held to a 
heightened standard.  For example, in Chavez, the Missouri Court of 
Appeals upheld a verdict that effectively required the water-slide 
operator to install a different type of safety restraint in the rafts in order 
to satisfy the heightened standard of care.336  This creates a lose-lose 
scenario because, on one hand, failing to alter the raft restraints exposes 
the slide operator to significant liability from any future patron 
injuries.337  On the other hand, by changing the restraints, the slide 
                                                          
 332.  See Beard, supra note 253 (explaining how patrons will target operators for large verdicts); 
Votruba, supra note 331, at 714 (noting the effect on the settlement process when parties realize 
jurors are more likely to find in their favor based on a prejudicial instruction).  
 333.  See Kaczorowski, supra note 42, at 1199 (explaining common carrier approach to 
“culpability and causation: Whoever was in the best position to avoid an injury was liable for it.”). 
 334.  Avery & Dickson, supra note 10, at 311. 
 335.  See id. (noting that most early safety defects stemmed from design defects).  
 336.  Chavez v. Cedar Fair, LP, No. WD 75373, 2013 Mo. App. LEXIS 843, at *1–2, *8 (Mo. 
Ct. App. July 16, 2013), rev’d, No. SC93658, 2014 Mo. LEXIS 220, at *26 (Mo. Nov. 12, 2014). 
 337.  See Avery & Dickson, supra note 10, at 304 (“Essentially, this means that the patron is 
provided with a level of protection; however, the protection is commonly experienced after an 
incident on an amusement ride or device.  Regardless if a state or entity has adopted the standards 
whole or in part, the organization could be held to design and manufacture, testing, operation, 
maintenance, inspection, and quality assurance practices within the standards. . . .  ASTM F 24 
standards are still evolving in an effort to address the complexity and ever-changing landscape of the 
amusement ride and device industry.”); Cereola & Foucar-Szocki, supra note 28, at 51–52 (“[S]tate 
laws and regulations constitute the floor or minimum standard of conduct for determining the duty of 
care owed patrons.  It is well settled tort law that compliance with governmental laws and 
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operator is likely to violate either state regulations or standards enforced 
by ride-inspection specialists because of the strict requirements and 
restrictions on installing different restraints in a water-slide raft.338  
However, in addition to resolving this dilemma by reversing the 
appellate court, the Missouri Supreme Court also pointed out that looser 
straps (the type that the jury found to be unsafe) are essential on steep 
raft rides because patrons restrained by buckles or bars could drown if 
the raft flipped over.339  That comment is significant because it shows 
how the heightened standard may force operators to replace safe devices 
(loose straps) with dangerous devices (bars or buckles) in order to avoid 
future liability. 
In comparison, the reasonable care standard does not require ride 
operators to violate safety regulations in order to avoid liability for 
construction or design defects.340  For example, in one New York case, 
an injured patron sued a ride operator after a defective water pump 
malfunctioned and shot the patron onto the ground.341  The operator 
provided evidence of thorough, daily pump inspections, and the court 
quickly found that the latent pump defect was a manufacturer’s error for 
which the ride operator was not liable.342  As the court noted, while 
operators have a duty to reasonably inspect their rides, “reasonability” 
embodies the understanding that even the most thorough inspections 
cannot identify every potential flaw.343  The outcome in that case is just 
one example of how the reasonable care standard ensures that liability 
does not extend beyond the risks that the actor can control. 
                                                          
regulations does not automatically equate to the level of care required of a “reasonably prudent 
person” . . . [h]owever, failure to comply . . . would most certainly be strong evidence of 
negligence.”).   
 338.  See ASTM, Standard Practice for Classification, Design, Manufacture, Construction, and 
Operation of Water Slide Systems, in ASTM F2376-2006: STANDARD PRACTICE FOR DESIGN OF 
AMUSEMENT RIDES AND DEVICES 1549–52 (2006), available at https://law.resource.org/ 
pub/us/code/ibr/astm.f2376.2006.pdf (providing over fifty of the premier standard-setting 
organization’s requirements that apply to modification of raft restraints). 
 339.  Chavez, 2014 Mo. LEXIS 220, at *1. 
 340.  Ortiz v. Splish Splash at Adventureland, Inc., No. 10045/05, at 3 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Sept. 17, 
2007) (pointing out that ride operator had a record of performed inspections for water pressure 
defects and, with nothing discovered, was not liable anyway because that would be a design defect 
instead of operational cause). 
 341.  See id. (alleging operator failed to locate error that shot patron out of slide). 
 342.  Id.  
 343.  See id. (finding that prior inspections satisfied the operator’s duty of reasonable care, even 
though the operator did not discover the product defect); Avery & Dickson, supra note 10, at 305 
(noting it is an impossible standard to require operators to identify every potential flaw). 
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2.  Avoiding Infinite Operator Liability by Adopting a Clear Standard 
The heightened standard’s ambiguity creates conflict with the 
foundational goal of early carrier jurisprudence by transforming 
operators into “insurers of their passengers’ safety.”344  This “insurer 
effect” is common today because courts have failed to articulate a 
concrete test to prevent the heightened standard from having a strict 
liability effect.345  In addition, it is unclear where reasonable care ends 
and heightened care begins.346  Does a ride operator satisfy the 
heightened duty by inspecting a ride six times a day, or do six 
inspections only equate to reasonable care?  If six inspections are 
reasonable, then would seven inspections satisfy the heightened duty?  
Or does the heightened duty require twelve inspections?  There is no 
answer to those questions because there is no specific legal test to 
distinguish reasonable care from the heightened standard of care. 
Nevertheless, patrons insist that reasonable care permits fewer 
precautions than under a heightened standard of care.347  Certainly, courts 
phrase the scope of the heightened standard differently by using labels 
like “the utmost degree of care of very prudent persons,” “the highest 
degree of care,” “the highest degree of care that is possible to human 
foresight and prudence,” “the greatest possible care and diligence,” and 
with other similar descriptions.348  Yet the precise meaning of those 
phrases is unknown.349  And because reasonable care demands 
precautions that are proportionate to an activity’s risks, phrases like the 
                                                          
 344.  Gomez v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 41, 44 (Cal. 2005) (quoting Lopez v. S. Cal. Rapid 
Transit Dist., 710 P.2d 907 (Cal. 1985)).   
 345.  See Westerbeke, supra note 29, at 14 n.76 (noting that jurors are unlikely to measure the 
limits of “the highest degree of care,” but most people can grasp the meaning of “reasonable” in 
determining if a person took sufficient precaution based on foreseeable risks); Westerbeke & 
McAllister, supra note 61, at 1065 (explaining that phrases like “the highest degree of care” are 
frequently applied but rarely defined with a measurable test). 
 346.  See Westerbeke, supra note 29, at 14 n.76 (asserting that the heightened standard has no 
measurable dividing line, which makes it more likely that jurors will effectively apply a strict 
liability approach). 
 347.  See, e.g., id. (exploring the Kansas Supreme Court’s concern in a firearm entrustment case 
that applying a reasonable care standard would not require strong enough precautions to prevent 
injuries from shootings); Nalwa v. Cedar Fair, L.P., 290 P.3d 1158, 1167 (Cal. 2012) (involving 
patron alleging highest degree of care breached because bumper car sat a hair of an angle too high, 
which would have been a permissible angle under a reasonable care standard). 
 348.  See Chavez v. Cedar Fair, LP, No. WD 75373, 2013 Mo. App. LEXIS 843, at *10–11 (Mo. 
Ct. App. July 16, 2013), rev’d, No. SC93658, 2014 Mo. LEXIS 220 (Mo. Nov. 12, 2014) (offering 
various descriptions); Fredericks v. N. Cent. R.R. Co., 27 A. 689, 691 (Penn. 1893) (providing 
additional descriptions).  
 349.  See Beard, supra note 253 (pointing out that heightened standard is unclear and demands 
unreasonable precautions). 
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“the highest degree of care” must require a ride operator to either take 
unreasonable precautions or somehow foresee risks that are invisible to a 
reasonable operator.350  In reality, the lack of a quantifiable or bright line 
distinction between the standards makes the heightened standard a proxy 
for strict liability because there is always something more that an 
operator could have done to prevent an injury—making hindsight the 
focus, instead of what the operator could control or foresee at the time.351 
a.  The Ever-Moving Ceiling 
Patrons use the heightened standard’s ambiguity to argue that ride 
operators just barely missed the mark.  In one Texas case, the court 
suggested that an operator could have breached the highest degree of 
care standard—despite exercising ordinary care, using a top-of-the-line 
engine guard to prevent sparks from escaping and causing damage, 
“carefully and skillfully handl[ing]” the device, and performing proper 
inspections.352  The court speculated that there “might have” been a 
better guard, and that better guard still “might not be the safest,” so the 
possibility that the operator could have done “something more” meant 
that the operator could still be liable.353  However, the court neither 
determined if a better guard actually existed, nor did the court clarify 
how much better a guard or alternative precaution needed to be in order 
to satisfy the heightened standard.354  Hence, the patrons were free to 
hypothesize to a jury about microscopic changes the operators could 
have made that might have prevented an injury—maybe.  Effectively, 
patrons could allege that an operator’s extensive precautions came close, 
but there was still no cigar because whatever an operator did only 
constituted reasonable care, and the highest degree of care required the 
                                                          
 350.  See Union Traction Co. of Ind. v. Berry, 121 N.E. 655, 658 (Ind. 1919) (“If the words 
‘highest degree of care practical’ are given any significance at all, they must mean, as applied to this 
case, that the conductor was required to possess and exercise something more than ordinary 
judgment, ordinary foresight, ordinary prudence, and ordinary care to prevent the injury.”). 
 351.  See Manus v. Trans States Airlines, Inc., 835 N.E.2d 70, 76 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005) 
(Goldenhersh, J., concurring) (providing argument from operator that “this is essentially strict 
liability, because the jury could conclude that if there were anything more that defendant could have 
done to prevent plaintiff’s injury, then defendant has breached a duty”). 
 352.  St. Louis Sw. Ry. Co. v. Parks, 76 S.W. 740, 741–43 (Tex. 1903). 
 353.  See id. (noting that a good guard may not be good enough to avoid liability). 
 354.  See id. (telling the operators to use a better guard without instructing the operators where to 
find one or if a better guard even existed). 
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operator to go one step further or to use some imagined alternative to 
satisfy the heightened standard.355 
Similarly, ride operators that comply with every state and industry 
regulation may still be required to do something more to satisfy the 
heightened standard.356  Indeed, with pure conjecture, patrons can always 
tell the jury that the highest degree of care requires one more inspection, 
one size bigger font on a warning sign, one more nylon strap, one more 
safety test, one more bolt, one less drop, one less inch of water, or one 
less twist.357 
At some point, no additional precautions will prevent injury without 
eliminating the purpose of the water ride.358  A central purpose of the 
heightened standard is to reduce the risk of injury by requiring 
precautions that are consistent with the “character” and “practical 
operation” of a water ride.359  Unlike strict liability, which discourages 
the continuation of an activity altogether, the heightened standard is still 
supposed to encourage ride operation, just in some safer manner.360  So, 
in theory, operators should not be required to take precautions that alter 
“the basic character of the activity.”361  However, just like the phrase 
“highest degree of care,” there is no test to determine when a ride 
precaution crosses this “basic character” line.  Absent a measurable line, 
patrons can side step the limitation by arguing for small changes that 
gradually raise the required amount or type of precautions.  With those 
gradual increases, ride operators are forced to implement impractical, 
inefficient, and wasteful measures362 that effectively transform operators 
into “insurers of their passengers’ safety.”363 
                                                          
 355.  See, e.g., Nalwa v. Cedar Fair, L.P., 290 P.3d 1158, 1163 (Cal. 2012) (pointing to degree of 
incline on bumper car alignment as the reason for the patron’s injury). 
 356.  See Cereola & Foucar-Szocki, supra note 28, at 51–52 (explaining that operators can meet 
every state and industry standard yet still be found liable for not doing something more).   
 357.  See Union Traction Co. of Ind. v. Berry, 124 N.E. 737, 738–39 (Ind. 1919) (pointing out 
that operators must be able to possess more-than-ordinary foresight and criticizing that idea as an 
ambiguous standard that allows infinite liability); Manus v. Trans States Airlines, Inc., 835 N.E.2d 
70, 76 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005) (Goldenhersh, J., concurring) (noting that a jury, in hindsight, will always 
find that there was something more an operator could have done to avoid the accident). 
 358.   Mosby v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., No. 06-13157, 2007 WL 4572049, at *6 (E.D. Mich. 
Dec. 27, 2007) (discussing practical limitations). 
 359.  Gomez v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 41, 44 (Cal. 2005) (explaining precaution-based goal of 
heightened liability).   
 360.  See JOHN L. DIAMOND, LAWRENCE C. LEVINE & ANITA BERNSTEIN, UNDERSTANDING 
TORTS 59–60 (4th ed. 2010) (explaining that the goal of strict liability is to make the cost of an 
activity so high as to discourage the particular method of conducting that action). 
 361.  Nalwa v. Cedar Fair, L.P., 290 P.3d 1158, 1163 (Cal. 2012).  
 362.  See Avery & Dickson, supra note 10, at 306 (requiring unachievable precautions). 
 363.  Gomez, 113 P.3d at 44. 
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The reasonable care standard, on the other hand, is a clearer standard 
that both prevents open-ended liability and also requires operators of 
higher risk rides to take increased precautions.  Specifically, reasonable 
care means that operators must take precautions commensurate with the 
dangers of a particular ride under all the circumstances.364  At its core, 
the heightened standard of care “is simply another way to describe a 
reasonable care standard in which the heightened dangerousness of the 
[water ride] requires commensurately heightened precautions in order to 
satisfy reasonable care under all the circumstances.”365  Thus, reasonable 
care is not a “lesser duty,”366 as a reasonable operator of a high-risk ride 
would always exercise heightened care.367  Even where there is a low 
probability of injury, the reasonable operator would still undertake strong 
precaution where the injury would be severe.368  In other words, there is 
only a semantic difference between “reasonable care” and “the highest 
                                                          
 364.  W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 34, at 208–09 
(5th ed. 1984). 
 365.  See Westerbeke & McAllister, supra note 61, at 1064–65 (highlighting how reasonable 
care already achieves heightened precautions because caution must be commensurate with risk).   
 366.  Gomez, 113 P.3d at 48; see Smith v. O’Donnell, 12 P.2d 933, 935 (Cal. 1932). 
 367.  See E. R., Carriers—Liability of Elevator Operator, 4 TEX. L. REV. 247 (1926) (“[T]here is 
no difference between the two rules of care, and the classification of degrees of care is merely an 
attempt at saying that the precaution required in every case is dependent on the dangers involved.”); 
Fleming Jr., supra note 331, at 678; DIAMOND ET AL., supra note 360, at 59–60 (illustrating why 
reasonable care requires extreme care for a roller coaster ride); Westerbeke, supra note 29, at 14 
(pointing out that the jury is more likely to understand and correctly apply a reasonable care standard 
because reasonability is a common, familiar concept, while jurors lack a common understanding of a 
“highest degree of care” standard); Denver & Rio Grande R.R. Co. v. Peterson, 69 P. 578, 581 
(Colo. 1902) (explaining that degrees of negligence and sliding scales of duty create confusion 
because the duty is the same regardless of the term used); Mosby v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., No. 06-
13157, 2007 WL 4572049, at *7 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 27, 2007) (“The Tennessee cases demonstrate that 
their application of the ‘heightened’ standard is nothing more than an acknowledgment of the 
increased risks associated with carriage for hire and the passengers’ reliance on the common carriers 
for their safety.”). 
 368.  See DIAMOND ET AL., supra note 360, at 59–60 & n.60 (“[R]easonable care [always 
requires] ‘care appropriate for the circumstances of the case.’” (emphasis omitted) (quoting Felgner 
v. Anderson, 133 N.W.2d 136, 140 (Mich. 1965)); Gerardi, supra note 276, at 184–85 (citation 
omitted) (“Ordinary negligence concepts protect the patrons of roller coasters and similar ‘high risk’ 
amusement rides.  There is no need to distort the meaning of ‘common carrier’ to reach such a result.  
Indeed, the common law recognizes that an operator’s duty must be in proportion to the apparent 
risk.  As the risk increases, so does the duty of care. . . . The odds may be a thousand to one that no 
train will arrive at the very moment that an automobile is crossing a rail way track, but the risk of 
death is nevertheless sufficiently serious to require the driver to look for the train and the train to 
signal the approach. . . . The duty of care will vary according to the risks inherent in a particular 
amusement park ride.  Operators of such rides will be held liable accordingly.”). 
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degree of care.”369  But it is a semantic difference that creates limitless 
liability by misleading jurors and confusing courts.370 
Instead of confusion, reasonable care creates consistency in the law 
by providing courts and juries with a common measuring stick—
precaution in proportion to risk—to determine the scope of an operator’s 
duty.371  That measuring stick produces more efficient and effective 
safeguards for water ride patrons because the proportionality requirement 
filters out impractical precautions.372  As a result, the proportionality 
requirement achieves the goal of early common carrier jurisprudence by 
encouraging precautions that are “consistent with the character and . . . 
practical operation” of the particular water ride.373  By their inherent 
character, water rides are neither comfortable nor uneventful.374  Patrons 
not only understand that water rides come with injury risks—patrons pay 
good money for bigger, faster, and scarier water rides.375  So, while a ride 
operator could eliminate the risk of drowning by draining the water, that 
precaution would be inconsistent with practical operation of the ride.376  
                                                          
 369.  See DIAMOND ET AL., supra note 360, at 59 (explaining in all cases, the standard of care is 
reasonableness; only the amount of care changes based upon the circumstances).   
 370.  See supra note 367 (pointing out risk for jury prejudice when applying heightened 
standard). 
 371.  See supra notes 365, 367–68 (linking tradition and clarity to use of reasonable care 
standard). 
 372.  See Mosby, 2007 WL 4572049, at *4 (“The law only requires of it all those things 
necessary for the safety of the passenger that are reasonable and consistent with the business of the 
carrier, and proper to the means of conveyance employed by him to be provided, that the highest 
degree of practical care and diligence and skill shall be adopted that is consistent with the mode of 
conveyance used, and that will not render its use impractical and inef[f]icient for it[s] intended 
purposes.” (emphasis omitted) (quoting Nashville R.R. v. Howard, 78 S.W. 1098, 1103 (Tenn. 
1904))). 
 373.  Lopez v. S. Cal. Rapid Transit Dist., 710 P.2d 907, 909 (Cal. 1985).  
 374.  See Lamb v. B & B Amusements Corp., 869 P.2d 926, 930–31 (Utah 1993) (“The 
heightened standard of care required of common carriers is predicated on the principle that 
‘[p]ersons using ordinary transportation devices, such as elevators and buses, normally expect to be 
carried safely, securely, and without incident to their destination.’ . . . Persons who use amusement 
rides . . . [must] be aware of their own physical abilities and limitations and exercise some judgment 
as to their ability to endure the physical and mental stresses encountered on various rides.”); Harlan 
v. Six Flags Over Ga., Inc., 297 S.E.2d 468, 469 (Ga. 1982) (explaining that amusement rides are not 
designed to provide comfortable transportation, and patrons expect thrills, drops, bumps, and high 
speeds); Goodfried, supra note 38, at 11 (“[T]he purpose of thrill rides is to frighten and surprise the 
rider by utilizing means that present the impression of inherent danger. . . . [A]nd passengers choose 
these rides for exactly this reason. Some may argue that thrill ride passengers seek imagined danger, 
rather than real danger. . . . [But] passengers are not watching a movie about roller coasters; rather, 
they are on the roller coaster.  Imagined danger does not exist when a passenger is plummeting 200 
feet and speeding through extremely tight twists and turns at velocities exceeding 100 miles an 
hour.”). 
 375.  See Lamb, 869 P.2d at 930–31. 
 376.  See Mosby, 2007 WL 4572049, at *4–5 (“[T]he practical difficulties would be 
considerable, and in cases of collision or other accident the dangers of having the windows 
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Yet that type of precaution is what emanates from the heightened 
standard—a standard that “poses the very real threat of eliminating” 
water rides altogether.377 
Reasonable care balances patrons’ expected risks with an operator’s 
extensive caution.378  That does not give carte blanche for ride operators 
to ignore serious risks; but, unlike the heightened standard of care,379 
reasonable care does not require operators choose between shutting down 
the ride and removing the features that patrons crave and pay to 
experience.380  Thus, it may be reasonable to drop riders at 60 miles-per-
hour from a 100-foot-tall platform.381  But, given the proportionality 
requirement, a reasonable ride operator must protect ignorant riders and 
vulnerable children by applying height restrictions and warning patrons 
against hidden dangers.382  And with more frequent or severe patron 
injuries, ride operators must make adjustments and demonstrate a high 
level of precaution in order to satisfy the reasonable care standard.383 
A ride operator is unlikely to prevail after failing to lock the harness 
for a roller-coaster patron who then fell out during the ride.384  Likewise, 
where multiple patrons on a water ride are injured in a similar way, such 
as by being forcefully slammed into the same spot on a large water slide, 
the operator must show specific, responsive precautions designed to 
prevent a similar, subsequent accident.  And with each additional injury, 
the slide operator must show increased precautions to demonstrate 
reasonable care in light of the increased risk of harm.385  So, far from 
                                                          
effectually barred might be far worse than the danger of injury from an occasional missile.”) 
(quoting Knoxville Cab Co. v. Miller, 138 S.W.2d 428 (Tenn. 1940). 
 377.  Sullivan, supra note 292, at 70 (quoting Gomez v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 41, 56 (Cal. 
2005) (Chin, J., dissenting)). 
 378.  See Lamb, 869 P.2d at 931 (offering different expectations on bus than ride). 
 379.  See Gomez, 113 P.3d at 45–46; Webb, supra note 42, at 1087. 
 380.  See Mosby, 2007 WL 4572049, at *5 (showing how reasonable care creates a meaningful 
liability limit). 
 381.  See Nalwa v. Cedar Fair, L.P., 290 P.3d 1158, 1160 (Cal. 2012) (linking reasonability with 
patrons’ expectations). 
 382.  See Mosby, 2007 WL 4572049, at *4–5 (showing how reasonable care creates a meaningful 
liability limit). 
 383.  See Bibeau v. Fred W. Pearce Corp., 217 N.W. 374, 375–76 (Minn. 1928) (“The evidence 
would support a finding of the jury that the passenger experienced an unusually violent jerk which 
caused her injuries.  One would hardly suppose it possible for defendant to continue the roller-
coaster business if such accidents were ordinary occurrences.”). 
 384.  See id. (reasoning that no patrons would attend amusement parks if injuries were common 
expectations, and arguing that it would be hard to show it is reasonable to leave a harness unlocked 
on a roller coaster). 
 385.  See Frederick v. Detroit, Dep’t of St. Ry., 121 N.W.2d 918, 920–21 (Mich. 1963) (noting 
that, depending on the circumstances, greater care may be required). 
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being a toothless standard, reasonable care is flexible and demands that 
ride operators take serious precautions to protect patrons. 
b.  Baseline Consistency and Flexibility 
The proportionality requirement also remedies the patchwork of 
inconsistent liability standards by creating a baseline duty requirement.386  
Operators do not have to guess, or litigate to discover, what “the highest 
degree of care” requires because all operators, regardless of the infinite 
ride variations, must exercise caution in proportion to the ride’s unique 
risks.387  That increased predictability results in increased operator 
compliance, which “significantly reduce[s] the likelihood of patron 
injuries or deaths.”388  Further, patrons will not suddenly start losing at 
trial, as proven by plaintiffs who still win after an appellate court orders a 
retrial with a reasonable care instruction instead of the heightened 
standard from the first trial.389 
Moreover, reasonable care is consistent, yet flexible.390  
Reasonability always requires care commensurate with risks, but those 
risks vary based on the circumstances.391  Water rides illustrate the need 
                                                          
 386.  See Avery & Dickson, supra note 10, at 310–11 (necessitating limitations and requiring 
flexibility because of ride characteristics); Cereola & Foucar-Szocki, supra note 28, at 51–52 
(explaining role of state law and reasonable care floor—baseline rules promote increased safety). 
 387.  See supra notes 26–31, 364–65, 367–68 (focusing on reasonable care’s flexible, predictable 
formula). 
 388.  See Avery & Dickson, supra note 10, at 310–11 (noting importance of equal, baseline 
standard “It is imperative that every park or mobile ride or device operator, regardless of size, should 
have to adhere to the same standards. . . . these standards could significantly reduce the likelihood of 
patron injuries or deaths”).  
 389.  Geri L. Dreiling, Helicopter Crash Case Gets $21M Verdict On Second Try, MISSOURI 
LAWYERS WEEKLY (June 18, 2001), http://www.grgpc.com/News-PDFs/grg16.pdf (involving 
plaintiff who won on a retrial after the standard of care was switched from the heightened standard 
to reasonable care). 
 390.  DIAMOND ET AL, supra note 360, at 60 & n.60 (quoting Bethel v. New York City Transit 
Auth., 703 N.E.2d 1214, 1217 (N.Y. 1998)) (Thus, a “single, reasonable person standard is 
sufficiently flexible by itself to permit courts and juries to take into account the ultrahazardous 
nature of a tortfeasor’s activity.”); Frederick, 121 N.W.2d at 921 (internal citation omitted) (“The 
common law standard of reasonable care is constant although it ‘may require an infinite variety of 
precautions, or acts of care, depending upon the circumstances, and it is primarily for the jury to say 
just what precautions were appropriate to the danger apparent in the case at hand.’”); Mosby v. 
Greyhound Lines, Inc., No. 06-13157, 2007 WL 4572049, at *6 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 27, 2007) (internal 
citation omitted) (noting that reasonable care is flexible in requiring that precaution match the risks, 
and also pointing out that “common carriers are not insurers of their passengers’ safety;” so, courts 
“have consistently recognized that bus drivers, may as a general rule, anticipate that passengers will 
be aware of that fact and may start their bus in a normal motion before all the passengers are 
seated”). 
 391.  See supra notes 26–31, 364–65, 367–68 (providing formula for reasonable care that 
demands precaution proportionate to risk).  
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for a flexible standard because no two rides are the same.392  Even more, 
“the combination of ride and device types, rider decisions, operator 
considerations, inspections practices, oversight, and design play a role in 
each incident. . . . Each rider is unique and their experiences and 
knowledge . . . diverse.”393 
A water slide might have a particular drop that can jar patrons who 
fail to hold on tightly to the raft’s safety straps.  Reasonable care requires 
an operator to guard against that unique risk by, for example, warning 
patrons about the drop.  Conversely, two patrons racing in kayaks might 
get injured after trying to flip each other over.  In these cases, a 
heightened standard ignores the patrons’ role in the accident and, instead, 
fixates on the operator’s failure to do ‘something’ more—even when 
more warnings and precautions will not stop patrons from acting 
irresponsibly.394 
Furthermore, the heightened standard cannot accommodate water 
rides with multiple components.  For instance, Big Surf Waterpark has a 
ride with a gentle slide that sits close to the ground, but stairs on the 
other side of the ride lead to an extreme slide called “Fast and Furious” 
that stands several stories tall.395  The abstract nature of the heightened 
standard makes it impossible to determine with any consistency what 
constitutes the “highest degree of care” on one slide versus another.  
While reasonable care is not a mathematical measurement, courts and 
juries are more likely to share a common understanding and 
measurement of what is “reasonable” based on the apparent risks for 
patrons on the individual slides.396 
3.  Jury Prejudice 
Third, the heightened standard prejudices juries against ride 
operators.397  When courts apply the heightened standard, the jury 
instructions do not instruct jurors because jurors are left to wonder about 
                                                          
 392.  See supra notes 17–18, 122, 137–43 (describing how each ride is unique).  
 393.  Avery & Dickson, supra note 10, at 306. 
 394.  See Goodfried, supra note 38, at 28 (pointing out that the heightened standard shifts 
responsibility onto ride operators for patrons’ reckless conduct that operators are helpless to 
prevent).  
 395.  See Syrett & Wood, supra note 8 (describing “[t]he Rapids at Big Surf, a slide that lets you 
choose your own adventure: fast and furious from the top, or start closer to the ground for a gentler 
ride into the catch pool”). 
 396.  See Goodfried, supra note 38, at 28 (calling for the court to adopt a flexible standard 
because the common-carrier approach places near-exclusive fault onto innocent ride operators). 
 397.  See discussion, supra Part III.B.2.a. 
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the meaning of phrases like “the utmost care.”  Regardless of the jurors’ 
confusion over the heightened standard’s abstract requirements, judges 
are often barred from answering questions that clarify the jury 
instruction.398 
But wait, there is more.  The heightened standard comes with several 
emphatic descriptions—from doing “everything possible to provide for” 
patrons’ safety399 to the duty to exercise “the highest degree of care”400—
filled with loaded words that set the operator’s duty at unreachable 
heights.401  With an arsenal of flowery rhetoric, it is no surprise that 
jurors frequently misunderstand the heightened standard and treat the 
duty like a strict liability standard.402 
Furthermore, those emphatic statements effectively negate any 
limitations on the operator’s duty because the jury instructions do not 
explain how to balance the “more than reasonable care”403 requirement 
with the “operators are not insurers” limitation.404  As a result, jurors 
assume that operators are liable because “virtually every accident could 
be avoided if the [operator] acted differently in some way.”405 
                                                          
 398.  See Votruba, supra note 331, at 705 (explaining that in some states, the judge is even 
barred from answering clarification questions about the jury instructions posed by the jury during 
deliberations). 
 399.  See supra note 60 (providing various ways to describe the heightened standard). 
 400.  See Hetcher, supra note 331, at 640 (discussing application); see also E. R., supra note 
367, at 247 (“[I]t is merely an attempt to impress this fact on the jury that leads courts to incorporate 
the more emphatic statement in their charges.”). 
 401.  Manus v. Trans States Airlines, Inc., 835 N.E.2d 70, 72–73 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005) (“The term 
‘highest degree of care’ as used in the instruction given to the jury is not so technical or arcane as to 
require explanation.  Any attempt to further define or explain the term would have quite possibly led 
to confusion and error.” (quoting Lockett v. Bd. of Educ. for Sch. Dist. No. 189, 555 N.E.2d 1055, 
1065 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990))); see also Votruba, supra note 331, at 704–05 (discussing jurors’ 
understanding of the heightened care instruction). 
 402.  See supra notes 345, 349–51, 357, 365–67 (charting various ways that juries may 
misunderstand and misapply the heightened standard). 
 403.  Nunez v. Prof’l Transit Mgmt. of Tucson, Inc., 271 P.3d 1104, 1107 (Ariz. 2012) (“[A]n 
attempt to explain the common carrier doctrine to a jury would be riddled with the prospect of 
confusion. . . .  To hold that a common carrier must exert more than reasonable care under the 
circumstances not only serves no useful purpose; it is a hard concept to make sense of and one very 
likely to be misunderstood.” (quoting Lowery v. Montgomery Kone, Inc., 42 P.3d 621, 627 (Ariz. 
Ct. App. 2002))) . 
 404.  See id. (“This Court found that this ‘reasonably prudent man’ instruction ‘correctly states 
the law,’ and that failure to give it ‘tended to mislead the jury, by failing to point out sufficiently to it 
the limitations on the care required . . . of a common carrier.’”) (quoting Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. Co. 
v. France, 94 P.2d 434, 437 (Ariz. 1939))). 
 405.  Id. at 1109 (“[B]y requiring that a carrier exercise more care than that reasonable under the 
circumstances of the case, the ‘highest degree of care’ instruction approaches the insurance standard, 
as virtually every accident could be avoided if the carrier acted differently in some way.”) (emphasis 
added). 
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These emphatic jury instructions also distract jurors from examining 
how the patron’s conduct contributed to the injury.406  Instead of focusing 
on the operator’s conduct and the patron’s behavior, jurors go on a 
mental marathon to sort out the meaning of unfamiliar legal standards 
and sort through the complex web of parties, claims, and defenses.407  
Often, the only instruction that sticks with jurors is that the operator is 
liable for “even the slightest negligence.”408  Of course, that description 
suggests to the jurors that the operator cannot make any mistakes, while 
the patron’s “slight” or “small” negligence appears fine because there is 
no similar language in the patron’s duty description.409  With that 
understanding, jurors are reluctant to find against patrons and quick to 
dismiss the operator’s contributory negligence, comparative fault, or 
assumption of risk defenses.  Without those defenses, operators bear the 
full cost for patrons’ self-inflicted injuries—a significant burden 
considering 65-85% of ride injuries stem from patrons violating posted 
rules.410 
Oddly, early courts’ goal of incentivizing cautious passenger 
behavior by eliminating a carrier’s liability for a passenger’s carelessness 
was the central reason those courts both rejected strict liability for 
                                                          
 406.  See, e.g., Union Traction Co. of Ind. v. Berry, 121 N.E. 655, 658 (Ind. 1919) (arguing jury 
instruction with heightened standard prejudices the defendant); Houston & Tex. Cent. Ry. Co. v. 
Keeling, 120 S.W. 847, 848 (Tex. 1909) (noting highest degree of care jury instruction by itself is 
inadequate because “attempting to define the carrier’s duty only by the use of an adjective, are not 
apt to convey to the minds of jurors any very definite conception of the subject.”). 
 407.  Matt Milner, Highest Degree of Confusion: The Case Against the Common Carrier 
Doctrine, ARIZ. L. REV. SYL. (2011) (“Requiring a common carrier to exercise greater than 
reasonable care ‘is a hard concept to make sense of and one very likely to be misunderstood.’  As a 
result, when weighing the comparative fault between a common carrier and a passenger, the jury is 
charged with apportioning fault based on two different standards of care: the reasonable care 
standard governs the plaintiff’s actions, but the highest degree of care standard applies to the 
defendants.  The task of apportioning fault in a negligence case is always challenging, but when 
jurors are asked to apply different legal standards to different actors the challenge grows more 
complex.” (citing Lowrey, 42 P.3d at 627)), available at http://www.arizonalawreview.org/?p=1493. 
 408.  Hill v. Skywest Airlines, Inc., No. 1:06-cv-00801-SMS, 2007 WL 2326070, at *4 (E.D. 
Cal. Aug. 13, 2007) (citing Acosta v. S. Cal. Rapid Transit Dist., 465 P.2d 72, 77 (Cal. 1970)). 
 409.  See Kaczorowski, supra note 42, at 1155 (“[C]ontributory negligence was a bar to 
passenger recovery.  Nonetheless, if a carrier’s negligence created a dangerous situation and alarmed 
passengers, courts were lenient in determining whether the passengers’ behavior in the 
circumstances was reasonable.”). 
 410.  See Butler, supra note 178, at 402–03 (“Offering a ‘fun day at the park,’ however, should 
not excuse riders from understanding the risks involved.  As an official of the IAAPA has said, 65-
85% of accidents involving transportation-based amusement parks stems from riders breaking posted 
rules, either intentionally or inadvertently.” (citing Gene Sloan & Anthony DeBarros, Park Safety 
Rules Lax, USA TODAY, Apr. 7, 2000, at 1A)); Mulrine, supra note 189 (“Some rides pose specific 
risks, the report says: Spaceball, a popular ride, has caused five eye hemorrhages and a retinal tear 
since 1990. But rider stupidity causes many accidents. In at least one, a rider pushed a restart button 
just as others were disembarking.”). 
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passenger carriers and also attempted to create a liability standard that 
would require strong precautions while still limiting liability for 
responsible operators.411  As those courts noted, holding operators liable 
for a patron’s injuries—especially injuries that were caused by the 
patron’s own behavior—was unjust and unnecessary because a passenger 
could always protect himself from his own poor judgment.412 
And the reasonable care standard embodies principles of self-
accountability by limiting a ride operator’s liability when a patron is 
injured from ignoring an obvious danger or being careless.413  Further, 
applying reasonable care to both patrons and ride operators shines a 
spotlight on “the behavior of the parties” instead of emphatic phrases in 
the jury instructions.414  By focusing on the parties’ conduct, jurors reach 
more consistent and fair decisions that award caution and punish 
carelessness.415 
Some proponents of the heightened standard argue that the 
prejudicial effect is overblown because jury instructions have little effect 
on the jury’s ultimate finding.416  Proponents add that reasonable care is 
                                                          
 411.  See supra Part II.A.2. 
 412.  See Budwick, supra note 60, at 355 (“However, because passengers are not inanimate and 
are able to care for themselves, courts considered it unjust to hold carriers strictly liable for injuries 
caused to passengers. Therefore, the common law required some degree of fault on the part of the 
carrier. The common law imposed a duty to use ‘the highest degree of care which a reasonable man 
would use.’ . . . Such a high standard was justified because the carrier had committed to his trust the 
safety of people who were confined within the carrier’s vehicle and who relied directly upon the 
carrier for safe transportation.” (citing Kaczorowski, supra note 42, at 1157–59)). 
 413.  Mosby v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., No. 06-13157, 2007 WL 4572049, at *6 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 
27, 2007) (repeating that reasonable care is a flexible concept that encourages passengers to avoid 
obvious dangers). 
 414.  See Milner, supra note 407 (“When facing the possibility of being held to the highest 
degree of care—and as a consequence face a higher likelihood of liability—those parties will likely 
attempt to escape categorization as a common carrier. In a scheme that simply applies the reasonable 
care standard, this aspect of common carrier litigation would disappear. Instead the sole focus would 
be on whether the behavior of the parties was reasonable in light of the circumstances, not on 
whether they fall within the scope of the common carrier definition.”). 
 415.  See id. (citing Lowrey v. Montgomery Kone, Inc., 42 P.3d 621, 627 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2002)) 
(pointing out that jurors are likely to be confused over a heightened care instruction, especially for 
comparative fault determinations, because “jurors are asked to apply different legal standards to 
different actors”); Wood v. Groh, 7 P.3d 1163, 1169–70 (Kan. 2000) (“There is a substantial 
difference between the two standards proposed: ordinary care or the highest degree of care. . . . 
There is a real possibility that the jury would have returned a different verdict had the correct 
standard been given to the jury in measuring the conduct of the parents.”). 
 416.  See Votruba, supra note 331, at 704–05 (“In most cases the instructions are only passively 
heard once and do no more than tell the jury to evaluate what the ordinary reasonable person would 
do given the circumstances. The jury generally hears” no definitions for these terms, instructions on 
how to apply the standard, or how to match conduct to the standard.  As a result, jurors “are largely 
left to their own devices to decide what is considered negligent”); Fleming Jr., supra note 331, at 
680 (“[I]f the jury is given the power to decide the case, it is impossible actually to prevent them 
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no better because it is either undefined in jury instructions417 or defined 
with confusing legal jargon.418  True, courts do not give jurors an Excel 
spreadsheet, graphing calculator, or precise mathematical formula to 
compute the exact requirements of either standard of care.  Nevertheless, 
“for over 150 years,”419 the reasonable care standard has governed the 
majority of negligence claims.420  Due to that long-standing tradition, 
courts, jurors, and litigants have a clearer understanding of the 
reasonable care standard than the heightened standard.421  That clarity 
creates consistent law from directed verdicts, summary judgment, and 
appellate reviews because judges and lawyers apply a common test 
(precaution commensurate with risk) for analyzing reasonable care.422  
Also, while this test may sound like legal jargon, jurors are far more 
likely to understand a reasonable care test because, first, that has been the 
traditional standard in tort cases for over a century; and second, jurors 
can draw on their common understanding of “reasonability” to assess a 
case.423  In contrast, jurors are unlikely to digest a jury instruction on the 
                                                          
from deciding it on any basis whatever which appeals to their own minds, tastes, prejudices, or 
emotions. . . . [T]he jury may decide the case on bases which they have been expressly told to 
disregard.”); Hetcher, supra note 331, at 641 (“[T]he line between the judge’s sphere and the jury’s 
does not separate an area of normative, law-like matters from one that is purely factual. It is a 
misconception to say that the jury simply applies the law. Its role is to decide the ultimate question 
of liability in the individual case before it.”). 
 417.  See Gilles, supra note 331, at 814–15 (emphasizing that jurors generally hear instructions 
but are not given a way to apply those standards in a cost-benefit manner); Wright, supra note 331, 
at 148 (noting that the Posner-esque and Learned Hand theories of negligence are not included in 
jury instructions, so the scholastic understanding of these tort concepts is “rarely actually employed 
in judicial opinions, and almost never explains the actual results reached by the courts”) (citing 
Symposium on Negligence in the Courts: The Actual Practice, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 423 (2002). 
 418.  See Votruba, supra note 331, at 717–19 (“Although using pattern jury instructions that 
maintain technical accuracy is arguably very useful, it often results in instructions that are full of 
legal jargon and difficult to understand.  This makes the jury’s task more difficult and inhibits its 
ability to accurately apply the standard. . . . [S]tudies show that jurors misunderstand the laws and 
instructions and this misunderstanding is often attributed to the confusing nature of legal language 
which is full of jargon or is overly vague.”); Zipursky, supra note 60, at 2023 (arguing that “a fact-
finder who is asked what a reasonably prudent person would have done under certain circumstances 
has the right to think through that question however she wants,” and the Posner conception of tort 
liability is thus only helpful if Judge Posner or a law student is a jury member). 
 419.  Joe Schremmer, Comment, Avoidable “Fraccident”: An Argument Against Strict Liability 
for Hydraulic Fracturing, 60 U. KAN. L. REV. 1215, 1232 (2012) (citing James A. Henderson Jr., 
Why Negligence Dominates Tort, 50 UCLA L. REV. 377, 386 (2002)). 
 420.  See id. (citing Ind. Harbor Belt R.R. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 916 F.2d 1174, 1177 (7th Cir. 
1990)). 
 421.  See supra notes 26–31, 364–65, 367–68 (supporting established tradition of reasonable care 
standard). 
 422.  See discussion supra Part III.B.1. 
 423.  See supra notes 364–65, 367 (speaking to jurors’ ability to understand a reasonable care 
standard). 
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heightened standard, as there is no common reference point for deciding 
if “there has been no negligence whatsoever, and [if] the damage or 
injury has been occasioned by inevitable casualty or by some cause 
which human care and foresight could not prevent.”424  Further, even 
when instructions omit a specific test, the common meaning of 
“reasonable” suggests sensible precautions based on the particular 
circumstances.425  Conversely—applying the heightened standard to the 
same facts426—operators rarely prevail because jurors interpret the 
“highest degree of care” instruction as requiring endless and excessive 
precautions.427 
Moreover, jury instructions calling for “the highest degree of care” 
invade the jury’s fact-finding function.428  The question of law is whether 
a duty of care exists.429  Then, the jury’s function is to determine the 
necessary amount of care, given the circumstances, to meet that duty.430  
                                                          
 424.  Mark A. Franklin, Article, California’s Extension of Common Carrier Liability to Roller 
Coasters and Similar Devices: An Examination of Gomez v. Superior Court of Los Angeles, 34 W. 
ST. U. L. REV. 29, 41 (2006) (“This has typically required carriers to prove ‘that there has been no 
negligence whatsoever, and that the damage or injury has been occasioned by inevitable casualty or 
by some cause which human care and foresight could not prevent.’” (quoting Kline v. Santa Barbara 
Consol. Ry. Co., 150 Cal. 741, 745 (1907))).   
 425.  MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, Reasonable, Definition 1a–c, available at 
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/reasonable (“[B]eing in accordance with reason; not 
extreme or excessive; moderate, fair”). 
 426.  See Lopez v. Three Rivers Elec. Coop., Inc., 26 S.W.3d 151, 158 (Mo. 2000) (“If properly 
instructed, the jury would have been informed that the phrase ‘ordinary care’ means ‘that degree of 
care than an ordinarily careful person would use under same or similar circumstances.’ . . . Put 
another way, under the facts of this case, the jury might have determined that Three Rivers was not 
liable because it did exercise ordinary care.”). 
 427.  See id. (“Prejudice is ordinarily presumed when a jury instruction imposes upon a party a 
standard of care greater than that required by law.  The presumption is rarely rebutted.”) (citation 
omitted). 
 428.  See Frederick v. City of Detroit, Dep’t of St. Rys., 121 N.W.2d 918, 922 (Mich. 1963) 
(arguing that the appropriate level of care is for the jury to decide based on the circumstances, so 
“[w]hen trial judges describe the standard of duty in terms of ‘high care,’ ‘higher care,’ ‘highest 
care’ or the like, they impinge upon the jury’s function as finders of fact”). 
 429.  See id. at 923–24 (“[T]raditional concepts of trial by jury merits our emphasizing [that] . . . 
[i]t is the court’s function to determine as a matter of law whether the relation of the parties gives 
rise to a duty and to define it. . . . Accordingly, when a duty arises as a matter of law between a 
carrier and its passengers, it is the common law duty of due care and it may be defined simply as the 
duty to exercise such diligence as would be exercised in the circumstances by a reasonably prudent 
carrier.  It then becomes the function of the jury to determine from the evidence what action, if any, 
should have been taken or omitted in order to measure up to the standard of a reasonably prudent 
carrier in the [sic] same circumstances.  By instructing the jury that high care or the highest care is 
required of carriers, a court impinges upon the jury’s obligation to determine the carrier’s 
compliance with its duty of due care by consideration of the proofs of what a reasonably prudent 
carrier would have done in the circumstances disclosed by the evidence.  It is for the jury to decide 
as a matter of fact, and not for the court to decide as a matter of law . . . .”); Lopez, 26 S.W.3d 151, at 
158 (“The appropriate standard of care is a question of law.”). 
 430.  Union Traction Co. of Ind. v. Berry, 121 N.E. 655, 658 (Ind. 1919). 
2015] WET ‘N WILD 849 
Granted, the jury’s function is not unlimited.431  But directing the jury to 
require “the highest degree of care” conflicts with the traditional concept 
of trial by an impartial jury because the very description mischaracterizes 
the concept and sways jurors to find against ride operators and in favor 
of patrons.432  That bias can only be remedied with a flexible reasonable 
care standard because the jury can effectively sift through the infinite 
variations of water rides, patrons, and ride features that all play a role in 
water-ride injuries.433 
4.  States with Common Carrier Statutes 
A word about the legislative role in this duty disagreement is helpful 
to address concerns about the potential for judicial overstepping.  Several 
states have common carrier statutes that trickle into courts’ analysis of 
the appropriate liability standard for water-ride operators.434  A detailed 
analysis of those statutes is beyond the scope of this Comment.  Still, it is 
                                                          
 431.  See id. 
 432.  Cereola  & Foucar-Szocki, supra note 28, at 49 (“The special duty of care imposed upon a 
common carrier may be nothing more than [sic] the recognition of the special circumstances 
surrounding the operation of a carrier’s facilities.  Therefore, the greater the danger, the greater the 
responsibility required of the reasonable man of ordinary prudence which is the measuring stick of 
common law ordinary negligence standard.  If so, then there should be no difference in the standard 
of care, in jurisdictions applying common carrier liability versus those that utilize an ordinary 
negligence standard.  However, from a practical perspective, in a common carrier jurisdiction, a 
charge by the Court to the jury, directing a heightened standard of care, may very well sway the jury 
in favor of the plaintiff whenever the evidence is susceptible to a favorable interpretation for either 
side.”).  
 433.  Mosby v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., No. 06-13157, 2007 WL 4572049, at *6 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 
27, 2007) (pointing out that it is the jurors’ role to “determine what is reasonable given the nature of 
the risks involved and the standards and customs of the defendant’s business”).  
 434.  The vast majority of states have some sort of common carrier statute.  See KAN. STAT. 
ANN. §§ 66-1,111, 66-1,142b (West 2014) (requiring private and public carriers to comply with 
common carrier regulations or be subject to civil penalties); TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 5.001(a)(1) 
(West 2013) (applying common law duties and liabilities to common carriers in Texas); GA. CODE 
ANN. § 46-9-132 (West 2014) (requiring “[a] carrier of passengers [to] exercise extraordinary 
diligence to protect the lives and persons of his passengers”); MO. ANN. STAT. § 537.250 (West 
2014) (expanding liability for common carriers to include “any loss, damage or injury to . . . 
property”); VA. CODE ANN. § 56-119 (West 2014) (prohibiting attempts to exempt carrier from 
liability for “any loss, damage, or injury to freight or passengers in its custody and care as a common 
carrier”); IOWA CODE ANN. § 327D.7 (West 2015) (prohibiting exculpation agreements to eliminate 
carrier liability); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 706.036, 706.291 (West 2014) (requiring liability 
insurance for broadly defined group of common carriers); 66 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2304 (West 
2014) (establishing liability generally for common carriers).  California, Oklahoma, and North 
Dakota all have nearly identical common carrier statutes that require carriers for reward “use the 
utmost care and diligence for their safe carriage, must provide everything necessary for that purpose, 
and must exercise to that end a reasonable degree of skill.”  CAL. CIV. CODE § 2100 (West 2014);  
see also N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 8-02-02 (West 2013) (replacing “must” with “shall”); OKLA. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 32 (West 2013) (using identical language to the California statute). 
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important to understand why courts are not running afoul of legislative 
intent by adopting a reasonable care standard. 
Some proponents of the heightened care standard argue that 
amusement rides must be treated as common carriers because various 
state statutes addressing carriers indicate a legislative intent to apply the 
heightened standard to ride operators.435  Accordingly, those proponents 
question whether courts have authority to apply a reasonable care 
standard absent either legislative permission or revisions to the particular 
state’s carrier statute.436 
Though several states have common carrier statutes, only Oregon’s 
statute explicitly applies the heightened standard of care to amusement-
ride operators.437  Other courts rely on analogies between thrill rides and 
common carriers to link the heightened standard with a legislative 
purpose;438 and several courts disagree about the accuracy of those 
analogies.439 
                                                          
 435.  See CAL. CIV. CODE § 2100 (West 2014); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 8-02-02 (West 2013); 
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 32 (West 2013). 
 436.  See Gomez v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 41, 53 (Cal. 2005) (Chin, J., dissenting) (noting 
that courts are required “to determine the Legislature’s intent when it enacted the statute”); Butler, 
supra note 178, at 379 (linking courts’ attempts to mix common-law concepts and legislative intent  
with the increasing division over ride liability standards). 
 437.  See OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 460.355(2) (West 2014) (“The [amusement ride] owner or 
operator shall be deemed not a common carrier; however, such owner or operator shall exercise the 
highest degree of care for the safety of users.”). 
 438.  Interestingly, Missouri’s common carrier statute only applies to transportation “by motor 
vehicle . . . upon the public highways and airlines engaged in intrastate commerce.”  MO. ANN. 
STAT. § 390.020(6) (West 2014).  That statute also defines a motor vehicle as “any vehicle, truck, 
truck-tractor, trailer, or semitrailer, motor bus or any self-propelled vehicle.”  Id. § 390.020(19).  
However, the Missouri Appellate Court’s Chavez decision applied common carrier liability to 
operation of a water slide that was neither located on a public highway nor employed a motor to 
propel the rafts.  See Chavez v. Cedar Fair, LP, No. WD75373, 2013 Mo. App. LEXIS 843 at *1–3 
(Mo. Ct. App. July 16, 2013) (explaining that passengers on a raft simply slide down the flume).  
Thus, according to the text of Missouri’s statute, water slides do not fit the definition of a common 
carrier.  The Chavez appellate court explained that applying the heightened standard of care did not 
mean the slide operator was classified as a common carrier.  Id. at *14–16 n.6.  Rather, the slide 
operator was simply required to exercise the same standard of care as a common carrier because 
slide patrons lacked freedom of movement and could neither cause nor prevent an accident.  Id.  
However, that distinction may not resolve a conflict with legislative intent.  If the legislature passed 
a statute requiring insurance companies with 100 employees to pay higher taxes, it would seem 
strange for the court to find that a meat distribution company also had to pay higher taxes because 
the meat company had 100 employees.  It is unclear whether the court could side-step the design of 
the statute—higher taxes for large insurance companies—by applying the effect of the statute to a 
company without also classifying that company as an insurance company.  Indeed, statutory 
authorization may be required for the court to separate classification from duty imposition.  See OR. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 460.355(2) (West 2014) (explaining, in text of statute, that an amusement ride 
“operator shall be deemed not a common carrier; however, such owner or operator shall exercise the 
highest degree of care for the safety of users.”).  As a result, Missouri courts appear to be applying 
common-law concepts regarding common carriers instead of turning to specific legislative materials 
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If the legislature intended for operators of dangerous thrill rides to 
exercise heightened caution, then combining the reasonable care standard 
with a rebuttable presumption accomplishes the legislature’s goal 
because elevated risks will still demand elevated and commensurate 
precautions.440  On the other hand, the heightened standard is a blanket 
liability standard that conflicts with legislative intent by increasing 
liability both for rides that resemble common carriers and also rides that 
lack any resemblance.441  But even with Oregon’s carrier statute, or a 
similar statute, the legislature should provide a specific legal test that 
clarifies where reasonable care ends, where heightened care begins, and 
how to measure the upper limits of the heightened standard.442  Absent 
this type of clarification, courts cannot consistently apply the “highest 
                                                          
to interpret state carrier laws.  To be sure, the Missouri Supreme Court did address this issue in its 
decision to reverse the appellate court’s Chavez decision.  See Chavez v. Cedar Fair, LP, No. 
SC93658, 2014 Mo. LEXIS 220, at *21–22 (Mo. Nov. 12, 2014) (holding that the “established 
definition of ‘common carrier’ does not, as an overall rule, encompass an amusement park that 
operates attractions for the purpose of providing amusement to patrons”).  But the supreme court’s 
discussion of common carrier statutes focused on patrons’ purpose to be entertained by the ride 
instead of being transported to a particular location.  See id. at *22 (emphasizing that a company 
“cannot fall under the common carrier definition” if the company’s purpose is to provide 
entertainment and fun to riders because the company is considered to be in the entertainment 
business instead of the transportation business).  While the patrons’ purpose was at the heart of 
decision to overrule the appellate court, the supreme court never cited or discussed any statutory text 
or legislative history when analyzing Missouri’s common carrier laws.  Id. at *20–22.  So, it remains 
unclear if the common law doctrines surrounding common carriers—and the court’s application of 
these legal concepts to select business activities—compliments or offends the Missouri legislature’s 
intent.  And without an in-depth analysis of the relevant statutes and legislative materials, one may 
be confused about why the Missouri Supreme Court said that patrons’ purpose in getting on thrill 
rides disqualifies common-carrier liability, yet—just two paragraphs later in the same opinion—the 
court held that the common-carrier standard of exercising “the highest degree of care” applied to 
every person who operates a motor vehicle in Missouri.  See id. at *23 (requiring “automobile 
operators to exercise the highest degree of care”).  Under the supreme court’s holding, a driver’s 
purpose in operating a vehicle—be it driving children to school in a van or drag racing on a 
motorcycle without a passenger—has no effect on the applicable liability standard.  Yet, the purpose 
of getting on an amusement ride is the driving, dispositive factor for applying a different liability 
standard.  Id.  The bottom line is that courts often turn to common-law concepts instead of legislative 
materials when analyzing common carrier issues—an approach that upholds legal tradition while 
ignoring legislative intent.  For an example of a court examining both case law definitions and also 
statutory definitions of common carriers to determine whether to apply a heightened standard of 
care, see Summers v. Montgomery Elevator Co., 757 P.2d 1255, 1261–62 (Kan. 1988) (refusing to 
apply common carrier liability to elevator operator because elevator was outside the scope of 
statutory and case law definitions of common carrier). 
 439.  See supra note 436 and accompanying text. 
 440.  The reasonable care standard accomplishes the legislature’s goal because elevated risks 
demand elevated care commensurate with the risk.  See supra notes 26–31, 364–65, 367–68 
(analyzing reasonable care formula). 
 441.  See supra notes 345, 349–51, 357, 365–67 (highlighting lack of flexibility when applying 
heightened standard).  
 442.  See Gomez v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 41, 53 (Cal. 2005) (Chin, J., dissenting) (disputing 
courts’ role when these type of statutes exist). 
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degree of care” standard in a way that fulfills the legislature’s intent 
because courts, litigants, and jurors all disagree about the standard’s 
meaning and effect.443 
C. Practical Pooling: Swirling a Standard of Reasonable Care with a 
Rebuttable Presumption.444 
Combining a rebuttable presumption with the reasonable care 
standard creates a clear, consistent approach that resolves traditional 
common carrier concerns about operator control and patron 
vulnerability.445  Specifically, the reasonable care standard protects 
vulnerable patrons because operators must take precaution 
commensurate with the risk of patron injury.446  In addition, the 
rebuttable presumption evens the control disparity between operators and 
patrons by requiring operators to explain the cause of water-ride 
accidents.447  Furthermore, the dynamic duo of reasonable care and the 
rebuttable presumption flushes away the problems of infinite liability and 
jury confusion that flow from the heightened standard. 
1.  Resolving Evidentiary Issues that Exist Independent of a Liability 
Standard 
In water-ride cases, the applicable liability standard is the chief 
concern for ride operators.  But the premier issue for patrons is not the 
                                                          
 443.  See supra notes 345, 349–51, 357, 365–67 (illustrating confusion over meaning of the 
heightened standard).   
 444.  This section discusses a rebuttable presumption of negligence.  This concept is distinct 
from the close-cousin concept, known as res ipsa loquitor.  However, courts frequently interchange 
the labels for these two concepts, so it is difficult to separate the doctrines based on title alone.  
Thus, this Section cites several cases discussing “res ipsa loquitor,” but, in application, those cases 
focus more on the rebuttable presumption.  For a more detailed discussion of res ipsa loquitor, see 
STUART M. SPEISER, THE NEGLIGENCE CASE: RES IPSA LOQUITUR § 1:9 (1972); and E. I. Du Pont 
De Nemours & Co. v. Cudd, 176 F.2d 855, 857–58 (10th Cir. 1949). 
 445.  See Webb, supra note 42, at 127–28 (noting that the rebuttable presumption should be on 
the better-informed party because, historically, “[t]his potential ‘information gap’ has become a 
prominent rationale for allowing evidentiary presumptions under res ipsa loquitur.  Mansfield sagely 
recognized the plaintiff’s disadvantage in unexpected accident cases, asking rhetorically, ‘What 
other evidence can the plaintiff give?’  He pointed out how the sailor had had no ability to judge 
either the soundness of a coach or the skills of its driver and consequently had been dependent on the 
expertise of the defendant and his employees.”). 
 446.  See Gerardi, supra note 276, at 184–85 (noting that reasonable care already requires 
increased precaution for more dangerous rides).  
 447.  See O’Callaghan v. Dellwood Park Co., 89 N.E. 1005, 1007 (Ill. 1909) (noting that “[i]f the 
injury of a passenger is caused by apparatus wholly under the control of a carrier and furnished and 
managed by it, and the accident is of such a character that it would not ordinarily occur if due care is 
used, the law raises a presumption of negligence.”). 
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liability standard but “the availability and adequacy of [causation] 
evidence.”448  After all, a jury never decides if an operator was negligent 
if patrons lack sufficient causation evidence to survive a motion to 
dismiss and summary judgment.449  Thus, while reasonable care is the 
appropriate liability standard, this standard must be combined with a 
rebuttable presumption in order to create an even playing field for 
operators and patrons alike. 
The rebuttable presumption is an evidentiary concept that helps 
injured plaintiffs who lack access to causation evidence.450  In nearly all 
water-ride cases, there exists a wide gap between a ride operator and an 
injured patron who knows little to nothing about ride mechanics and 
lacks access to evidence about an accident’s cause.  While a patron may 
remember crashing into a ride wall, the patron often cannot pinpoint the 
source or cause of the crash.  And where patrons are on a ride where the 
operator controls the patrons’ movement, patrons are even less likely to 
know what caused an accident.451 
On the other end of the gap is a ride operator who is usually familiar 
with a ride’s mechanics, problem areas, accident history, and—above 
all—has the best access to evidence about the cause of the accident.  
Where an operator controls patrons’ movements on a ride, the operator is 
often the only eyewitness with key details about the cause of an accident. 
To fill this causation and evidentiary gap, the rebuttable presumption 
“shifts to the [operator] the obligation to explain” the cause of the 
patron’s injury.452  But this presumption does not overburden the 
                                                          
 448.  Myrlak v. Port Auth., 723 A.2d 45, 51 (N.J. 1999). 
 449.  See id. (noting the need for a threshold evidentiary rule). 
 450.  See S. Pac. Co. v. Hogan, 13 Ariz. 34 (Ariz. 1910) (finding negligence presumed when 
train derailed).   
 451.  See Myrlak, 723 A.2d at 51 (discussing the primary evidentiary purpose of res ipsa 
loquitor); Aiken, supra note 87, at 25 (“The basic concept of res ipsa loquitur is that the result (i.e., 
injury or damage) would not occur if one with exclusive management and control of an 
instrumentality uses it properly.  It is not a principle of substantive law but of evidence” (citing 
Zukowsky v. Brown, 488 P.2d 269, 276–78 (Wash. 1971)); Kimberly Haag, Note, Res Ipsa 
Loquitur: A Step Along the Road to Liability Without Fault Do Physicians Have A Fighting Chance 
in the Face of the Modern Application of This Doctrine in Medical Malpractice Cases? A Closer 
Look at the New Fiction, 42 BRANDEIS L.J. 149, 153 (2003) (noting that “all jurisdictions agree that 
the mere happening of an accident does not justify recourse to the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.” 
(citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328D, cmt. c (1965))).  For the two traditional 
requirements that a plaintiff must satisfy to apply res ipsa loquitor, see Turk v. H. C. Prange Co., 119 
N.W.2d 365, 369 (Wis. 1963). 
 452.  Myrlak, 723 A.2d at 51; St. Louis Sw. Ry. Co. v. Parks, 76 S.W. 740, 742 (Tex. 1903) 
(pointing out the obvious example that “an injury to a passenger on a railroad resulting from a 
derailment of a train or the abnormal operation of the machinery gives rise to an inference of 
negligence”); see also Matthew R. Johnson, Note, Rolling the “Barrel” A Little Further: Allowing 
Res Ipsa Loquitur to Assist in Proving Strict Liability in Tort Manufacturing Defects, 38 WM. & 
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operator because “what is required of [the operator] is an explanation, 
not exculpation.”453  Thus, the operator does not have to disprove 
negligence to rebut the presumption.454  Instead, the operator merely 
needs to provide evidence of ride precautions and other causative factors 
so that a jury could determine if those precautions were reasonable or 
whether the accident was unforeseeable.455  After the operator provides 
sufficient causation evidence, the burden of proving negligence reverts to 
the patron.456 
The ride operator is also in the best position to provide evidence 
about the causative circumstances of the accident.457  For instance, if a 
log flume boat derails458 while plummeting “in total darkness”459 at 36 
miles per hour460 down an 85-foot-tall channel461 with roaring water 
                                                          
MARY L. REV. 1197, 1204 (1997) (Hereinafter “Matthew”) (explaining that applying res ipsa 
loquitor “creates a rebuttable presumption of negligence, and the jury must presume the conduct 
sued upon to be negligent unless the defendant puts on evidence to counter the presumption.” (citing 
Newing v. Cheatham, 540 P.2d 33, 42–43 (Cal. 1975))).  
 453.  Myrlak, 723 A.2d at 51 (quoting Buckelew v. Grossbard, 435 A.2d 1150, 1157 (N.J. 
1981)). 
 454.  Kohl v. Disneyland, Inc., 201 Cal. App. 2d 780, 782–84 (Cal. Ct. App. 1962) (noting that 
plaintiff still has the burden to show that the accident occurred, but then, the burden shifts to the 
defendant to explain that the cause-in-fact and proximate cause were not the defendant’s 
negligence).  
 455.  Myrlak, 723 A.2d at 51 (citing Buckelew, 435 A.2d at 1150); Johns Hopkins Hosp. v. 
Correia, 174 Md. App. 359, 374 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2007) (pointing out that passengers lacks 
technological expertise of machinery and appliance, as well as defects, and that lack makes the 
passenger dependent on the carrier’s proper care). 
 456.  Diaz v. L.A. Cnty. Metro. Transp. Auth., 2009 Cal. App. LEXIS 1217, at *1–4 (Cal. App. 
2d Dist. July 23, 2009) (explaining that after the defendant produces evidence that supports 
reasonable care, then the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to prove negligence with contrary 
evidence).  
 457.  See Young, supra note 92, at 265–66 (pointing to courts’ division on the following issue: 
“The carrier is expected to explain how the collision occurred because his employees have been in a 
better position than the plaintiff to have seen what happened . . . . Whether a plaintiff in such a case 
should be in a position to make out a prima facie case by showing merely the happening of the 
collision, and the relationship between himself and the defendant, is a matter of policy upon which 
the courts are not in accord.”). 
 458.  See supra note 3 and accompanying text.  
 459.  See Log Flume, TOWERSTIMES, http://old.towerstimes.co.uk/history/oldrides/logflume.htm 
(last visited Feb. 3, 2015) (“Once the longest Log Flume in the world, this ride was basically an 
aquatic rollercoaster and was based on Canadian water chutes that are used to transport logs from 
forest to riverside. There was nearly 1 kilometre of waterway winding through woodlands with three 
drops during the ride: the first was a large lift hill, but a small drop, to gain some height. The second 
drop was in total darkness and the final drop was the real drencher.”). 
 460.  Viking Revenge Flume, SEA WORLD, http://seaworld.com.au/animals-rides-and-
shows/rides/viking-revenge-flume.aspx (last visited May 8, 2015) (giving the following statistics: 
“Height13m | 41ft, Speed58km/hr | 36MPH, Length460m | 1,509f”). 
 461.  Timber Mountain Log Ride, KNOTTS BERRY FARM, https://www.knotts.com/rides/Water-
Rides-1-5-12-21/Timber-Mountain-Log-Ride (last visited May 8, 2015) (“This classic attraction, 
which opened at Knott’s Berry Farm in 1969, remains as one of the most elaborate log flume rides in 
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pumps constantly cascading 24,000 gallons of water throughout the 
ride462—it is highly unlikely that a patron’s conduct is to blame for the 
derailment of the ride’s 771 pound boat.463  And other than the rare case 
where a patron designs water rides for a living,  most patrons injured on 
a log flume lack information about the accident’s cause and have only 
the accident itself as evidence of negligence.464 
Even if the patron remembers a few key details, it is unlikely that the 
patron can put enough pieces of evidence together to accurately 
determine if the accident’s cause was a defect in the boat track, the water 
pumps, an electrical failure, a computer error, the operator’s pressing of a 
wrong button, the park’s failure to identify a broken ride component or 
even inspect the ride at all, or some unforeseeable and unpreventable “act 
of God.”465  This knowledge gap demonstrates that it is not enough for a 
patron to have evidence that an accident occurred—the patron also 
needs, but often cannot obtain, proof that the accident was caused by a 
                                                          
the U.S. The much anticipated attraction opened in July 11, 1969 with screen legend John Wayne 
taking the inaugural ride”). 
 462.  Timber Mountain Log Ride Will Undergo Major Renovation, KNOTTS BERRY FARM, 
https://www.knotts.com/boardwalk/media-center/log-ride-press-kit (last visited May 8, 2015) (“The 
Calico Log Ride, as it was originally named, takes guests through an 85-foot-high by 330-foot-long 
mountain range themed to a nineteenth-century lumber camp. The ride, housed in an eight-story 
building, includes 24,000 gallons of water that circulates free floating logs past a variety of 
mechanical figures and taxidermied animals culminating in a 38 foot fall.”). 
 463.  Physics Day at Busch Gardens, LOG FLUME: ADVANCED 80 (May 19, 2013), 
http://sphsdevilphysics.weebly.com/uploads/5/0/7/1/5071691/_ib_physics_day_guide.pdf (showing 
that the mass of the log in one log flume was 350 kilograms); But see Pete Cavender, So Fat He 
Sank the Log Flume, FORZA BLOG (Oct. 3, 2013), http://www.forzasupplements.co.uk/blog/news/so-
fat-he-sank-the-log-flume/#.UvLx0mSwJDE (“The boat went up a ramp, before speeding downhill 
with a big splash. We were absolutely soaked!  But as we neared the end of the ride, the boat came 
to a sudden halt.  ‘What’s happening?’ I mused.  Seconds later, another boat smashed into the back 
of us.  ‘I think we are stuck,’ I mumbled.  After a minute, there were even more boats piling up 
behind us. I knew exactly why. . .Waiting at the end of the ride, I could see the girls were giggling, 
but I was mortified.  I was weighing down our boat so much it couldn’t move through the shallow 
water!  Unsure what to do, I grabbed the wall and the side of the ride and used my hands to push our 
boat away from the pile-up.  ‘Talk about a splash landing[]’”). 
 464.  See Johnson, supra note 93, at 262 (surveying early negligence cases and noting that 
“wrongly injured plaintiffs had no way to recover if the evidence establishing the injury was solely 
in the hands of the defendant.” (citing Ronald J. Allen, Burdens of Proof, Uncertainty, and 
Ambiguity in Modern Legal Discourse, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 627, 632 (1994))).   
 465.  Id. at 262 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 328D cmt. c (1965)) (noting the 
increased importance for res ipsa loquitor with injuries from modern machinery because of increased 
complexity and ease of misuse by operators); Bibeau v. Fred W. Pearce Corp., 217 N.W. 374, 376 
(Minn. 1928) (arguing, in a roller coaster case, that “new and credulous patrons seeking thrills on a 
roller coaster of the character of this one are subjected to much greater danger than is generally 
realized.”); O’Callaghan v. Dellwood Park Co., 89 N.E. 1005, 1006–07 (Ill. 1909) (pointing to 
danger of thrill ride to justify heightened care). 
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specific act or omission of an identifiable, culpable, and negligent 
operator.466 
In comparison, the ride operator likely has access to an ocean of 
evidence about the circumstances that contributed to this hypothetical log 
flume accident.  This access stems from the operator’s control over the 
ride instrumentalities and specialized knowledge about the particular 
ride, which places the operator in the best position to obtain evidence and 
explain the likely cause of the patron’s injury.467  And, perhaps the most 
important information, the ride operator can place the pieces of evidence 
in chronological order because, unlike the patrons who are caught up in 
the ride’s thrills and sensations, the operator often is relaxed and has a 
big-picture view of the events leading up to the accident.468  In fact, 
operators are frequently eyewitnesses to the accident and are thus in the 
best position to explain the cause.469 
In addition to being at the scene of the accident, ride operators have 
easy access to employees and contractors who may have inspected, 
repaired, maintained, or tested the ride.  Any one of those individuals 
may know about unique problems or concerns with a ride component—
risks that are unknown to patrons.470  Likewise, operators have 
specialized knowledge about the ride’s technological features.471  
                                                          
 466.  See Benedick v. Potts, 40 A. 1067, 1068–69 (Md. 1898) (holding res ipsa loquitor did not 
apply where the railway car passenger was found unconscious, on the side of the tracks, and unable 
to recall the cause of his injury after the train went through a tunnel); see also Fisk v. Chi. Water 
Chute Co., 119 Ill. App. 536, 541 (1905) (declaring that plaintiff alleging negligent operation of a 
boat ride had the burden to provide specific evidence of negligence and could not apply res ipsa 
loquitor); Akhter v. Schlitterbahn Beach Resort Mgmt., L.L.C., No. 03-13-00117-CV, 2013 WL 
4516130, at *6 (Tex. App. Aug. 22, 2013) (finding that an injured water-ride patron had “no more 
than a scintilla of evidence—if any evidence—that this event was attributable to any acts or 
omissions by water park personnel. . . . Mere proof that [a patron] was injured at a [] water park is 
not proof of proximate cause.”); Johnson, supra note 93, at 262 (explaining that plaintiffs cannot 
recover if all the causation evidence is in the hands of the defendant). 
 467.  Rivere v. Thunderbird, Inc., 353 So. 2d 346, 348 (La. Ct. App. 1977) (involving an injury 
where “the defendant had control over three factors which the trial judge touched upon in his oral 
reasons, to-wit: (1) the slide itself, (2) the water, and (3) the notice to patrons.”).  
 468.  See Young, supra note 92, at 265–66  (explaining the knowledge gap between patrons and 
operators). 
 469.  See id. (noting that res ipsa loquitor helps injured patrons “where it would be difficult for 
him to know definitely what the carrier’s employees had failed to do or to discover what they had 
done improperly. . . . The carrier is expected to explain how the collision occur[]ed because his 
employees have been in a better position than the plaintiff to have seen what happened.”).  
 470.  See Bibeau, 217 N.W. at 376 (finding that patrons do not understand the scope of ride 
dangers).   
 471.  Johns Hopkins Hosp. v. Correia, 921 A.2d 837, 846 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2007) (noting 
patrons’ dependence on the ride operator). 
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Consequently, operators can quickly determine whether the use or 
misuse of a ride component or complex mechanical device is to blame.472 
What is more, the operator may be the only individual to inspect the 
ride because nearly one-third of thrill rides “are never inspected by any 
public official.”473  In short, ride operators should have little trouble with 
producing sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption. 
2.  The Synergistic Relationship Between Reasonable Care and a 
Rebuttable Presumption 
Despite the operator’s well of information, there will still be cases 
where the cause of the accident is unclear.  That being so, a deep dive 
through courts’ water-ride jurisprudence revealed no cases where an 
operator was both presumed negligent and also failed to identify some 
other cause of an accident.  Given that the rebuttable presumption does 
not require operators to definitively prove the cause of the accident, there 
is little need for operators to worry about being unable to rebut the 
presumed negligence.474 The presumption is less about proving 
reasonable care, and much more about digging through several potential 
causes for the patron’s injury—including evidence of the patron’s 
conduct on the ride or a ride component that may or may not be 
defective.475  And if the ride operator does struggle to identify potential 
causes of an accident, then patrons would certainly be in a far worse 
position in trying to locate clues and assemble a causation theory.  In 
those difficult cases, it may take patrons so long to piece together the 
accident that the statute of limitations expires.476 
Additionally, where an operator points to, for example, a design 
defect as the cause, the presumption extends to the designer as well.477  
                                                          
 472.  See Johnson, supra note 93, at 283 (1996) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 
328D cmt. c (1965)) (providing that specialized dangers require specialized knowledge). 
 473.  Mulrine, supra note 189, at 59.  
 474.  See Norman v. Thomas Emery’s Sons, Inc., 218 N.E.2d 480, 482 (Ohio Ct. App. 1966) 
(connecting a presumption of negligence with a contributory negligence defense). 
 475.  Hipps v. Busch Entm’t Corp., No. Civ. A. 97-1907, 1997 WL 535181, at *4–5 (E.D. Pa. 
July 31, 1997) (explaining that res ipsa loquitor is not a substantive law, but a rule of evidence.  
“Accordingly, the plaintiff need not prove that the defendant had exclusive management or control 
of the injury producing instrument. . . . ‘[T]he critical inquiry is not control but whether a particular 
defendant is the responsible cause of the injury.’” (quoting Gilbert v. Korvette, 327 A.2d 94, 101 
(Pa. 1974))). 
 476.  Id. 
 477.  Fowee v. Paramount Parks, Inc., No. CA98-09-116, 1999 WL 138694, at *2 (Ohio Ct. 
App. Mar. 15, 1999) (involving a plaintiff whose only evidence of a design defect was his injury, but 
the plaintiff lacked any evidence showing fault). 
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So, a patron is not punished by the ride operator’s inability to determine 
what caused the ride to malfunction.478  As a result, notwithstanding 
today’s extensive discovery methods, the rebuttable presumption still 
achieves the goal “at the heart of modern litigation theory” by 
incentivizing parties with superior knowledge to fully produce accurate 
information.479 
When a case centers on the patron’s conduct, the operator can still 
rebut the presumption of negligence with evidence of the operator’s 
reasonable precautions, such as safety reports, inspection logs, or 
warning signs.  Then, courts can balance the operator’s precautions with 
inherent water-ride risks.  For instance, in Valentin v. Six Flags, a slide 
operator argued that the patron should have recognized the park’s 
slippery surfaces, which were an inherent part of the water park.480  
Then, as evidence of reasonable care, the operator provided the ride’s 
inspection instructions.481  But the operator had not actually performed 
any inspections, which is why the operator failed to discover that the 
slide’s steps were slick and unstable due to an extensive mildew 
accumulation that was growing underneath the slide’s platform.482  In 
that case, it was unreasonable for the operator to abstain from inspecting 
the ride for so long that a hidden heap of mildew covered the slide steps 
and created a hazard for patrons.483 
However, in Desai v. Silver Dollar City, the operator rebutted the 
presumption of negligence by producing posted signs and loudspeaker 
warnings—that the patron admitted to reading and hearing—instructing 
patrons to stay inside the raft during the ride.484  The burden shifted to 
                                                          
 478.  Id. 
 479.  See Johnson, supra note 93, at n.10 (“The rule persists in these post-discovery days because 
of its added incentive to the full production of information, which is at the heart of modern litigation 
theory.” (quoting Ronald J. Allen, Burdens of Proof, Uncertainty, and Ambiguity in Modern Legal 
Discourse, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 627, 628 (1994))).  
 480.  Valentin v. Six Flags Over Ga., L.P., 649 S.E.2d 809, 812–13 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007) (internal 
citations omitted) (rejecting the park owners argument because there was only evidence that cleaning 
procedures existed, but not that they were followed.  As the court explained, “evidence that the 
hazard was a mildew substance allows for an inference that the hazard was permitted to exist in the 
area for an unreasonable period without being remedied, and therefore, creates a genuine issue of 
material fact over whether the alleged inspection was adequate. . . . Under these circumstances, 
whether the hazard was discoverable upon a reasonable inspection is an issue necessitating jury 
resolution.”). 
 481.  Id. 
 482.  Id. 
 483.  See id. at 811–13 (noting that the mildew had accumulated to such an extent that it was 
reasonable to infer either notice of the problem or a lack of reasonable care in maintaining the steps). 
 484.  Desai v. Silver Dollar City, Inc., 493 S.E.2d 540, 545 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997) (noting that 
there was no negligence when a woman, who had ridden a raft ride before and was again instructed 
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the patron, a physics major, who was injured after disobeying the 
warnings, jumping out of the raft, and being hit by an oncoming raft.485  
While the patron alleged that the operator was negligent by sending the 
raft down too quickly,486 the court found for the operator.  The court 
explained that the patron assumed the risk of being hit by the raft by 
choosing to disregard the operator’s warnings and jump out of her own 
raft.487 
Both Valentin and Desai illustrate that the rebuttable presumption 
resolves the evidentiary concerns for patrons, and the reasonable care 
standard resolves the infinite liability concern for ride operators by 
balancing unique ride risks with appropriate caution.488  This flexible, 
balanced, and information-generating approach is essential to cope with 
the infinite variety of fact-sensitive water-ride cases.  And with modern 
parks selling “tickets to a wide range of people[,] including those who 
may be unable to foresee, understand or comply with what is expected of 
them,”489 this flexible reasonability-presumption combo will only 
increase in effectiveness. 
3.  A Default Rule 
Finally, courts should apply the rebuttable presumption as a default 
rule in water-ride cases.  While courts have different requirements for 
                                                          
not to leave the raft, jumped and was hit by another raft.  As the court explained, “she voluntarily 
assumed came to pass. In effect, even though she was warned do not do this or you might get hurt, 
Mrs. Desai tested the danger until she was hurt. It defies both logic and our law to permit a recovery 
under this evidence.  Further, although the dissent discusses many possible acts of negligence 
whether active or passive, e.g., failure to communicate between the top and bottom of the slide, 
lifeguards not immediately present, etc., the obvious fact remains that none of these acts would have 
resulted in Mrs. Desai’s injury if she had remained in the raft as she was instructed.”). 
 485.  See id. at 543, 546.  
 486.  See id. at 546 (Eldridge, J., dissenting).  
 487.  Id. at 545.  
 488.  Marley v. Silver Dollar City, Inc., 400 S.E.2d 337, 337 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990) (applying the 
assumption of risk defense to a patron who fell off a slide because, under Georgia law, “‘A person 
who rides or uses an amusement device assumes the hazards naturally and obviously arising from 
the proper use and operation of the device, such as the hazards inherent in the operation of a 
miniature car or scooter, if it is properly designed, constructed, and maintained’ . . . We conclude 
that the risk of landing upside down after being propelled downward by the force of gravity and flow 
of water was a normal hazard of the ‘Bonzai Pipeline’”(quoting Atlanta Funtown v. Crouch, 152 
S.E.2d 583, 590 (Ga. Ct. App. 1966))).  Compare Kahalili v. Rosecliff Realty, Inc., 141 A.2d 301, 
306–07 (N.J. 1958) (applying res ipsa lquitor and reasonable care standard where plaintiff fell out of 
a roller coaster), with Gomez v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 41, 47–48 (Cal. 2005) (applying 
heightened standard of care to an amusement park based personal injury suit).  
 489.  Avery & Dickson, supra note 10, at 305 (noting that “ride owner/operators agree to sell 
tickets to a wide range of people including those who may be unable to foresee, understand or 
comply with what is expected of them.”). 
860 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63 
applying the presumption,490 the requirements still center around the 
requirement for patrons to show that the “injury does not normally occur 
without negligence caused by an instrumentality under the defendant’s 
exclusive control.”491  The inconsistent application of the heightened 
standard is proof that each ride offers patrons and operators a different 
degree of “control.”  Trying to categorize rides into ‘enough-control’ and 
‘not-enough-control’ buckets for applying the presumption is a futile 
endeavor.  That said, the rebuttable presumption might be inappropriate 
for swimming pools because patrons neither “ride” a swimming pool, nor 
do operators control patrons’ movements.  Nevertheless, that line may be 
arbitrary because several waterpark pools employ flotation devices or 
boats, wave-generating equipment, and other mechanical devices like 
spray cannons and water jets; all features that can affect patrons’ control 
or present risks about which operators have superior knowledge.  Hence, 
courts should rarely, if ever, refrain from applying the rebuttable 
presumption to water-ride cases.  By so doing, courts diminish concerns 
about clarity and create a clear, uniform treatment for water-ride cases.492 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Combining a reasonable care standard with a rebuttable presumption 
provides a win-win solution for courts, patrons, and ride operators.  The 
reasonable care standard creates consistency and protects operators from 
infinite liability.  The rebuttable presumption produces otherwise-
obscured causation evidence and thereby protects injured patrons.  Water 
rides are too diverse for the current web of common carrier liability 
                                                          
 490.  See Alan H. Konig, Tort Law–Res Ipsa Loquitur in Medical Malpractice Actions: Mireles 
v. Broderick, 23 N.M. L. REV. 411, 412–13 (1993) (“The doctrine [of res ipsa loquitur] has now been 
accepted and applied in all jurisdictions.” (citing W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON 
ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 39 (5th ed. 1984))); Johnson, supra note 452, at 1202 (noting that “almost 
every state has embraced [] res ipsa loquitor.”  This may be difficult to trace because several courts 
mix up the rebuttable presumption with res ipsa.  But the concepts share a similar basic premise with 
which courts are likely to be familiar (citing 1 STUART M. SPEISER, THE NEGLIGENCE CASE: RES 
IPSA LOQUITUR § 6:38 (1972))); Young, supra note 92, 265–66 (explaining that while most courts 
have adopted some type of res ipsa loquitor doctrine, courts are divided on what a plaintiff must 
show to receive the inference, such as requiring something more than just evidence that an accident 
occurred).   
 491.  See Haag, supra note 451, at 166, 153 (noting that “all jurisdictions agree that the mere 
happening of an accident does not justify recourse to the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.” (citing 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328D cmt. c (1965))).  
 492.  See id. at 159–60 (citing FOWLER V. HARPER ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 19.11 (2d ed. 
1986)) (noting that the current confusion over the res ipsa loquitor doctrine, on behalf of both courts 
and jurors, “may increase a defendant’s chance of being subject to a misguided decision.”  Of 
course, the rebuttable presumption is distinct from res ipsa loquitor.  But the point remains that it is 
confusion about the doctrine—not the doctrine itself—that may create problems for a defendant). 
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standards to be effective.  The flexibility from combining reasonable care 
with a rebuttable presumption is a powerful tool that benefits patrons and 
ride operators alike—ensuring smooth sailing for the foreseeable future. 
 
 
 
 
